Chapter Ten The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid, Suksesi and the Battle for Control of NU (1 Greg Fealy The 29th Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Congress held in early December 1994 in Cipasung, West Java, was one of the most controversial in the organisation's 69-year history. It was surrounded by allegations of vote-buying, procedural irregularities, slander, biased media reporting and external interference from NGO activists and sections of the government. It also saw the most serious challenge yet to the leadership of NU's outspoken chairman-general (ketua umum), Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known by the sobriquet, 'Gus Dur'). Although re-elected by a narrow margin, the validity of his victory was disputed and the new NU board presented with continuing demands for an extraordinary congress to resolve the conflict within Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation. The depth of the controversy reflected a widespread perception that the next five years would be a critical period for the organisation and its role in national affairs. With an estimated 35 million members (i.e., almost 20 per cent of the population), the leadership and policies of NU have implications far beyond the organisation. Two related issues dominated the congress: the debate over the implementation of NU's khittah (charter), especially as it related to political activity; and the election of chairman-general of the Tanfidziah (Central Executive Board). Ten years earlier NU had 'restored' the khittah 1926-that is, the ideals of religious and social activity set out by the organisation's founding fathers in 1926-as its guiding principles. A central element of the return to the khittah was that NU would no longer participate as an organisation in formal party politics and would instead concentrate upon educational, religious, social welfare and community development activities. As part of this process, it withdrew from the Islamic party, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party), with which it had been obliged to merge in 1973. Individual members were free to continue their involvement in practical politics but could not simultaneously hold office in both NU and a political party. There remained considerable dispute within NU, however, about the degree to which it and its leaders could participate in broader political issues or cooperate with the government and other political forces. The need to clarify NU's political role at the Cipasung congress was largely a response to the growing uncertainty over the presidential succession (or suksesi, as it is popularly known) and the future of the New Order regime. Soeharto has been president and the defining figure in the New Order since 1967. At 73, he was now in the twilight of his career. This prompted intense speculation and debate about how long he should remain as president, who would replace him, and the nature of the transition to a post-Soeharto political system. There was a widespread belief that the New Order, in its present form, would not survive his departure. Since the early 1990s there had been intense manoeuvring within Indonesian politics to secure control or influence over the presidential succession and transition to a new political system. NU, as with many other social and religious organisations, had come under extreme pressure from competing political forces to declare its position on the suksesi issue. Opinion on how best to respond fell into three broad categories: that NU should maintain strict political neutrality and refuse to take sides in the issue; that it should take a conservative approach by supporting Soeharto and the political status quo; or that it should pursue a reformist line, using its influence to create a more democratic and just society. The khittah and politics issue was inextricably linked to the election of the NU chairman. At the centre of that battle was Abdurrahman Wahid. Despite having long declared that he would step down at this congress, he announced in mid-November that he would stand for a third five-year term as chairman.2 His renomination polarised NU's membership, the government and a variety of other political interests into two broad forces: those supporting the incumbent chairman and those who opposed him. The latter were collectively referred as Asal Bukan Gus Dur, loosely translatable as 'Anyone But Gus Dur'. This polarisation of attitudes towards Abdurrahman reflected the turbulent nature of his period as NU chairman. Abdurrahman's Chairmanship Abdurrahman first rose to prominence in NU in the early 1980s as one of the leaders of the reform movement known as the 'Situbondo group', which advocated a return to khittah 1926. Opposing