By refusing to endorse Soeharto openly, we withhold support to this unbalanced system of governing. By supporting Pancasila and the constitution we can say that NU is trying to smooth the transition from the current system which is based on cronyism, and the destruction of the country in the long run, and the robbing of our natural resources for the benefit of a few.29 Thus, NU's refusal to support Soeharto was seen as a sophisticated and safe way of encouraging political change. There was an additional, more urgent message in the Pancasila strategy of the Rapat Akbar. Abdurrahman believed that Pancasila represents an essential political compromise that Islam should not be the formal basis of the state. As a religiously and ethnically diverse nation, Pancasila is the ideological expression of tolerance and commitment to inclusive behaviour and politics. He contended that Pancasila and its stress on religious and ethnic tolerance is a necessary precondition to the development of a genuine democracy in Indonesia. He frequently argued that democracy will fail in an environment of religious strife and intolerance. ICMI and Abdurrahman's Perception of Religious Tolerance Abdurrahman was alarmed at what he perceived to be a trend towards 're-confessionalisation' of politics and a decline in religious tolerance. In this context, he has focused on the new Islamic organisation, ICMI, founded in December 1990, as representative of a major threat to his vision of a religiously pluralist Pancasila society. He has thus sought to contrast NU with ICMI. As chairman of NU Abdurrahman describes his 'job' as one of primarily looking after the well-being of the umat.30 He also criticises the government, however, for doing 'too much' for the Muslims.31 Detailed consideration of this apparent contradiction is essential to grasp Abdurrahman's conception of what kind of nation Indonesia should be. He has argued that Indonesia's national unity is based on a living political comp remise--the Pancasila ideology--an agreement of the Muslims to live in a state which would never be based on formal recognition of Islam as objectively 'better' or more deserving of government support than other religions. Pancasila, he says, offers Indonesian Muslims, the best possible deal: they have the freedom to follow their religion by their own volition in a religious, though not a secular or Islamic state. Abdurrahman argues this is politically realistic in light of Indonesia's religious diversity. Moreover, according to Abdurrahman and NU scholars, it is fully consistent with Islamic religious doctrine which does not recognise an absolute imperative for the establishment of an Islamic state. Although Abdurrahman and others fundamentally agree with de-linking 'primordial' affiliations from day-to-day politics, they do not agree with the restrictive political structure established by the New Order and the long-standing depiction of Islam by the government as an enemy of Pancasila and the state. It is significant, therefore, that by the mid- to late 1980s, President Soeharto began actively courting Indonesian Muslims to enhance his Islamic credentials. This has been widely interpreted as an attempt by Soeharto to diversify his own power base in light of diminishing armed forces support for his Presidency. Evidence of Soeharto's efforts to cultivate Muslim allegiance is abundant. For example in 1990, he made the much publicised haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca for the first time. Many Muslims interpreted this as a sign of piety and natural step in one's life- particularly for an increasingly aged man such as Soeharto.32 There were also legislative and programmatic aspects to this reconciliation such as the 1989 religious education law and the 1990 law on religious courts' judicial authority.33 Finally, in December 1990 President Soeharto gave his consent to the establishment of a major new Islamic organisation: ICM1.34 This was an extraordinary event. The association grouped together government officials and leading Islamic intellectuals, including many who had been bitterly critical of Soeharto's New Order and its treatment of Islam in previous years. Noticeably absent from those who joined the new organisation was Abdurrahman Wahid. His fundamental disagreement with ICMI is that it represents manipulation of Islam to support the government. It also shows that Islamic activists are allowing themselves to be exploited by Soeharto in order to advance their own goal of Islamising government and society. For Abdurrahman, such a development constitutes an abandonment of Pancasila's guarantee of religious tolerance and national unity. ICMI supporters, however, contend that the new organisation is the most appropriate and effective means for ensuring the well-being of the umat. Abdurrahman's apprehension regarding ICM1 is also based on fundamental disagreement over the meaning of an 'Islamic society'. A number of prominent intellectuals in ICMI advocate the establishment in Indonesia of an 'Islamic society' in which government policy, programs, and law are imbued with Islamic values. Abdurrahman argues that intellectuals who advocate such a society are, in reality, still seeking to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.35 