Chapter Nine Democratisatian, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid (1 Douglas E. Ramage All that the West sees in Islam is radicalism and its incompatibility with modern, open, democratic politics. Indonesia, however, has the opportunity to show that politics based on confession--as it is in Algeria or Iran--is not the only way. Not only can modernity and open politics exist in a Muslim-majority society, as it can here in Indonesia, but it can also be nurtured so that democracy can flourish well in Islam. Abdurrahman Wahid 2 Abdurrahman Wahid has dominated Nahdlatul Ulama's leadership and Islamic discourse for the past decade. He is also one of Indonesia's leading advocates of democratisation and religious tolerance. This article will show that his political thought is based on a democratic, secular and nationalist vision of Indonesian politics. One of his core beliefs is that if Indonesia is to become a genuinely democratic civil society, then peoples' political aspirations ought not be channelled through religion. To support his democratic and social goals Abdurrahman often invokes Indonesia's national ideology, Pancasila, rather than islam, to legitimise his participation in political discourse and for expressing key political ideas. Analysis of Abdurrahman's role in and thinking about three significant events between 1990 and 1992 will illustrate his conception of a democratic and politically secular society. Study of these three events will also show how and why he uses Pancasila to express his political ideas. The three key events are NU's 1392 anniversary rally in Jakarta (the Rapat Akbar), the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), and Abdurrahman's leadership of Forum Demokrasi. Additionally, analysis of his political thinking will be given, based upon interview data from 1991-1994. Finally, this article will show how Abdurrahman distinguishes between his roles as, firstly, an Islamic leader and chairman of NU, and secondly, a secular democrat and chairman of Forum Demokrasi. In order to understand fully his political thought it is important to see Abdurrahman Wahid as representing a generation of revolutionary Islamic thinkers in Indonesia. Greg Barton argues that the thought of Abdurrahman, along with that of 'Djohan Effendi, Nurcholish Madjid, and the late Ahmad Wahib 3 is sufficiently coherent and complete to be called a school of thought in its own right'. Barton identifies these thinkers as 'neo-modernists' and argues that this school of Islamic thought has 'been instrumental in the creation of a new intellectual/political position in (Indonesian] Islamic thought'. One of the defining consequences of these neo-modernists is a 'commitment to pluralism and the core values of democracy'. Moreover, these pluralistic values have been 'woven into the very fabric of [Islamic] faith as...the core values of Islam itself. Barton concludes that because of these reasons Abdurrahman, and other neo-modernist Muslims are 'found in the vanguard of democratic reform'.4 Abdurrahman Wahid's interpretation of, and frequent reference to, Pancasila is tied to his role as a leading exponent of neo-modernist Islam and democratic pluralism. He has long argued that Muslims should embrace Pancasila.5 He conceives of Pancasila as being the precondition for democratisation and the healthy spiritual development of Islam in a national context. This is a position that contrasts with many of the 'modernists' who seek to 'Islamise' Indonesia. Abdurrahman considers Pancasila to be a living political compromise which allows all Indonesians to live together in a national, unitary, non-Islamic state. Yet he sees numerous threats to his conception of Pancasila as a basis for civil democratic society both from within the Islamic community and from the armed forces. One way to understand Abdurrahman's political thinking and NU's role in contemporary politics is to see how he conceives his role in Indonesian society to be defined as much by his nationalism as by his faith. For Abdurrahman, Pancasila is a nationalist ideology essential for maintaining Indonesian unity. His view of Pancasila as the necessary nationalist basis of the state is important because some Muslims have viewed Pancasila as a secular ideology which is incompatible with Islam. Abdurrahman, however, frequently points out that his father Wahid Hasyim, an NU leader, also agreed, in 1945, to support a nationalist, non-Islamic state.6 NU was one of the first mass- based organisations to recognise the legitimacy of the New Order. For Abdurrahman, NU is as firmly grounded in nationalist credentials as is the armed forces. He argues that there is no imperative in Islamic teaching