Government Reaction to Forum Demokrasi Immediately after the appearance of Forum Demokrasi. government ministers and senior ABRI officers issued highly critical statements. Admiral(ret.) Sudomo, Senior Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs in 1991, and the ABRI spokesman. I3rig. General Nurhadi. questioned why there was a need for the Forum. Sudomo said that Indonesia is already a 'Pancasila Democracy and therefore has 170 need for a Forum Demokrasi. Both Sudomo and Nurhadi were disturbed by the establishment of the Forum which implied genuine democracy had not yet been achieved in Indonesia. This is a consistent ABRI complaint against advocates of democracy. For example, in July 1994 the deputy head of social and political affairs for ABRI stated that critics of the government speak 'as if there is not democracy at all in Indonesia'.54 Nurhadi submits that a potential problem with the Forum is that it may contribute to the process of creating narrow groupings. Moreover, he expressed concern that Forum Demokrasi will try to change the views of the masses and therefore contravene the Floating Mass concept in which masses are to remain depoliticised.55 In response to ABRI and government suspicions, Abdurrahman underscored several points. First, he argued that Forum Demokrasi is not a mass-based organisation and nor will it become a political party. The Forum, he said, was not even a political pressure group', and promised that it would never be anything more than a refuge for 'contemplative and reflective thought'. Unlike ICMI, it would not be activist and take up specific political issues. Forum Demokrasi, which has limited itself to a general concern for democracy, would also be different from the Petition of Fifty which has taken up particular political issues and often been highly critical of President Soeharto.56 The government reaction to the Forum's establishment indicates an almost instantaneous suspicion that new organisations will disturb national stability and incite the masses. Military obsession with maintenance of stability qua stability is foremost in ABRI thinking. Moreover, ABRI officials are particularly wary of Abdurrahman because he combines charisma, intelligence, and a mass following in NU which the New Order has found difficult to control. Abdurrahman was careful to emphasise in his dialogue with government and military authorities following the announcement of the Forum's establishment that his role as head of the Forum was completely divorced from his role as head of NU. Therefore, he argued, there is no aim at mass mobilisation.57 The Challenge Posed by Forum Demokrasi The Forum, and Abdurrahman personally, came under increased government surveillance in 1992. There were two major reasons for heightened official concern over the Forum's activities. First, prior to general elections the government seeks to tighten its control over the political system. After all, as Try Sutrisno has explained, the general elections are not meant to produce change.58 Yet the Forum and Abdurrahman personally advocated precisely that--change. For the New Order, political change is automatically associated with chaos and instability. Second, whereas ICMI, according to Amien Rais, opted for a strategy that sought the continuance of President Soeharto's rule, Forum Demokrasi implied that it wanted change.59 The Forum never, however, called upon the President not to be renominated. Yet the failure to endorse Soeharto was construed by the President's supporters as evidence of disloyalty. Lt. General Harsudiyono Hartas openly questioned Forum's intentions. Hartas claimed that Forum Demokrasi the in contravention of Pancasila. He argued that the statements issued by the Forum 'confused the public' and often contradicted fundamental tenets of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. The Forum's supporters, he said, acted as if 'they were still affiliated with the previous era and this can be seen from their statements on justice, human rights, and democracy'. Such language shows the government's view that the period of liberal democracy in the 1950s was incompatible with Pancasila and Indonesian culture. Hartas warned the Forum not to cause 'agitation' nor seek fundamental change.60 Abdurrahman responded to Hartas' suggestion that the Forum contradicts Pancasila and the constitution by challenging him to stipulate which article of the constitution or which principle of Pancasila had been contravened.61 Hartas' warnings to the Forum and Abdurrahman came shortly after two Forum meetings were banned by police, one in February and the other in April 1992. The April 20 meeting was intended by the Forum as a Halal bi Halal [traditional gathering to mark the end of the Islamic fasting month]. In addition to Forum members and supporters, other prominent national figures present at the gathering included the then chairman of the PDI, Soerjadi, and retired General Soemitro. No official reasons were given for the banning other than the Forum's failure to possess proper permits for such gatherings.62 A week later Abdurrahman was prevented from addressing a meeting of the PPP in Surabaya and the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Sudomo reported that President Soeharto had asked him to 'monitor' Forum Demokrasi.63 It was difficult for authorities to portray Abdurrahman's and the Forum's activities as contrary to Pancasila. Abdurrahman rebutted such accusations by asserting that the Forum was, in fact, the most 'Pancasila-ist' of organisations and that democracy was an inherently Indonesian concept. Attempts to restrict its interpretation in a non-liberal fashion are not justified by any provisions of the constitution or Pancasila, he argued.64 Kompas editorialised that Abdurrahman's behaviour and Forum Demokrasi were indeed based on Pancasila and the constitution.65 Citing the government's contention that Pancasila should be considered an 'open ideology', the Kompas editorial saw it as entirely appropriate that non-governmental groups such as the Forum sought