fanatical followers, some of whom, they claimed, were not even NU members but rather students and NGO activists.13 External interference was a particular source of apprehension and resentment. Some 1500 troops were deployed around Cipasung with more than one hundred intelligence and security officers stationed at the congress site. Some of these officers were posted full time to various provincial delegations to monitor and 'assist' with their deliberations. Coordinating operations was the head of the Internal Affairs Department's Political Section, Gendon Mulyono who had played a similar role at the PDI and PPP congresses.14 His involvement added to fears that the NU congress may experience the same disruption as befell PDI's Medan congress in 1993. Media coverage was another source of antagonism. The Abdurrahman Wahid camp, in particular, complained of biased reporting. One of the most notable examples was the ICMI newspaper, Republika, which misquoted the noted Japanese anthropologist Mitsuo Nakamura and a senior NU figure from East Java as urging Ahdurrahman's withdrawal when recordings revealed they had praised his leadership and spoken positively of his renomination.15 Its refusal to publish a correction or retraction until after congress had finished added to suspicions of an ICMI campaign to undermine the existing NU leadership. On several occasions groups of angry young Abdurrahman supporters confronted Republika journalists accusing them of printing lies and slander. The coverage by Gatra, Sinar, Pelita and RCTI (the television network owned by the president's son, Bambang Trihatmodjo) was also attacked as tendentious. The earnest mood of the congress was reflected in the speeches of Abdurrahman, who as chairman was the only one of the candidates to address a plenary session. Normally a colourful and witty speaker, his two main speeches were notably subdued. Little reference was made to broader political or social issues, the focus instead being upon administrative and organisational matters. After so much criticism of his policies and managerial style, he seemed determined to demonstrate that he had neither neglected nor mishandled his responsibilities as chairman. By the time of the election, on the evening of the fourth day, only Abdurrahman Wahid and Abu Hasan remained as serious candidates for the chairmanship. Support for Chalid Mawardi had slumped 16 and Fahmi Saifuddin had withdrawn his nomination several hours beforehand and returned to Jakarta. Fahmi's decision came after a delegation of senior NU leaders and kiai expressed fears of a split in the organisation and appealed to him not to stand.17 With Fahmi's departure and Chalid's faltering campaign the ABG forces now threw their combined weight behind Abu Hasan. The contest for the position of rais am attracted less publicity but was also of considerable importance to the future direction of NU. The incumbent rais ant, Kiai Ilyas had been elected as a compromise candidate at the 1992 Munas (National Conference) in Lampung.18 A cautious and reserved ulama (religious scholar) he remained aloof from much of NU's internal politics. His performance as president was widely regarded as lacklustre but even-handed. Although his renomination attracted less than enthusiastic support, his good relations with the government and ability to work with the various factions within NU made him the front-runner. He also enjoyed the advantage of being host of the congress. His main rival was the wakil rais am (deputy president) KH Sahal Mahfudh, a younger ulama from Kajen, Central Java. His involvement in social development projects and educational reform have made him a popular figure amongst pro-khittah groups within NU. His candidature enjoyed strong backing from Abdurrahman as well as branches in Central and East Java. The election proceedings began with a dispute about the number of accredited votes. According to the calculations of the congress committee there should have been 280 vote-casting delegates. An additional 36 delegates, however, claimed that they too were eligible to vote but had been excluded due to administrative problems. A subsequent motion to accord these delegates voting rights was passed by acclamation. The validity of these extra 36 votes would later be disputed by Abu Hasan. There were three leadership positions to be decided: rais am, wakil rais am and chairman. The ballot for each would be in two stages, nomination then election. Only candidates receiving forty or more nominating votes would be eligible for election. The newly elected rais am and wakil rais am also held the right to veto any candidate for chairman. In the first ballot Kiai Ilyas Ruhiat gained 205 votes to Kiai Sahal Mahfudh 101.19 Kiai Sahal then withdrew his nomination and offered himself as wakil rais am. A motion that the two be declared elected without further ballot was passed on the voices. The cancellation of the election for deputy president angered Abu Hasan's supporters who had intended to nominate KH Syukron Makmun for the position. If successful, Kiai Syukron planned to veto Abdurrahman's candidature.20 The nomination stage of the chairmanship election proved far closer than most