He outlines his opposition to this in the following way: I quarrel with Amien Rais [a political scientist and Muhammadiyah leader active in ICMI] who would like to establish an Islamic society. For me an Islamic society in Indonesia is treason against the constitution because it will make non-Muslims second class citizens. But an 'Indonesian society' where the Muslims are strong--and strong means functioning well--then I think that is good.36 ICMI is dangerous, according to Abdurrahman, because of the 'simple fact that their behaviour [members of ICMI], and the behaviour of Soeharto in using ICMI for his own non-Islamic goals, reconfessionalises politics. ICMI returns Islam and religion to the political arena after two decades of efforts to deconfessionalise politiCs'.37 He argues that the strategy of Islamic activists in ICMI, which is to 'take advantage of being used by Soeharto, will increase ABRI anxiety and reignite ABRI fears of Islamic fundamentalism'. ABRI, he repeatedly states, is deeply suspicious of lCMI and perceives it to be manipulated by Soeharto to strengthen his position vis-n-vis the armed forces.38 Abdurrahman worries that ICMI will give ABRI the excuse to clamp down' again on Islam. He adds that if ABRI persecutes Islamic activists for pursuing a political agenda incompatible with the inclusive, tolerant nature of Pancasila, then this heavy- handed response will encourage fundamentalism or 'sectarianism' to grow. He argues that 'if ABRI is relied upon to defend Pancasila against those who would seek an Islamic Indonesia then we end up using an undemocratic force [ABRI] in a counter- productive way'.39 Hence, ICMI's urging of greater Islamisation of government and society may have the unintended consequence of setting back democratisation efforts by giving the armed forces an excuse to further restrict all forms of independent political activity, Islamic or otherwise. Sectarianism and New Order Society Abdurrahman refers to the de-linking of mass-based politics from religion as 'deconfessionalised' politics. It is similar to what the New Order has called the 'depoliticisation' or 'deideologisation' of politics. He seeks to avoid a return to a political system such as existed in the 1950s and early to mid- 1960s in which people channel their political aspirations through organisations which appeal solely on a 'confessional' basis. This system resulted in the communal and religiously-based violence of 1965-1966. Yet Abdurrahman argues that the deconfessionalisation of politics did not necessitate the current restrictive and authoritarian political structure which the New Order calls 'Pancasila Democracy'.40 One of Abdurrahman's aims for the Rapat Akbar was to show that NU exemplified an Indonesian Islam that was accepting of non-Muslims and Indonesians of Chinese descent by its adherence to Pancasila. By arguing strongly for Pancasila, he hoped to show that NU rejected the attempts of some Muslims to blame Indonesia's or the Islamic community's problems on non-Muslims. He had been deeply disturbed by the emergence of anti-Chinese and anti-Christian discourse since the Monitor affair in 1990.41 Some of the people responsible for provoking an anti-Christian dynamic in public discourse are now, Abdurrahman believes, prominent in ICMI. He fears that ICMI, as a government-sponsored organisation, legitimises intolerance, and Abdurrahman believes it is the 'duty' of NU to demonstrate an alternative, tolerant vision of Islam and society.42 Abdurrahman's Letter to Soeharto As it turned out, Abdurrahman Wahid was bitterly disappointed with the results of the Rapat Akbar. He complained, in a letter to Soeharto written on 2 March 1992, that the government obstructed the rally and therefore hindered his efforts to combat sectarianism and rising religious and racial intolerance. Most importantly, he predicted that if the government failed to support NU's goals of nurturing harmonious, open-minded religious national life, it would give succour to those who do not accept this vision of Indonesia. These people, he wrote, present a significant threat to the 'perpetuity of Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia', and he predicted that Indonesia may become like Algeria; that is, a nation in which attempts to establish an Islamic state causes social unrest and threatens economic development.43 In private, Abdurrahman elaborated on the meaning of the Algerian analogy. He believed that some Muslims, particularly those now associated with ICMI, support both the democratisation and demilitarisation of lndonesian national politics. This he claims is disingenuous. What such activists really seek is to manipulate Islam using an ostensibly democratic process to set up an Islamic state in which democracy would be demeaned and, indeed, short- lived.44 Abdurrahman's critique of ICMI boils down to what he sees as essentially, a 'Trojan Horse' theory: that is, many of the Islamic activists involved in ICMI have accepted Pancasila simply as a tactic to enter the government and Islamise politics from within. The ideal vehicle for the Islamisation of government is ICMI because it is a government-sponsored, bureaucratically-staffed entity. According to Abdurrahman, ICMI