to promote democratisation. Just as it was extremely difficult for the government to prohibit NU's Rapat Akbar in March 1992 because its purpose was to express loyalty to Pancasiia and the constitution, so too was it possible for Abdurrahman, Kompas, General Soemitro, and others to support the Forum's activities as genuinely 'Pancasila- ist'. Abdurrahman and Forum Demokrasi were also accused of advocating 'liberal' ideas, such as the need for electoral choice through free and fair elections. Abdurrahman contended that such accusations ignored the original intent and meaning of Pancasila. It was, and remains, he said, a 'political compromise between democrats, supporters of a theocratic state, and nationalists', and allowed all Indonesians to 'come along together in a nationalist, unified state'. It was not Pancasila per se that guarantees democracy; it stipulates a tolerant society upon which a democratic polity can exist. Rather, it is the body of the constitution which is the democratic document which sets out that voting is permissible and allows for a measure of free speech and human rights.66 He argues that when Pancasila is used by the authorities to justify an undemocratic system or to attack Forum Demokrasi, then it is the regime 'who is cheating on Pancasila'.67 There was also intense pressure from the government on Abdurrahman to quit Forum Demokrasi. He was told by one of Soeharto's allies that his democratising activities put him in opposition to the President and thereby contravened a commitment he made to avoid conflict with Soeharto. According to Abdurrahman, he was told he could reduce the friction by either endorsing Soeharto for another term or leaving the Forum. He responded by declaring he would quit NU rather than agree to these terms. Abdurrahman stated that if forced to make a choice between the democratisation movement and the Islamic movement, 'my choice is clear, I will leave the Islamic movement'.68 NU, Forum Demokrasi and Abdurrahman's Secular Democratic Vision There is a distinction between the way Abdurrahman uses Pancasila as leader of NU compared to the way he uses it as leader of the nation's democratisation movement. The NU strategy envisioned by Abdurrahman is primarily one of 'deconfessionalisation' in order to prevent reoccurrence of disintegrative politics based on religion. It is also to ensure that Indonesian Islam is divorced from petty political manoeuvering that may damage the interests of the umat. Such manoeuvering could create suspicions that Muslims are not fully committed to Pancasila and the state. The use of Pancasila in the Rapat Akbar illustrates this approach and attempts to establish NU as a Pancasila-ist organisation par excellence. The Forum strategy, on the other hand, places much more emphasis on promoting democracy but with a strong concern for a religiously tolerant society as a condition for democracy. In Abdurrahman's mind the relationship between a tolerant 'Indonesianised' Islam and a healthy democratic polity is inseparable. However, for political purposes, he cannot emphasise that he uses his mass base in NU as a force for democratic change, particularly when such change is automatically viewed by authorities as a threat to the existing Pancasila Democracy. In his capacity as leader of Forum Demokrasi and as a politically secular nationalist, Abdurrahman goes far beyond his NU message that Pancasila is a necessary precondition for both a democratic and religiously free society. He argues that the politically secular basis of society is established with adherence to Pancasila: If you reject primordialism and accept Pancasila, you must also eventually accept political liberalism. Because primordialism means inequality, that only people from certain origins will be equal. This mitigates against secular nationalism, including the philosophy of ABRI.69 Abdurrahman adds, however, that even though the logic of liberalism--treating citizens equally before law--is contained in Pancasila, adherence to the ideology's tolerance is not enough for democracy. 'lf you want to achieve political democracy you need more than Pancasila'. He elaborates that democratic secular nationalists seek three basic conditions that will allow the development of genuine democracy in Indonesia. First, there must be a separation of the state and civil domains. He argues this has not happened in the New Order because it has subscribed to an ABRI-derived vision of the organic totality of the state. Second, there must be a separation between civil society and government. According to Abdurrahman, this separation entails the autonomy of civil society and will necessitate basic freedoms of expression, association, and movement. Finally, he argues that a separation of powers within government is essential for creating a true democracy. There must be an internal government system of checks and balances. Abdurrahman asserts that New Order politics is characterised by a military-derived 'integralistic secularism'; that is, the New Order is politically secular, but in an undemocratic way which fails to distinguish between either state or civil domains. Democratic secularism, however, requires separation of governmental powers and a clear distinction between state and civil society. For Abdurrahman and other secular nationalists, there is at least a shared agreement with ABRI that Indonesia should be a secular society. Abdurrahman contends that secularism is the first step towards a democratic society and that it could be established independent of--or at least prior to--genuine political democracy.70 Conclusion: 'A Very Narrow Path' The core of Abdurrahman's political dilemma is that he wants Islam, with NU as a prominent part of the Islamic movement, to be a force for peaceful change and transition towards a democratic, tolerant society. Yet he contends that the emergence of ICMI and manipulation of Islam for political purposes by Soeharto makes the journey towards this goal difficult. He summed up his dilemma in the following way: So it is clear that we have