for the establishment of an Islamic state. That is why, he says, his father and the NU leadership could easily accept a state not explicitly based on Islam. Abdurrahman says that indonesia is a state based on consensus and compromise, and that compromise is inherent in Pancasila. Other NU leaders have expressed a similar vision of Pancasila. For example, according to Buchori Masruri, head of NU for Central Java, the compromise established by Pancasila ensures a religious state, but not one based exclusively on Islam and is, 'fully in keeping with the Prophet Muhammad's natural tolerance of Jesus and other people of the Book'. Pancasila, Buchori concludes, is a political recipe for all Indonesians to live together in the state'.7 Abdurrahman frequently stresses NU's nationalist credentials by emphasising NU's loyalty to Pancasila. For example, in a major speech to the NU membership in 1992, he recalled that NU's acceptance of Pancasila made perfect sense for several reasons.8 He explained that in 1945 Sukarno sought the advice of the NU leadership, including his father who, he believes, helped Sukarno devise the five principles of Pancasila. Clearly Abdurrahman has a sentimental attachment to Pancasila based on father's role in its formulation.9 Furthermore, Abdurrahman argues that there is no contradiction between Islam and nationalism and that Islam can thrive spiritually in a nationalist state that is not formally based on Islam: NU adheres to a conception of nationalism that is in accordance with the Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. NU has become the pioneer in ideological affairs. This is the case even though throughout the entire Islamic world there is still a problem between nationalism and Islam. All the Saudi writers consider nationalism a form of secularism. They do not yet understand that nationalism such as in Indonesia is not secular, but rather respects the role c4. religion.10 This outlook, Abdurrahman adds, makes the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and non-Muslims sympathetic and appreciative of NU's inclusive stance. He argues that religious belief in Indonesia is respected by a religiously neutral political system and that Pancasila is the formulaic expression of a politically secular state that is, nevertheless, supportive of religion generally. As it happens, he does not have to look to Saudi Arabia for Islamic rejection of a nationalist perspective based on Pancasila. For example, Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, one of the founding members of ICMI, argues that nationalism cannot be the unifying basis of Indonesia. He contends that only Islam, the belief of '90% of the people', can serve as the moral basis for the state.11 Conversely, Abdurrahman states that 'without it--Pancasila--we will cease to be a state'.12 In order to understand fully Abdurrahman's political ideas and his use of Pancasila to promote democratisation, it is necessary to review the 'withdrawal' of NU from formal party politics in 1984. In particular, Abdurrahman's explanation in 1992 of why NU withdrew from the formal party system illustrates core elements in his conception of politics. In 1983 Nahdlatul Ulama became the first major islamic organisation to agree to the Soeharto government's asas tunggal(literally 'sole basis') stipulation that all organisations must accept Pancasila as their philosophical foundation.13 It is necessary to recall the extraordinary political and ideological contentiousness of this time. president Soeharto's attempt to monopolise Pancasila by insisting on the sole right to interpret and operationalise it through New Order political structures was best illustrated by government initiatives between 1973 and 1983. The 1973 emasculation of the competitive political party system reduced the number of parties to three, one of which was ostensibly 'Islamic' (the PPP) and included NU as a faction member. Soeharto's plans for the 'de-politicisation' of politics were directed at de-linking religion, and especially Islam, from party affiliation and behaviour. This constituted a genuine 'Pancasila Democracy' in the political thinking and planning of New Order strategists. However, the desire to prevent a return to political violence and contentiousness based on 'primordial' loyalties was a widely shared goal in the immediate post-Sukarno era. Abdurrahman Wahid frequently states that he shares the New Order's goal of de-linking 'primordial' behaviour from politics.14 It was in the highly polarised political climate after the Tanjung Priok riots 15 that NU held its 27th National Congress in December 1984 in Situbondo in East Java.16 A year earlier at an NU conference the organisation