observers had anticipated, with Abdurrahman Wahid receiving 157 votes, Abu Hasan 136, Fahmi Saifuddin 17, and Chalid Mawardi six. This brought Abu Hasan within striking distance of Abdurrahman. With Chalid's six votes almost certainly going to Abu the chairmanship would be decided by the 17 delegates who had cast their votes for Fahmi. The possibility of defeat shocked many in Abdurrahman Wahid's camp. They had estimated their support to be about 65 per cent of the vote but instead received just under 50 per cent. Some muttered bitterly about the tactics of their rivals and contemplated the likely consequences of an Abu Hasan victory. Several kiai who were close to the NU chairman fought back tears and quietly prayed. During the ensuing election ballot each vote for Abdurrahman Wahid brought cheers of approval from his tense supporters; votes for Abu were met with silence. When the count concluded at 3 a.m., Abdurrahman Wahid had gained 174 votes or fifty- five per cent to Abu's 142. The high-spirited celebrations which continued till dawn prayers reflected the relief within the Abdurrahman camp. Abdurrahman would later describe his re-election as a 'victory over money, slander and intimidation'. Whilst this was true in part, there are a number of other factors which also contributed to Abu Hasan's strong showing. His support amongst NU's Outer Island delegates was critical. These delegates have a disproportionately large share of congress votes due to the fact that two-thirds of NU branches are outside Java, even though they represent only forty per cent of the organisation's total membership.21 These branches have traditionally resented Javanese domination of NU, a fact exacerbated in recent years by the scarcity of Outer Islanders among Abdurrahman Wahid's leadership group and the infrequency of his visits to areas outside Java. Outer Island branches also have a far higher percentage of civil servants within their leadership than branches on Java and are hence more susceptible to government influence. Abu's plans for a more pro-government, economically-orientated leadership also succeeded in attracting support from NU businessmen and younger, career-minded members. Finally, he won backing from the sizeable group of older Javanese leaders who had fallen out with Abdurrahman Wahid. These included Abdurrahman's uncles, Jusuf Hasjim and KH Shohib Bisri, and former allies, KH Attabik Ali and KH Imron Hamzah. Aftermath The close of the congress did not bring an end to the battle between Abdurrahman Wahid and his opponents. A five-member committee comprising Ilyas Ruhiaf Sahal Mahfudh, an Abu Hasan representative, and Abdurrahman and one of his supporters was appointed by the congress to determine the composition of the new NU board. Abu argued that he and his supporters were entitled to 45 per cent of the positions on the board based on the percentage of the vote they received in the election. He also demanded the position of deputy chairman for himself.22 Abdurrahman flatly refused these demands contending that Abu and his supporters would merely use their positions to destabilise NU in the same way that hostile appointees to the PDI board had created havoc for Megawati's leadership. He furthermore reportedly alleged that Abu was unfit to hold office in NU as he had received a secret Rp36 billion (US$18 million) commission for a development project at the Tanjunp Priok port.23 When the new NU board was announced in mid- December most of Abdurrahman's opponents had been removed or shifted to relatively powerless positions.24 Abu Hasan's response was to form, in late December, a rival NU board known as KPPNU (Koordinasi Pengurus Pusat NU or NU Central Coordinating Executive), which he claimed had support from 22 of NU's 2G provincial boards.25 Abu's primary objective was to Force an extraordinary NU congress (muktamar luar biasa or MLB) at which new elections could be held. The KPPNU contained many prominent figures from the Cipete group, including Idham Chalid, KH Ali Yafie and Syukron Makmun.26 Its credibility was soon tarnished, however, when at least nine of its putative members announced that they had not been consulted about joining the board and were unwilling to participate. Some of the statements of regional support were also shown not to have local board approval.27 Little was heard of KPPNU for the remainder of 1995. Abu also launched defamation proceedings against Abdurrahman in January over his allegations regarding the Tanjung Priok commission.28 Abu's actions in establishing a rival board and suing the NU chairman are without precedent in the organisation's history. For much of 1995 the focus of the anti-Abdurrahman campaign shifted to a group of senior East Java kiai led by Jusuf Hasjim and Shohib Bisri. Jusuf was especially prominent. From late January he began a series of 'safaris' to NU branches in Java and Sumatra, and also blitzed the media with interviews highly critical of his nephew.29 Shohib used his position as chairman of a major pesantren association to marshal support for an extraordinary congress.30 In addition to this, Jusuf and Shohib established the Forum Putra-Putri Pendiri NU (Forum for the Sons and Daughters