to handle this thing [ICMI] very carefully. On one side we should not allow Islam to be used in the wrong way by those fellow Muslims who would like to evolve an Islamic Society here. On the other hand, we have to avert the use of excessive force against them in an undemocratic way. This way its a very narrow path for us...because the military, in acting harshly in an undemocratic fashion to defend Pancasila, in essence, castrates Pancasila.71 Abdurrahman looks to a political future of greater democratisation, less military influence, and no Islamic fundamentalism. Yet he harbors deep fears that democratisation will provide Indonesians with the opportunity to 'choose Islam' which in turn may play into the hands of both Islamic radicals and the armed forces which rejects both democracy and Islamic politics. This is his Algeria analogy. According to Abdurrahman, the democratic option may be exercised only once--and then a fundamentally undemocratic state may emerge from a democratic process. In the interest of a 'deconfessionalised' state many Indonesians, and perhaps Abdurrahman as well, may opt for an ABRI-dominated non-democratic state that at least protects religious, ethnic, and regional minority rights in the interests of national unity. The alternative is a form of democratisation in which reconfessionalised political Islam may win at the ballot box. For NU and Abdurrahman Wahid, Pancasila is first and foremost an ideology of deconfessionalisation', national unity, and religious tolerance. Abdurrahman contends, however, that by accepting Pancasila, Indonesians also accept the foundations of a secular democracy. Abdurrahman argues strongly that precisely because the armed forces embrace Pancasila's stipulation of respect for all citizens, regardless of religion or ethnicity, ABRI has also accepted the foundation of a liberal, democratic society. Even though the armed forces still reject liberal democracy, he believes that the 'logic of liberalism is already there in ABRI's stance on Pancasila'. Therefore, the chances for eventual democratisation are greater through eventual compromise between ABRI, NU and others who share the inclusive vision of Pancasila rather than through, in Abdurrahman's words, a process of 'democratisation through Islamisation'.72 In arguing against Islamic politics in Indonesia, Abdurrahman says: Deep in my heart I know that it is impossible for Indonesia to be governed by one side. My dream, my belief for a modem Indonesia is open politics--where political behaviour is ordinary and where it is not based exclusively on religion and race.73 Abdurrahman argues that if Indonesian Muslims are fully supportive of a secular political system in which all Indonesians are treated equally on the basis of 'their sameness of citizenship' then Indonesian Islam will eventually demonstrate to the world that modernity, open politics, and democracy can flourish well in a Muslim-majority society.74 ************* 54 Maj. General Hari Sabarno, cited in 'ABRI Officer Says Openness Cause of Indonesia's Dilemma', Jakarra Post, 8 July 1994. 55 For Sudomo's comments, see 'Forum Demokrasi Aneh', Angkatan Bersenjata, 6 April 1991. The official position of ABRI was laid out in 'Nurhadi: Forum Demokrasi Bisa Jadi Politik Praktis: Maksud Gus Dur Dkk Sebaiknya Melalui Wadah Yang Sudah Ada', Pembaruan, 6 April 1991. Also note the concern that the Forum could influence the masses. This is a constant worry of ABRI leaders--that any new (or existing) social movement could exert influence over the masses and thereby agitate for political change. See for example the comments by Brig. Gen. Hendropriyono who warned both the Petition of Fifty and Forum Demokrasi not to stir up the masses, in Tempo, 10 April 1993, p.27. 56 See 'Forum Demokrasi Untuk Hilangkan Rasa Saling Curiga- Mencurigai', Suara Pembaruan, 4 April 1991. 57 For Abdurrahman's denial that Forum Demokrasi will become a political activist group see his interview in Suara Karya, 9 April 1991. 58 General Try Sutrisno's comments are cited in 'Change of Leadership Sought', Jakarta Post, 11 April 1992. 59 ICMI never formally endorsed Soeharto for another term. However, its preference for his continuance in office is clearly reflected in the same person, different policy' strategy outlined by Amien Rais in his interview in Detik, 3 March 1993 and in the author's interviews with numerous ICMI activists. 60 For Hartas' firm warnings to the Forum, see 'Tidak Ada Larangan bagi Forum Demokrasi' Kompas, 25 April 1992. 61 For Abdurrahman's response, see 'Forum Demokrasi Siap Dialog Konsep Demokrasi Politik', Suara Karya, 27 April 1992. 62 'Police Criticised for Abruptly Banning Forum Gathering', Jakarta Post, 21 April 1992. 63 'Abdurrahman Darred from Speaking in Public', Jakarta Post, 27 April 1992; and 'Soeharto wants Sudomo to Monitor Forum Demokrasi', Jakarta Post, 30 April 1992. 64 Abdurrahman Wahid, interviews, 18 and 24 June 1992. See also 'Forum Demokrasi Slap Dialog Konsep Demokrasi Politik', Suara Karya, 27 April 1992. 65 See 'Tentu Saja, Demokrasi Kita Mengacu Kepada Undang-Undang Dasar 1945', Kompas, 29 April 1992. 66 Here Abdurrahman distinguishes between the Preamble to the Constitution of 1945 which contains the Pancasila principles and the constitution itself. 67 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 24 June 1992. 68 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 24 June 1992. 69 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 17 September 1994. 70 Abdurrahman laid out his concept of secular democratic society in two interviews, 15 June 1994 and 17 September 1994, and in his presentation 'Democracy, Religion and Human Rights in Southeast Asia', at the East-West Center, Honolulu, 16 September 1994. 71 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 18 June 1992. 72 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 17 September 1994. 73 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 15 October 1992. 74 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 15 October 1992 and 15 June 1993.