had stated its intention to accept Pancasila based on the nationalist heritage of NU. NU's Islamic scholars concluded that there was no need for establishing an Islamic state and that Pancasila was compatible with the principles of Islam.17 At the 1984 Congress NU formally proclaimed Indonesia to be a state based on Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945 and that this is the 'final form of state' that will govern the Indonesian archipelago.18 The acceptance of Pancasila by NU was, as noted by former Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali, a 'brilliant compromise'. This compromise was formulated by the late NU leader Kiai Achmad Siddiq, who along with Abdurrahman formed the duumvirate responsible for the transformation and revitalisation of NU. Achmad argued that NU could accept Pancasila as its asas tunggal because it was a 'philosophy created by human beings, whereas Islam was divine revelation'.19 The other significant decision in 1984 was to withdraw from active participation in politics. NU formulated this decision in a statement known as 'Kembali Ke Khittah 1926', or 'Return to the Charter of 1926'.20 Greg Barton traces NU's decision to leave formal politics to a recognition that 'party-political activity in the name of Islam was both counter-productive for the umat (community of believers), and, inasmuch as such activity gives rise to sectarianism, is unhealthy for society at large'. Moreover, Barton adds, By the mid-1970s Abdurrahman and his colleagues were expressing the conviction that the interests of the umat, and of broader society, would be better served by the umat turning away from party-political activity and embracing the non-sectarian state philosophy of Pancasila, fifteen years before it became popular, or even acceptable, to express such thought.21 The decision to withdraw from politics, according to Abdurrahman, was not only due to a desire to focus on social, educational and religious goals, but was also a response to the New Order's depoliticisation strategy. He argued that because of the unrelenting government proscription of Islamic politics and use of Pancasila to restrict the legitimate political behaviour of parties in the 1970s and early 1980s, NU decided to 'leave politics'. If NU stayed in the formal, government-sanctioned political structure then it would be increasingly compromised and unable to protect its institutional interests or the interests of the umat. NU would also be unable to contribute to the national discourse on development and politics with a distinctive, democratic and independent voice. Abdurrahman argued that formal political institutions allowed by the government were set up to support the New Order's development program and simply served to proscribe independent political behaviour. Thus, departing party politics became a way to avoid government control and manipulation. An important part of the government's de-politicisation program was its attempts to monopolise Pancasila. Withdrawing from formal politics allowed NU to promote a more liberal approach towards the state ideology. Abdurrahman explained it in the following way: So the idea was that in order to resist the government's interpretation of Pancasila as the all-embodying, all- dominating ideology, is by developing an alternative view of Pancasila. And that vision on Pancasila could only be developed outside politics.22 While Abdurrahman and NU emphasised Pancasila as the inclusive, non-sectarian state ideology, they rejected Soeharto's monopolisation of the interpretation and application of Pancasila. Moreover, Abdurrahman argues that NU as an Islamic force for democracy and religious tolerance could only be fostered outside the formal structure of New Order party politics.23 Abdurrahman argued that continued participation in the restrictive New Order political structure would render NU completely useless. In fact, he claimed that withdrawal from party-politics meant that NU's freedom of 'political' movement outside the formal structure of the New Order was significantly enhanced. The most obvious example of this strategy is his appropriation of Pancasila at NU's 1992 anniversary rally to call for religious tolerance and pluralism. The Rapat Akbar, 1 March 1992 On 1 March 1992 Nahdlatul Ulama commemorated its sixty- sixth anniversary by holding a mass rally (Rapat Akbar) at the Senayan Sports Stadium in Jakarta. According to the Jakarta press, between 150,000 and 200,000 people attended the rally.24 This was the largest non-governmental rally in twenty-five years.25 The ostensible purpose of the Rapat Akbar was to celebrate the organisation's anniversary by reiterating NU loyalty to Pancasila. Several