support for Soeharto will be rewarded with the appointment of Muslim advocates of an Islamic society to senior bureaucratic positions.45 However, the failure of many ICMI activists to be appointed to the cabinet announced on 17 March 1993 indicates shortcomings of the Trojan Horse scenario. Abdurrahman Wahid contends that in order to realise a state based on the five principles expressed in Pancasila, and for such values to have functional meaning in Indonesia, then Pancasila must not be used by the government solely to legitimise the current authoritarian system of politics. He argues that the root cause of the emergence of sectarian and Islamic politics is both the political system created by the New Order itself and the personal political imperatives of Soeharto. Although supportive of the idea of 'deconfessionalised ' politics, Abdurrahman argues that because the political system is so tightly controlled people are forced to rely on religion to participate in politics. Moreover, the regime must not manipulate the Islamic community in ways which, he believes, may repoliticise Islam in a divisive way. The creation of ICMI simply to bolster the short-term political fortunes of Soeharto is one such case. This is fundamentally different from the nature of debate about the meaning of Pancasila in earlier decades. Never before has an Islamic organisation or a nationalist Islamic leader with the stature of Abdurrahman Wahid so explicitly used Pancasila as the vehicle for a political message of religious tolerance. His advocacy of a religiously tolerant, politically democratic nation is given voice, in part, through his leadership of Forum Demokrasi. Forum Demokrasi Forum Demokrasi was established in March 1991 by a group of about forty-five prominent intellectuals.46 The organisation is not incorporated as a formal association, but simply as a 'discussion' or 'working group' under the chairmanship of Abdurrahman Wahid. Although many well-known and respected intellectuals from various religious, academic, and political backgrounds are associated with the Forum, Abdurrahman tends to have a dominant voice, much as he does with NU. Marsillam Simanjuntak, a leading democracy activist, has said that it was a conscious decision of the Forum to choose Abdurrahman as chairman in order to bring a high profile and credibility to the association.47 An examination of' the reasons for the establishment of Forum Demokrasi will illustrate some of Abdurrahman's politically secular democratic ideas and objectives. The purposes of Forum Demokrasi are multiple and interconnected, according to Abdurrahman and its supporters. First, its establishment was provoked by a desire to combat religious and ethnic intolerance. The most troubling case for those associated with the Forum was the Monitor Affair in October 1990. The Monitor case, argued Abdurrahman, demonstrates that some groups in society are willing to manipulate religious issues in order to further their own interests.48 The establishment of ICMI in December 1990 also prompted the formation of Forum Demokrasi. Abdurrahman has repeatedly indicated that he believes ICMI is a prime example of political exploitation of religion which prioritises 'exclusive', narrow group interests over national concerns. By promoting the interests of Islam, ICMI promotes an undemocratic vision of Indonesia. In a published interview, Abdurrahman argued that ICMI will 'alienate non-Muslims' and nominal Muslims, and thereby 'aggravate the already strong divisions and misunderstandings in our society between different religious, ethnic and cultural groups, especially if Islam is seen to be trying to manipulate the government just for its own benefit'.49 He has been reluctant, however, to cast the Forum as a direct challenger to ICMI. Abdurrahman says that because of rising sectarianism in Indonesia, one of the Forum's aims is to encourage a 'return to the commitment to national unity'. For him, the Forum 'constitutes a vehicle for pushing a national integrative process through the elimination of sectarian-oriented groups'. He repeatedly emphasises that Forum Demokrasi is supportive of Pancasila so there is no way he can be accused of promoting values incompatible with the ideology or the constitution.50 In this respect, Abdurrahman combines both his desire to encourage democratisation with his goal of promoting a secular and religiously tolerant democratic government. Although not mentioned when he announced the creation of the Forum, Abdurrahman has accused members of the Islamic movement, especially those associated with ICMI, of exaggerating the Monitor Affair in order to depict Islam as under siege from Christians. This approach. he said, allowed Muslim activists to justify their attempts to establish an Islamic society. He further argued that the behaviour of leading members of the Islamic community regarding the banning of Monitor reflects attitudes Incompatible with democracy and its attendant, inseparable freedoms, including the freedom of speech.51 He lamented what he saw as government complicity in the rise of sectarianism and the manipulation of racial and religious issues for short-term political gain. He declared his conviction, however, that 'Indonesia's silent majority is pluralistic in attitude and tolerant of diversity. It's the rigidity of government policy which leads to repression [of opinion] and it is repression which causes sectarianism'.52 He fears that the Chinese Indonesians may become targets of Muslims frustrated with the New Order's authoritarianism.53 ************ 29 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 18 June 1992. 