of NU Founders) or FPPPNU in September 1995 as a vehicle for anti-Abdurrahman activity as well as to enhance their own claims as heirs to the NU leadership.31 In mobilising support for an extraordinary congress, these kiai had two potent weapons. The first was Abdurrahman's continuing disfavour with the president. Following the congress, Soeharto refused to grant an audience to the new NU board because of Abdurrahman's remarks in A Nation in Waiting.32 Such meetings are customary following the congresses of major organisations and signify presidential sanction of the newly- elected leaders. The anti-Abdurrahman forces claimed that NU was being punished for its chairman's rashness and asserted that relations with the government would not improve until Abdurrahman had been removed. The second factor was the generous patronage from ABG elements within the government and military. Hartono, who had been promoted to army chief- of-staff in early 1995, visited pesantren regularly, dispensing financial and material support to key Abdurrahman opponents. Feisal Tanjung, Habibie and Siti Hardiyanti have also recently channelled funds and resources to the anti-Abdurrahman forces.33 The availability of such patronage served as a powerful inducement to kiai who might previously have been reluctant to oppose openly the NU chairman. Despite their resources, Abdurrahman's opponents faced a difficult task in achieving an MLB. Such a congress can only be convened with the support of a two-thirds majority of NU branches and the approval of the Syuriah. Throughout 1995 Kiai Ilyas and the Syuriah had firmly rejected proposals for an MLB. There also appeared to be far less than the required 200-odd branches in favour of an extraordinary congress. The anti- Abdurrahman forces had also to contend with a strong backlash from supporters of the NU board. Jusuf Hasjim and Shohib Bisri were condemned for using unfair and divisive tactics, rival meetings were organised to coincide with pro-MLB meetings, and there were unsuccessful attempts in late 1995 to expel Jusuf from the organisation.34 Conclusion The events of 1994-95 have left Nahdlatul Ulama more polarised than at any time since the early 1980s, with considerable energy and resources being expended in waging this internal battle for control of the organisation. The new NU board, though more cohesive than its two predecessors, has been hampered by the reluctance of branches opposed to Abdurrahman Wahid to acknowledge its authority and cooperate in implementing programmes. The struggle between pro- and anti-Abdurrahman groups has also spread to the organisation's divisions and affiliated bodies such as the young men's wing, Ansor, the education institute, Ma'arif, the student's association, IPNU, and Muslimat NU. The depth of this dispute reflects not only the bitter political and personal disputes within NU but also an unprecedented level of government interference. Although a shrewd and well- organised candidate, Abu Hasan would not have come so close to victory at the congress without the government's offensive against Abdurrahman. Similarly, the Jusuf Hasjim-Shohib Bisri campaign for an extraordinary congress benefited greatly from government and military assistance. In encouraging these opponents of Abdurrahman, the government has made clear its determination to remove the NU chairman or at the very least intimidate him into assuming a less critical stance. By re-electing Abdurrahman Wahid and continuing to support his chairmanship, NU has again demonstrated a sense of independence rare for a major social organisation in Soeharto's Indonesia. Such independence runs against a recent strong tide of Muslim cooptation by the government, of which ICMI is a prime example. The critical question for NU is how will it respond to the approaching period of political uncertainty. In previous crises in Indonesian politics, such as the transition to Guided Democracy (1957-60) and the emergence and consolidation of the New Order (1965-71), NU has had within its ranks both conservative elements willing to accommodate and support the political status quo and reformist elements intent upon promoting a more liberal and democratic vision of Indonesian society. At the present time, the forces of reform appear ascendant. The extent to which they will be able to pursue their agenda depends on the preparedness of the organisation as a whole to confront risk and uncertainty. ************** 13 Many older kiai bemoaned what they saw as the declining standard of behaviour amongst younger congress participants. They noted the large number of 'long-haired, unruly youths' who were given to 'emotional outbursts' such as cheering and yelling. They contrasted such behaviour with the traditional pesantren values of humility, respectfulness and calm self-discipline. 14 Forum Keadilan, 22 December 1994, p. 105. 15 Republika, 2 December 1994. 