things are curious in this. Why would the nation's largest Islamic organisation commemorate its anniversary by pledging loyalty to the state ideology? NU had already taken the decision at its 1983 national conference to accept Pancasila as its formal ideological basis. There are several reasons for this pledge of loyalty (ikrar) to Pancasila. Firstly, Abdurrahman was searching for a way to avoid endorsing President Soeharto for a fifth five-year term in office. He argued that because NU was no longer a 'political' organisation, supporting the President's renomination was Inappropriate. Secondly, he was deeply worried by the formation of the new government-sponsored Islamic organisation, ICMI, and was anxious to demonstrate that the umat still supported his leadership and the ideal of an inclusive, democratic Islam. He believed ICMI legitimised Islamic exclusivism and eroded social tolerance for non-Muslim Indonesians. He wished to show that NU supported a nascent democratisation process and would not be coopted by the government in the manner of Muslim intellectuals who had recently thrown their weight behind the government-backed ICMI. Thirdly, Abdurrahman perceived a rising tide of sectarianism and fundamentalism in Indonesia and was anxious to portray NU as representing a non-sectarian understanding of Islam. He perceived sectarianism to be threatening one of the most admirable aspects of New Order society: the severing of direct links between one's religion or ethnicity and how one participates in politics. Fourthly, there was an internal NU purpose to the Rapat Akbar. Abdurrahman sought to demonstrate that his control and support of NU could be demonstrated by a rally of up to two million NU members.26 Divisions within NU were heightened in 1991 after his formation of Forum Demokrasi, a group of intellectuals dedicated to democratising Indonesia. Some NU leaders were worried that Abdurrahman's activities on behalf of democratisation would damage NU by too closely associating it with democratic critics of the regime. Therefore, according to one observer, Abdurrahman was anxious to 'prove he was still in charge as the general chairman of NU' and that he intended the rally as a 'direct response to his critics inside the NU'.27 Two of these reasons--pressure to endorse Soeharto and ICMI--deserve detailed consideration. Pressure to Endorse Soeharto and Support for Democracy From late 1991 to early 1992 there was considerable indirect pressure on NU to endorse Soeharto for another term in office. Other major Islamic organisations, including Muhammadiyah, had already done so. In having NU instead pledge loyalty to Pancasila and to the constitution Abdurrahman avoided being locked into a statement of public support for Soeharto. It was difficult for the government to prohibit a mass meeting which sought to uphold the ideological pillars of the regime. Thus, NU did not look like it was opposing Soeharto because it supported the pillars of the state. Yet the Rapat Akbar was also Abdurrahman's vehicle for criticizing the government for acting in an undemocratic and 'anti-Pancasila' fashion.28 Abdurrahman said that if NU were to succumb to pressure to endorse Soeharto, this would have two 'catastrophic' consequences. First, such a decision would 'create dissension within NU because it is a political act'. Furthermore, he pointed out that the NU membership was divided over perceptions of Soeharto. Some members argued that the President should not be supported because he was 'not Islamic enough', while others argued that Soeharto manipulated Islam. Abdurrahman stressed, 'NU is in a very good position as the anchor of politics in Indonesia; PPP, PDI, and Golkar all need us, the armed forces needs us; nearly everybody needs us because of our mass base, which we utilise very prudently'. Abdurrahman interpreted the holding of the Rapat Akbar and its refusal to use the rally to endorse Soeharto as evidence that NU is acting as an 'agent of change': *********** 1 This article is drawn, in part, from Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia. Democracy, Islam and the Ideology in Tolerance, Routledge, London, 1995. I am very appreciative of the assistance provided by Greg Fealy and Greg Barton in the preparation of this article. 2 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 15 October 1992. 3 Djohan Effendi, a leading Islamic scholar, is Senior Researcher in the Department of Religious Affairs; Nurcholish Madjid is among the most prominent Indonesian Islamic scholars and heads a private Islamic Institute, Yayasan Paramadina. The late Ahmad Wahib was a young,broad-minded modernist thinker in the late 1960s. 4 Greg Barton, 'The Impact of Neo;-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: the emergence of 'a new pluralism', in I>avid Bourchier and John Legge, eds. Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp.144-47. See also Abdurrahman Wahid, 'Islam, Politics, and Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s', in Bourchier and Legge (1994), pp. 151-155. 5 Barton (1994), p. 147. 6 See, for example, the statement by Wahid Hasyim in 1945 that only with the 'indissoluble unity of the nation' could the healthy position of Islam be guaranteed. Cited in Harry Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. Indonesian Islam Under Japanese Occupation (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1958) p. 189. 7 Achmad Buchori Masruri, interview, 29 October 1992. 8 Abdurrahman's remarks are reprinted as 'Langkah Strategis Menjadi Pertimbangan NU', Aula (NU Journal), July 1992, p. 26. 9 Abdurrahman has on a number of occassions spoken of his father's role in formulating Pancasila. It is not at all easy however, to verify this as no documentary evidence has, as yet, come to light. 10 Abdurrahman, 'Langkah Strategis', Aula, July 1992, p. 26. 11 Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, interview, 16 April 1993. 12 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 18 June 1992. 13 On NU's acceptance of Pancasila during the asas tunggal debates, see Sidney Jones, 'The Contraction and Expansion of the Umat. Indonesia, No. 38 (October 1984); Einar M. Sitompul, Nahdlatul Ulama dan Pancasila, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991); Arief Mudatsir, 'From Situbondo Towards a New NU-A First Note', Prisma, No. 35 (March 1985), pp. 167-177; and Abdurrahman Wahid, 'The Islamic Masses in the Life of State and Nation'. Prisma, No. 35 (March 1985), pp. 3-10. 14 Abdurrahman Wahid interviews, 15 October 1992, 3 May and 15 June 1994. 15 In October 1984 riots in the North Jakarta port neighborhood of Tanjung Priok exposed a strong Muslim fear that the government's Pancasila propagation efforts were designed to dilute the political appeal of Islam. 16 NU had been singled out by Soeharto in 1980 for being anti-Pancasila. On the 1983 declaration of support for Pancasila, see for example 'Mengapa NU Menerima Pancasila Sebagai Asas', Suara Karya, 3 January 1984. 17 NU's nationalist credentials and its stated position that an Islamic state was not necessary in Indonesia can be traced back to as early as 1935 (see Sitompul, 1991) and in an explicit statement by Achmad Siddiq in the Konstituante in 1957. See Abdurrahman's citation of Siddiq's speech in 'The 1992 Election: A Devastating Political Earthquake?' in Harold Crouch and Hal Hill, eds, Indonesia Assessment 1992 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1992), p.125. However, it is also true that some NU members of the Konstituante did argue for an Islamic state. 18 See, for example, Abdurrahman Wahid, 'Pancasila dan Kondisi Obyektif Kehidupan Beragama·, Kompas, 26 September 1985; 'Abdurrahman Wahid Tentang Pancasila dan Agama', Sinar Harapan, 15 March 1985; and Manggi Habir, 'Ulamas Change Course', Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter referred to as FEER), 10 January 1985, pp. 36-39. 19 Munawir Sjadzali, interview, 12 April 1993 and Sidney Jones (1984), p.17. 20 See Sitompul (1991) and Mudatsir (1985) 21 Barton (1994), p. 147. 22 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 18 June 1992. See also the interview with Abdurrahman, We' Want to Reform Society', Asiaweek, 20 March 1992, p. 37. 23 Abdurrahman Wahid, 15 October 1992. 24 See 'Rapat Akbar NU Aman, Tertib, Lancar', Kompas, 2 March 1992 and 'Only 150,000 Come to NU Gathering', Jakarta Post, 2 March 1992. However, Abdurrahman Wahid argues that nearly 500,000 NU followers came to the stadium. Only those gathered directly in front of the main podium numbered approximately 150,000. Abdurrahman also says that the armed forces prevented many thousands more from coming to Jakarta for the rally. Interview, 17 September 1994. 25 Excellent coverage of the Rapat Akbar is found in many of Jakarta's dailies and national newsweeklies. See, for example, 'Gus Dur dan Massa di Parkir Timur', Tempo, 7 March 1992, pp. 23-26; and cover story in Editor, 'Warga NU Mana Kiblatmu', 7 March 1992, pp. 11-31. 26 On Abdurrahman's initial plan for up to two million people to attend the Rapat Akbar, see his interview 'Saya Ini Makelar Akhirat', Matra, March 1992, p. 13. 27 Muhammad Ryaas Rasyid, Stare Formation, Party System and the Prospect for Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of Golkar. 1967-1993, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1994, p. 293. 28 Abdurrahman Wahid, interview, 18 June 1992.