this reform agenda was the so-called 'Cipete group' headed by the long-serving NU chairman, KH Idham Chalid. At the 1984 NU congress the Situbondo group, with the support of the government, swept into power. Abdurrahman was elected as chairman, a position for which he possessed an impeccable pedigree. His grandfather, Hasjim Asj'ari, was a co-founder of NU and his father, Wahid Hasjim, a former deputy chairman of the organisation and Minister of Religious Affairs. During his first two terms as NU chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid had seldom been far from controversy. He had repeatedly spoken out on such sensitive issues as political reform, social equality, human rights. and religious and racial tolerance. He had argued that Islam has no definite concept of, or prescription for the state, speculated that the Muslim salutation 'assalam alaikum' may one day be replaced with the Indonesian greeting 'selamat pagi', opposed the banning of Salmon Rushdie's The Satanic Verses and the Indonesian magazine Monitor for blaspheming the Prophet Muhammad, attended Christian church services and maintained close links to Christian and Chinese intellectuals and businessmen, and contended that Indonesia should allow for the possibility of a non-Muslim head of state. Unlike most Muslim leaders he refused to join the government-sponsored Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslimin Indonesia (Association for Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) or ICMI, which he claimed had sectarian tendencies, and later became the founding chairman of Forum Demokrasi, a discussion group aimed at promoting democratisation in Indonesia. In mid-1994 he again made headlines for suggesting that large numbers of NU members who were disillusioned with PPP and the government party, Golkar, might support PDI (the Indonesian Democratic Party) at the next election. His most recent controversy came on the eve of the NU congress when he broke an unofficial ban on travel to Israel by accepting an invitation to Jerusalem to witness the signing of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. It is actions such as these, combined with an uncompromising and often dismissive approach towards his opponents, which have so divided opinion about his leadership. For his admirers, Abdurrahman Wahid was a brave and inspirational leader who had expanded the horizons of his Muslim constituency and strived to make Indonesia a more just society. They assert that under his leadership NU had become a more progressive and relevant force in the nation's development. Within NU support for his renomination came predominantly from Java-based branches, particularly those in East and Central Java. He also had an enthusiastic following among younger, more reform-minded NU activists. Outside the organisation, Abdurrahman Wahid had considerable backing from ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces) and especially army traditionalists such as General Edi Sudrajat. the Minister for Defence. Despite objecting to many of the NU chairman's views about liberalisation and human rights, ABRI regarded him as a valuable ally in the struggle against Soeharto's 're-Islamising' of Indonesian politics and the concomitant growth in power of ICMI and its chairman, the Minister fur Research and Technology, Dr B. J. Habibie. Suspicion of Islam as a political force remains strong in ABRI, a sentiment reinforced since the late 1980s by the President's cultivation of Muslim support as a means of counterbalancing the military's influence. In addition to army backing, Abdurrahman Wahid also drew support from amongst NGO circles and liberal intellectuals. Asal Bukan Gus Dur The Asal Bukan Gus Dur (ABG) forces comprised various components which were assembled behind three main challengers: Dr Fahmi D. Saifuddin, Chalid Mawardi, and Abu Hasan.3 Although there were substantial differences between the three, their criticism of Abdurrahman Wahid had several elements in common. Firstly, they asserted that his management of the organisation had been lax and autocratic. Examples commonly cited include a number of development schemes designed to help poorer NU members which had either failed or been severely curtailed,4 and the frequency of complaints from board members about not being consulted on important matters. Secondly, they argued that many of his concepts and actions confused his NU constituency and showed him to be out of touch with the concerns of ordinary Muslims. Finally, they claimed his persistent opposition to the government on a range of political issues not only breached the guidelines of the khittah but was also inimical to NU's interests. His oppositionist stance, it was argued, risked government retaliation