30 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 3 May 1993. 31 Adam Schwarz, 'Charismatic Enigma', FEER, 12 November 1992. 32 Political scientist Mochtar Mas'oed at Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta argued that the President's haj was widely perceived by Muslims (the 'masses') as proof of Soeharto's Islamic bonifides and devotion to the umar. Interview, 6 October 1992. 33 The courts law clarified and reaffirmed the independence of religious courts and their equality with civil courts. The education law stipulated that religious instruction was to be compulsory in all public schools. Abdurrahman objected to these laws, arguing there should be only 'one' law code for all Indonesian citizens. On the religious courts law see Himpunan Perundang-undangan dan Peraturan Peradilan Agama compiled by Abdul Gani Abdullah (Jakarta: PT Intermasa, 1991). For Abdurrahman's critique of these laws, see his 'Religious Beliefs: The Transmission and Development of Doctrine', Jakarta Post, 7 September 1991. 34 On the founding of ICMI, see for example, 'Presiden Soeharto: Tepat Waktu, Prakarsa Cendekiawan Muslim Bahas Pembangunan Abad XXI', Kompas, 7 December 1990; 'Cendekiawan Muslim: Melangkah dari Malang', and 'Momentum ICMI dan Munculnya Habibie', Tempo, 9 December 1990. 35 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 18 June 1992 36 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 24 June 1992. 37 Abdurrahman Wahid, 15 October 1992. 38 Abdurrahman Wahid, interviews, 15 October 1992, 3 May 1993, and 15 June 1994. 39 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 18 June 1992. 40 Abdurrahman's support for the New Order's deconfessionalisation process is also evident in Abdurrahman, 'Islam, Politics and Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s', in Bourchier and Legge (1994). 41 The 'Monitor Affair' refers to the October 1990 publication of a readers' poll of most admired public figures in the popular tabloid, Monitor. The published results showed that President Soeharto in first place, while the Prophet Muhammad was eleventh. Much of the Muslim community was outraged and baffled as to how a newspaper could publish a poll that compared the Prophet to worldly figures. For many Muslims this was an illustration of extreme insensitivity towards Islam because the paper was part of the Catholic-owned Gramedia publishing group. Monitor's editor was eventually arrested and convicted of insulting Islam. He served a four-year prison sentence. However, Abdurrahman Wahid strongly argued that even if Muslims were offended by the poll, the democratic right to free speech and publication should not be infringed. On the Monitor Affair, see the offending article: 'Ini Dia: 50 Tokoh Yang Dikagumi Pembaca Kita', Monitor, IV, No.255, 15 October 1990; For in depth coverage see the cover stories in the weeklies Editor, IV, No. 7, 27 October 1990, Tempo, 27 October 1990, and Tempo, 3 November 1990. 42 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 3 May 1993. 43 Abdurrahman's letter, p.2. 44 Abdurrahman Wahid, interviews, 15 October 1992 and 3 May 1993. 45 Indeed, some members of ICMI such as Sri Bintang Pamungkas, a prominent member of the PPP in the DPR, freely admit this is part of ICMI's strategy. 46 The group was formed during a two-day meeting at Cibeureum, a mountain resort south of Jakarta, on 16-17 March 1991. The establishment of the group was announced publicly on 3 April at a Jakarta news conference held by Abdurrahman Wahid, Marsillam Simanjuntak, and others. 47 Marsillam Simanjuntak, interview, 7 April 1993. 48 On the establishment of Forum Demokrasi and Abdurrahman's explanation of the significance of the Monitor case, see 'Di Tengah Masyarakat Muncul Kecenderungan Sikap Sektarian', Pelita, 4 April 1991. 49 See 'Kindling a Democratic Culture: Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid', Inside Indonesia, October 1991, p.5. Abdurrahman expressed this view on many occasions in interviews with the author, 18 and 24 EJune, 15 October 1992 and 3 May 1993. 50 See 'Forum Demokrasi Untuk Hilangkan Rasa Saling Curiga- Mencurigai', Suara Pembaruan, 4 April 1991 On Forum Democracy as supportive of Pancasila see also 'Intellectuals Establish Forum to Bolster Democracy in Indonesia', Jakarta Post, 4 April 1991. 51 Abdurrahman Wahid, interviews, 18 and 24 June 1992. See also his suggestion that the behaviour of some Muslims is undemocratic in Kompas, 14 October 1991. 52 Cited in Adam Schwarz, 'A Worrying Word', I;EER, 25 April 1991, p.23. 53 On Abdurrahman's concern regarding the growth of anti-Chinese attitudes in society, see his interview in Inside Indonesia, (October, 1991), p. 5. Adam Schwarz (FEER, 25 April 1991, p. 23) also reports that a reason for the establishment of Forum Demokrasi was to counter 'increased resentment' towards Chinese Indonesians.