mention performance of the haj in this context; the haj only results in the individual acquisition of merit, while giving zakat and shadaqah is also an act of social solidarity. Among the possible interpretations of izzul Islam wal Muslimin, finally, Kiai Achmad mentions the need for Muslims to overcome their under-representation in politics and economics, nationally as well as internationally. He was, more than other ulama, acutely aware of how backward the Muslim umat (community) in general was compared to the West and Japan, how underdeveloped the Indonesian Muslims were compared to the Christian minority and the secular elite, and how far NU's following lagged behind the modernist Muslims. This awareness gave the old term of izzul Islam wal Muslimin as he used it a new overtone of emancipation. This reformulation of NU's khittah caused a few raised eyebrows even among the kiai. Some of the politicians no doubt felt Kiai Achmad's ideas to be an attack on their own interpretation of what NU stood for, and many of the kiai too were not at once convinced by his arguments against radicalism and in favour of moderation and accommodation. The terms he used in support, tawassuth, i'tidal and tawazun, were known to the kiai and understood to represent desirable attitudes. Many kiai privately said, however, that they had never before heard NU's ideals and values defined by these terms; Kiai Achmad's interpretation of them too was new to many.22 That in the end he carried the day was due to his excellent personal credentials, being Machfoezh Shiddiq's younger brother and having been Wahid Hasjim's personal secretary, and to the political skills he had acquired in his long bureaucratic career. The 'Tim Tujuh' and the Situbondo Decisions Kiai Achmad was not the only one who attempted to lay down in writing what, according to him, was the essence of NU's tradition. Not long after Kiai Bisri Syansuri's death a grave conflict divided the organisation into two opposing camps, commonly called the Cipete and Situbondo groups, after the residences of the major protagonists, Idham Chalid and Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin. Idham Chalid had, since 1956, been the chairman-general (ketua umum) of NU and had shown great political flexibility and willingness to serve any government in power. He had been the president of PPP since its establishment and also in this function apparently had connived in chairman Naro's purging of vocal NU deputies from the party's list of candidates for the 1982 elections. Idham became the chief target of the general dissatisfaction of the kiai with the Jakarta politicians. On the eve of the 1982 elections, the four most senior kiai from East and Central Java visited Idham and persuaded him to resign the chairmanship for 'health reasons'. A few days later, Idham withdrew his resignation under pressure from his closest supporters. For over two years, until the congress of 1984, the organisation remained practically without an effective leadership. Idham was recognised by none but his closest supporters, but his opponents refrained from designating another chairman. The conflict was widely seen as one between kiai and politicians, even though kiai were to be found in both groups, as were politicians.23 A number of young and reform-minded men belonging to NU's elite families made concerted attempts to overcome the crisis. They attempted to mediate between the Cipete and Situbondo groups, and at the same time used, as best they could, the opportunity provided by the crisis to place themselves and their ideas in position to take over. This group included Abdurrahman Wahid, Fahmi Saifuddin (a medical doctor and rapidly rising bureaucrat, the son of Saifuddin Zuhri), the kiai- poet Musthofa Bisri of Rembang and another medical doctor, Muhammad Thohir of Surabaya (a nephew of Machfoezh and Achmad Siddiq). Inviting a few other kiai, young intellectuals and community development activists, they established in mid-1983 a forum to discuss the changes they thought necessary in NU.24 The Majlis-24, as this forum came to be called after the number of its members, appeared almost unanimous in their perception that three decades of practical politics had prevented NU from devoting sufficient attention to its religious, social and economic functions. Empty slogans and emotional posturing had taken the place of constructive efforts. It was felt that NU had got off the right track a long time ago and that it should attempt to regain its original purity by re-emphasising its identity as a jam'iyyah diniyyah, a religious association (the Arabic term as always suggesting a more profound meaning than could be expressed by its Indonesian equivalent). The forum called for the 'restoration' (pemulihan) of the original 'khittah' and gave a seven-man team (the 'Tim Tujuh') from their midst the task of formulating more explicit recommendations on the subject.25 The frequent references to the past and to the khittah of 1926 were not simply a transparent