such as interference in or restriction of the organisation's activities and the denial of access to government positions and resources for NU members. Of the three challengers, Fahmi Saifuddin initially posed the most serious threat to Abdurrahrnan's re-election. Fahmi, an assistant to the Minister for Public Health and lecturer at the University of Indonesia, was widely respected both in NU leadership circles and the government. The son of former NU secretary-general and Minister of Religious Affairs, KH Saifuddin Zuhri, he and many of his supporters were previously members of the Situbondo group who had become disillusioned with Abdurrahman's leadership. They wanted a more professional and consultative management style within NU as well as a strictly neutral political stance. Such a course, they believed, would restore the integrity of NU's khittah programme. Doubts about Fahmi's ability to withstand the conflicting pressures of leadership counted against his candidacy as also did his low profile at the branch level. The other two challengers--Chalid Mawardi and Abu Hasan-- also advocated more efficient administration of NU but varied from the Fahmi group in that they sought to bring NU much closer to the government, and particularly the pro-Soeharto forces. Both had campaigned for Golkar during the last election. Neither was learned in religious matters. Although not a pre- requisite, every NU chairman since the mid-1930s had been a religious scholar. Both men had been members of the Cipete group and loyal friends of Idham Chalid. Chalid Mawardi was an ex-journalist, politician and ambassador to Syria. Like Fahmi, he was the son of an NU leader: his mother Mahmudah Mawardi was a long-serving parliamentarian and former chairwoman of NU's women's organisation, Muslimat NU. Chalid had been a staunch opponent of Abdurrahman's since the early 1980s and contested the chairmanship at the 1989 NU congress. In 1994, he made much of the early running in the press against Abdurrahman, but despite his ability to generate publicity, few regarded him as a strong contender.5 The 'dark horse' in the leadership stakes was Abu Hasan. A wealthy Jambi-born entrepreneur with business links to the government and President's family, his company, P. T. Sealand, has extensive interests in shipping, construction and trade. Although a relative newcomer to NU's leadership ranks his generous donations to a wide variety of NU causes have enabled him to establish a substantial patronage network within the organisation. Support for Abu was especially strong in Outer Island branches and NU's welfare division. Mabarrot, of which he was chairman. The Government's Role The government's attitude to the four candidates was a source of some confusion. Initially it appeared as if the government would not oppose Abdurrahman Wahid's candidature. The State Secretary, Moerdiono, and several other trusted sources privately assured NU leaders that the president had no objections to Abdurrahman's re-election and would not interfere in the congress proceedings. Other sections of the government, however, began a concerted campaign against the incumbent chairman. Prior to departing for the congress, NU delegates were summoned to the offices of local government and military officials and instructed not to vote for Abdurrahman. Some Abdurrahman supporters were given inducements to change their allegiance; others were threatened with reprisals. Various media outlets closely connected to the government or the Soeharto family also took a pro-ABG stance. A key figure in this ABG campaign was the influential Kassospol (Head of ABRI's Social and Political Affairs section), Lt-Gen. Hartono. A devout Muslim, he was mistrusted by many of his ABRI colleagues because of his support for ICMI and Habibie, and his perceived willingness to serve the interests of the Soeharto family over those of the armed forces. Hartono strongly promoted the candidature of Fahmi Saifuddin.6 Other government figures opposing Abdurrahman Wahid included the Information Minister and Golkar chairman, Harmoko, who reportedly backed Chalid Mawardi and Abu Hasan, the Religious Affairs Minister, Tarmizi Taher, and Habibie. Soeharto's daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (commonly referred to as 'Mbak Tutut'), was also widely believed to be supporting moves against the NU chairman.7 She was the most politically active of the president's children and was deputy chair of the Golkar board. The apparent lack of cohesion in the government's approach complicated matters for NU delegates, with many complaining of the conflicting messages they were receiving from various ministries and military officials. Some observers interpreted the government's behaviour as a sign of confusion