16 There were various reasons for Chalid's declining fortunes. As the archetypal NU career politician, he was an unattractive candidate to those opposed to a more directly political role for the organisation. Many delegates also queried his steadfastness. His sudden shift to Golkar prior to the 1992 election campaign alienated many PPP supporters within NU and his decision not to oppose Saturday public holidays during the MPR (People's Deliberative Council) debates had also drawn criticism from ulama. (See Forum Keadilan, 8 December 1994, p. 15). Lastly, he was accused of smear tactics for publicly asserting that Abdurrahman neglected to pray regularly. A measure of his unpopularity came on the second day of the congress. When introduced to the plenary session he was greeted with loud booing--a highly unusual occurrence at an NU gathering. 17 The delegation included Abdurrahman Wahid, KH Sahal Mahfudh and KH Moenasir, the chairman of the congress organising committee. Fahmi's bitterness at the events surrounding his withdrawal was apparent from his subsequent letter of resignation from the NU board. He likened the atmosphere at Cipasung to that of a political party conference and expressed distaste at the extent of outside interference in the congress. More pointedly, he noted that he had little choice but to accede to the advice of senior kiai that he withdraw. Kompas, 15 December 1994; and Forum Keadilan, 5 January 1995, p.ll and p.14. 18 Kiai Ilyas's nomination at the Lampung Munas emerged only after the Syuriah had become deadlocked over whether KH Jusuf Hasjim or KH Sahal Mahfudh should be installed as interim rais am. As a respected senior ulama with a reputation for political neutrality, he was seen as a rais am who could ease the tensions within NU after a particularly divisive preceding twelve months. 19 The other two nominees for rais am, KH Abdullah Abbas and Idham Chalid, received a mere seven votes. 20 Forum Keadilan, 5 January 1995, p. 11. 21 Abdurrahman later claimed that about 80% of the 101 branches in Java voted for him whereas he had the support of only 42% of the 215 Outer Island branches. Tiras, 29 June 1995. 22 Abu cited, with some justification, the NU tradition of appointing as deputy chairman the candidate who obtained the second largest number of votes. 23 The report of Abdurrahman's allegations came from Abu Hasan's representative on the committee, Tengku Abdul Aziz. Abdurrahman refused to confirm or deny the report. Forum Keadilan, 5 January 1995, p. 11; and Gatra, 7 January 1995, p. 25, and 28 January 1995, p. 70. 24 A full list of the new NU board's membership is given in Kompas, 14December 1994. Abdurrahman succeeded in having several of his most trusted lieutenants appointed to key positions on the board. These included Rozy Munir and Mustofa Zuhad as deputy chairmen and Achmad Bagdja and Arifin Junaidi as secretary-general and deputy secretary-general respectively. Several of those named in the new board refused to take up their appointments. Among them were Fahmi Saifuddin (who had been appointed first deputy chairman), Jusuf Hasjim, Usman Abidin and Syukron Makmun. Gatra, 18 February 1995, p. 37. 25 Kompas, 31 December 1994; and Forum Keadilan, 5 January 1995, p.10. 26 Other prominent names listed in the KPPNU membership included the popular preacher, Zainuddin M. Z., Jusuf Hasjim, KH Abdullah Abbas, KI-I Anwar Musaddad, KH Nur Muhammad Iskandar, KH Maimun Zuber, Asmawi Manaf and KH Usman Abidin. For a complete membership list, see Kompas, 28 December 1994. Interestingly, Chalid Mawardi was not included. Several weeks after the congress he was installed as general chairman of Golkar's Islamic Missionary Council (Majlis Dakwah Islamiyah). Gatra, 21 January 1995, pp. 36-37. 27 Among those to later declare that they would not serve on the new board were Jusuf Hasjim, Anwar Musaddad, Nur Muhammad Iskandar, Zainuddin M. Z. and KH Abdullah Abbas. See Kompas, 29 and 31 December 1994; Gatra, 7 January 1995, p. 22; and Forum Keadilan, 19 January 1995, p. 17. 28 Forum Keadilan, 5 January 1995, p. 11, and 8 June 1995, pp. 24-5; Gatra, 7 January 1995, p. 25, and 21 January 1995, p. 36; and Tiras, 9February 1995, p. 65. Initially, Abu also threatened to sue the congress organising committee for accepting the additional 36 votes but he later abandoned this action. 29 See Forum Keadilan, 19 January 1995, pp. 93-7; Gatra, 21 January 1995, pp. 33-4, and 28 January 1995, p. 72. 30 Shohib was chairman of the Forum Komunikasi Pengasuh Pondok Pesantren (Pesantren Leaders' Communication Forum). 31 Forum Keadilan, 25 September 1995, p. 22 and 20 November 1995, p.22. The other leading member of the FPPPNU was Hasib Wahab, the previously low-profile son of NU's second rais am, KH Wahab Chasbullah. 32 The President had, on several occasions since the NU congress, met Ilyas Ruhiat, Sahal Mahfudh and other senior NU leaders, thereby leaving little doubt that his objection was to Abdurrahman, rather than the NU board. 33 For example, KH Badri Masduki, an outspoken critic of Abdurrahman, was reported to have received Rp70 million from Hartono, Feisal Tanjung arranged funding for Jusuf Hasjim's safaris, and Siti Hardiyanti also made Rp 5 billion available for distribution to selected pesantren through the Forum Komunikasi Pengasuh Pondok Pesantren. Tiras, 9 February 1995, pp 65-6; Media Indonesia Minggu, 23 September 1995; and Forum Keadilan, 25 September 1995, p. 22. 34 Tiras, 9 February 1995, p. 95; and Kompas, 6 and 14 November 1995.