attempt to disguise reformist intentions and to claim traditional legitimation. The initiators of these debates had a genuine interest in the past. They dug up the original statutes of the organisation and the Arabic preamble to the statutes (titled Muqaddimah Al-Qanun al-asasi) written by Hasjim Asj'ari for guidance, and they later made both widely available.26 In its recommendations, however, the 'Tim Tujuh' even more clearly than Kiai Achmad Siddiq was looking forward to the future.27 The team did take up several of Kiai Achmad's ideas but it added an emphasis of its own. The fact that none of the seven was a kiai and that all were concerned with the social and economic problems of the umat is evident both from the overall tone of the document and from the specific topics taken up for discussion. Of the various fields of activity discussed in the recommendations, education received the longest paragraph. It concentrated on modern science and technology and did not even mention religious education. This section was followed by a paragraph on social and economic activities, pleading for training in entrepreneurship and cooperatives, family planning, care for orphans and the aged, and community development. The same concern with the social and economic problems of the umat is perceptible in what the Tim Tujuh had to say on more strictly religious matters. It recommended that the concept of worship ('ibadah) be understood in a less restricted sense than had been common and that social solidarity and charitable work too be seen as acts of worship. The most formal, legalistic aspect of religion, the mazhab system should, according to the team, be made more flexible and responsive to new social developments and changing needs. In matters of organisation, finally, the team declared it urgent for NU to complete the transition from political party to Jam'yyah diniyyah--it clearly did not subscribe to Kiai Achmad's claim that the transition had in fact been made in 1973. What exactly this transition should mean was not made more explicit, and members of the Tim Tujuh would a few years later find themselves in conflict with each other over the consequences to be drawn from this recommendation. The team furthermore judged that supreme leadership in NU should be held by the Syuriah, the ulama council, and not, therefore, by the Jakarta-based politicians of the Tanfidziah (executive board), as it had effectively been for most of the past three decades. The reform-minded group had its lobbying well organised (which no doubt was facilitated by the fact its ideas were quite agreeable to the government). The recommendations of the Tim Tujuh were submitted to and largely adopted by the NU conference (Munas, 'national consultation') of December 1983 and the congress of the following year, both in Situbondo. The congress elected Abdurrahman Wahid as the new chairman- general, and no less than eleven other members of the Majlis-24 were also given positions on the new board. The greatest winner, however, was Kiai Achmad Siddiq, who had become the inevitable choice for rais am, due no doubt to strong backing from the government as well as his own clever manoeuvring. The 'Situbondo decisions' incorporate most of Achmad Siddiq's earlier formulations. The influence of the younger reformers is most clearly evident in the demand for a greater social relevance of NU activities at the Situbondo Munas and congress, which became even louder on subsequent occasions. The Munas discussed syu'un ijtima'iyyah (a new but traditional-sounding term meaning 'matters of social concern') and decided to carry out a number of modest community development projects: cooperatives, legal aid, a self-reliant transmigration project and clean water procurement. Clearly there was less than unanimity among the delegates as to what constituted matters of social concern, for among the matters of social concern listed in another recommendation by the same Munas we find the cost of the haj, the need for a handbook on how to coach new converts to Islam, proper Islamic dress, the separation of boys and girls on the sports field. The emphasis on social relevance also found expression in a new and different approach to the discussion of religious questions, always an important part of the proceedings at any NU congress. Questions to which local branches had not been able to find satisfactory answers were discussed in a separate session at the congress, where NU's leading fiqh experts gave their opinions. In the past, these questions had always been haphazard and not related to each other, and they were usually answered very briefly, with a reference to an authoritative fiqh work but without any attempt to explain why this reference was relevant to the case at hand.28 The reformers wished both different, more relevant questions and a different, more intellectual, way of answering them. At the 1984 congress, participants in the sessions discussing religious questions were confronted with a number of questions prepared in advance, several of which appealed to a sense of social justice. 