and disharmony within the political elite. There are grounds for believing, however, that the government's 'disunity' was partly the result of a calculated 'double game' played by Soeharto in which he gave contradictory instructions to different ministers. Some ministers were told that Abdurrahman would not be opposed whereas others were ordered to orchestrate his downfall.8 It was a stratagem which allowed the president to appear impartial and statesmanlike whilst striking at his foe. Soeharto's bid to remove Abdurrahman Wahid from the NU leadership forms part of a broader plan to secure his control over the 1998 presidential election. There were growing indications that he was preparing to renominate for a seventh term, health permitting, though failing this, he would seek to dictate the terms of succession. His determination to assert his authority was apparent in the recent crack-down on dissent and alternative sources of power. Examples of this included the banning of Tempo, Editor and De Tik in mid-1994, the promotion of Soeharto loyalists to strategic ABRI posts, the removal of outspoken members from Golkar and PPP, and the systematic destabilisation of the popular PDI leader and daughter of former President Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Although Soeharto and Abdurrahman Wahid once enjoyed cordial relations, there were several reasons why the NU chairman was now regarded as a threat. His refusal both to endorse Soeharto's 1993 renomination and to desist from attacking the government had irritated the president. More recently Soeharto had been deeply angered by Abdurrahman's blunt personal criticism of him in Adam Schwarz's book, A Nation in Waiting. When asked by Schwarz why the president had failed to heed warnings over ICMI, Abdurrahman replied: 'Two reasons. Stupidity, and because Soeharto doesn't want to see anyone he doesn't control grow strong'.9 Another significant factor had been Abdurrahman's implied approval of closer NU ties to PDI. The possibility of an NU-PDI coalition alarmed government strategists. Their efforts to engineer a sweeping Golkar victory in the 1997 general election could be thwarted if only a small proportion of NU's estimated 35 million members shift their allegiance from the government party to a resurgent PDI. The Congress The five-day congress began on 1 December, and was held at the pesantren (Islamic school) of NU's interim president-general (rais am), KH Ilyas Ruhiat, at Cipasung, near the city of Tasikmalaya. There were some 3500 delegates and invited observers and guests with many thousands more attending unofficially. As is customary for such congresses, the pesantren grounds and surrounding streets were filled with stalls and hawkers selling a diverse array of food and merchandise (including religious books, clothing, paintings and carvings, toys and all manner of NU memorabilia). Cultural performances and mass religious ceremonies were staged in a nearby field. The congress was formally opened by President Soeharto. The ceremony provided a clear indication of Soeharto's disapproval of Abdurrahman. Instead of greeting the president and other dignitaries upon their arrival, he was placed in the third row and excluded from the formal proceedings. Although later dismissed as a protocol mix-up, few doubted it was a deliberate snub.10 Soeharto was the first of many government officials to attend the congress. The armed forces commander, General Feisal Tanjung, and no less than ten ministers addressed plenary sessions. By the time the Vice-President, Try Sutrisno, formally closed the congress, almost half of the proceedings had been taken up with the speeches and question and answer sessions of government officials. Many delegates later complained that they were left with insufficient time to discuss the many organisational and religious issues facing NU.11 There was a serious and uneasy mood pervading much of the congress, a consequence of the intense pressure surrounding the chairmanship election. Delegates were subject to constant canvassing and questioning about their voting intentions, and allegations of impropriety grew as the election approached. Abu Hasan's lieutenants were accused of dispensing millions of rupiah in a brazen vote-buying campaign.12 His supporters in turn complained of harassment from Abdurrahman Wahid's more ************** 1 This is a revised and expanded version of an article entitled 'The Battle for Islam' which appeared in inside Indonesia, no. 42, March 1995, pp. 9-12. I would like to thank Abdurrahman Wahid and the NU board (FBNU) for inviting me to attend the congress, and also the many NU members who, by their explanations and comments, greatly assisted my understanding of events at Cipasung. I am especially grateful to Douglas Ramage who has generously shared his extensive knowledge of Indonesian politics with me in numerous discussions during and after the congress. 