'Which is more meritorious: performing the haj more than once if one can afford it, or using those funds to improve social welfare?29 Can zakat, or part of it, instead of being divided among the entitled recipients, be used to other purposes that are in the public interest?'29 On later occasions-- the 1987 Cilacap Munas and the 1989 congress in Yogyakarta-- the people who prepared the questions deliberately phrased them so that it was almost impossible to simply look up an answer in a fiqh book. Each question consisted of a number of sub-questions covering a range of situations, formulated in such _a way that they could hardly be mechanically answered but required deeper reflection. Two of the problems discussed at the 1989 congress were 'medical' questions reminiscent of important ethical debates in the West. Is a testament valid that bequeathes one's organs for transplantation to some person who needs them, considering that one of the conditions for the validity of a bequest is one's full ownership?' The answer to this one--after some discussion and quoting of appropriate texts--was negative, because according to the syari'ah one's organs are not one's own property but belong to God alone. The ulama decided to add to this answer, almost as an afterthought, that human organ transplants are allowed when medically necessary and when there is no alternative cure. The second question concerned euthanasia. The people who had prepared this one clearly intended to stimulate a fundamental discussion on the subject and presented a number of interesting hypothetical cases. May the costly treatment of an incurable patient (far beyond the financial capacities of his family) be stopped at his own request? Or of a patient who has been in coma for a long time without any hope of his regaining consciousness? Or, out of pity, the treatment of the victim of an accident who is certain to remain a physical and mental cripple if he lives? Where, the questions continued, does Islam place the boundary between life and death, and which are the outward signs by which life or death may be defined? The ulama declined to be drawn into a debate on these choices; they agreed that Islam enjoins the protection of life under all circumstances and that euthanasia is therefore strictly forbidden. The only question that did engender a lively debate in which rational arguments were used and not just quotations from fiqh books, consisted of a rephrasing of a question negatively answered at the previous congress. May zakat, instead of being distributed in the form of money and/or food, also be spent on some productive investment on behalf of the same beneficiaries? Simply phrased, what should one give the poor, fish or fish hooks? This question was of course directly relevant to the role NU wished to play in alleviating the poverty and backwardness of most of its constituency. Many of the ulama tended to respond emotionally to this question and answer with arguments based in a conception of fairness. The discussion, incidentally, remained inconclusive (apart from the provisional stricture that any alternative uses of the zakat should be agreed upon by those who have a right to its enjoyment). Conclusion Kiai Achmad Siddiq and the younger group of reformers have been successful in effecting a major shift in traditionalist discourse within NU. This shift was in congruence with the partially voluntary realignment of priorities away from political to educational and community welfare-oriented activities. The emphasis in Kiai Achmad's formulations on the middle path between extremes and on tolerance towards others was no doubt also viewed favourably by the government. This did not mean, however, that these principles were simply stated for reasons of political expedience. Both Kiai Achmad and many of the younger reformers were genuinely convinced of the need for dialogue rather than confrontation with different sections of the umat and with non-Muslims. Abdurrahman Wahid especially has repeatedly asserted his firm support for an inclusive nationalism over and against all forms of 'sectarianism' (a term that refers to narrower group loyalties and perception of non-Muslims as potential enemies). His strongest praise for Kiai Achmad Siddiq as a thinker concerned the latter's ideas on the concept of ukhuwwah, 'brotherhood.' Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah is a term commonly used in Indonesia to indicate the desirability of good relations between the various currents within Indonesian Islam, especially between NU and Muhammadiyah. Kiai Achmad put this ukhuwwah into practice when he presided over a formal reconciliation between both organisations. To this well-known ideal of brotherhood he added two new dimensions, which he named ukhuwwah wathaniyyah and ukhuwwah basyariyyah, indicating that they encompassed, respectively, the entire fatherland and all of humanity. These terms stood for his concern with the common interests of all Indonesians in their nation's economic and political welfare and with the common interests of all humanity in world peace and protection of the environment. He and Abdurrahman Wahid with a few others succeeded in introducing these concerns into traditionalist religious discourse. The same term of ukhuwwah, along with syu'un ijtima'iyyah and similar neo-traditional terms, also represent attempts to focus traditionalist discourse more on problems of social justice and economic development. In 1984 it was obvious that many of the ulama attending the congress failed to grasp what the reformers really wished to discuss, or simply refused to let themselves be drawn into that sort of discussion. In the following decade, however, many kiai gradually grew accustomed to a new style of discussion of religious questions. One of the initiatives born out of the Situbondo conference was a regularly convening study circle (halqah) in which young committed ulama with a few senior kiai addressed contemporary social and political problems, that were presented to them by outside experts. These discussions forced the participants at times to overstep the boundaries of the worn fiqh book discourse and think creatively.30 Taqlid and the mazhab were challenged and given slightly different meanings. Instead of following Imam Syafi'i's mazhab, i.e. the ready-made answers of his school, some of the younger kiai suggested that taqlid should mean following his manhaj,' his method--which allows for much more flexibility. Thanks to the patronage of by now senior kiai such as Kiai Sahal Mahfudh and Kiai Imron Hamzah, the halqah discussions had a much wider impact than the relatively small number of participants might suggest. Some of the problems first discussed in the halqah were later presented in the religious discussions sessions at NU's 1992 Lampung Munas. The most remarkable decision of this conference was also an important victory for the halgah group. For the first time the assembled ulama accepted a form of collective ijtihad as a legitimate method of answering religious-juridical questions to which no unambiguous answer can be found by more established methods. This was a watershed decision, guaranteeing that not only what the ulama discuss is changing, but also the methods by which they discuss it. ********* 22 KH Muchith Muzadi of Jember, who for many years acted as Kiai Achmad Siddiq's secretary, told with relish of the surprise of many of his colleagues when they first read Kiai Achmad's booklet. 23 The conflict is discussed more extensively in my book on the Nahdlatul Ulama in the 1980s, NU. Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Wacana Baru, LKiS, Yogyakarta, 1994. [Editors' note: a revised English-language version entitled Traditionalist Muslims in a Modernizing World: The Nahdlaful Ulama and Indonesia 's New Order is forthcoming.] 24 Besides those already mentioned, the Majlis 24 included the then junior Kiai Sahai Mahfudz (the first NU kiai to become actively involved in community development) and Muchith Muzadi of Jember (who often acted as Achmad Siddiq's secretary and is believed by many to be responsible for part of Siddiq's formulations), former student activist M. Zamroni, community development worker Abdullah Sjarwani, NU youth leader Slamet Effendy Yusuf, and the student leader and most promising young thinker, Masdar F. Mas'udi. 25 The members of this 'Tim Tujuh' were: H. Abdurrahman Wahid, M. Zamroni, H.M. Said Budairy, 11. Mahbub Djunaidi, H. Fahmi D. Saifuddin, H.M. Danial Tanjung and A. Bagdja, all of them young men based in Jakarta. Not a member of the team, but making crucial contributions to the ideas formulated and their later implementation was KH Mustofa Bisri of Rembang. 26 The statutes were published as an appendix to a book by a journalist close to the reform-minded group, Choirul Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul I/lama (Sala: Jatayu, 1985). The Muqaddimah al-Qanun al-asasi was translated into Indonesian by KH Musthofa Bisri and later appended to the Situbondo decisions (Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27 Situbondo, pp. 121-132). Comparison of this translation with the earlier one mentioned in note 7 shows how much interpretation is involved in translating even a relatively simple text like this. 27 Pokok-pokok Pikiran Tentang Pemulihan Khittah Nahdlatul Ulama 1926 (Jakarta: Tim Tujuh Untuk Pemulihan Khittah NU 1926, 1983). I am grateful to Fahmi Saifuddin, a member of this team, for an enlightening expose on the process of 'return to the khittah.' 28 The questions and answers discussed at the first 25 congresses have been collected in three slim volumes titled Ahkam al-fuqaha, published by Toha Putra, Semarang. 29 Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27, pp. 62-66. 30 This halqah and its role in opening up fiqh discourse are discussed at some length in my forthcoming book on NU. [Editor's note: for publications details, see footnote 23.]