2 Abdurrahman's intention had been to move from the Tanfidziah to the Syuriah (Central Religious Council) from where he could exercise a supervisory role rather than his present managerial role. He had even proposed in October 1994 that the Tanfidziah be abolished in order to enhance the authority of the ulama-controlled Syuriah. When this was rejected by the NU board he decided to renominate as chairman. He told the press he had taken this decision in order to preserve the integrity of NU's non-political orientation. Forum Keadilan, 8 December 1994, p.13. 3 Other names mentioned in the media as possible candidates were KH Wahid Zaini and KH Mustofa Bisri. Most NU insiders, however, believed that both kiai (religious scholars and teachers) would remain loyal to Abdurrahman and not challenge for the chairmanship. Kiai Mustofa was also known to be reluctant to leave his pesantren. 4 These unsuccessful projects included a pineapple canning enterprise in Purwokerto, West Java, a tapioca processing operation in Lampung, and a freshwater fishing development in Blitar, East Java. Perhaps the most hotly debated of NU's economic initiatives was the People's Credit Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat or BPR) NU-Summa, a joint venture between NU and the Summa bank. The BPR project was controversial because NU had yet to determine its attitude towards bank interest. Some NU members were also unhappy about Summa's involvement as it was owned by the Christian Chinese Soerjadjaja family. (This latter criticism abated following the collapse of the Summa bank in 1992. The Jawa Pos group replaced Summa as NU's BPR partner.) When launched in 1990, Abdurrahman claimed that there would be 2000 BPR NU-Summa branches serving NU members by the turn of the century. In 1994,however, there were only twelve branches operating, though they did return a profit of more than Rp 230 million. Given NU's lamentable history of mis-management of financial institutions, there would seem good reason for regarding the BPR venture as a modest success. Tempo, 9 June 1990; and Gatra, 26 November 1994, p. 23. 5 In the lead-up to the congress, Chalid Mawardi was the only challenger prepared to campaign publicly against Abdurrahman. When Garra magazine posed the question on its cover page, 'Who Dares to Oppose Gus Dur' (26 November 1994), Sinar magazine responded several days later with a cover photograph of Chalid and the headline: 'Here he is, Gus Dur's Opponent' (3 December 1994). In a hard-hitting interview with Sinar, Chalid accused Abdurrahman of inventing talk of an ABG conspiracy and questioned Abdurrahman's piety, saying: 'Gus Dur doesn't pray. The kiai are concerned about that. His religious tolerance is too high causing him to forget his own faith' (pp. 16- 17). See also Kompas, 21 November 1994; and Forum Keadilan, 8 December 1994. 6 See Kompas and Republika, 3 December 1994, for Hartono's statements praising Fahmi. 7 See Abdurrahman's frank interview in Asiaweek, 17 February 1995, p.37. 8 Abdurrahman referred obliquely to this in his Asiaweek interview (ibid). He described the ministerial conflict over his re-election as analogous to a wayang (shadow puppet) performance in which 'The dalang [puppeteer] never works with just one hand' (p. 38). Although unstated, there can be little doubt that he was alluding to Soeharto. 9 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Alien & Unwin, Sydney, 1994, p. 188. Such criticism was extraordinary given the prevailing culture of obeisance to Soeharto. Abdurrahman also alleged that the president had instructed the Finance Ministry 'to place obstacles in the path of the NU-Summa banks' (p. 189). 10 KH Sahal Mahfudh, NU's wakil rais am (deputy president) was also excluded from the opening ceremony. The wakil rais am would normally read the final prayer of the ceremony, but on this occasion KH Usman Abidin, a staunch foe of Abdurrahman, was accorded the privilege. 11 According to the official agenda, some twenty hours of congress proceedings were taken up with ministerial speeches, though many exceeded their alloted time. By comparison sixteen hours were allowed for discussion of organisational and religious affairs (excluding the elections). See Buku Agenda dan Panduan Muktamar ke-29 Nahdlatul Ulama, Panitia Muktamar Ke-29 Nahdlatul Ulama, Jakarta, 1994, pp. 18- 19. 12 Reports of branches receiving or being promised 'donations' of several million rupiah to vote against Abdurrahman were commonplace. Some delegates also claimed to have been personally offered between Rp 100,000 and Rp 300,000 to support Abu Hasan.