Chapter Seven
Traditions for the Future:
The Reconstruction of
Traditionalist Discourse
Within NU

Martin van Bruinessen


  When the Muslim modernists of the early 20th century were
thinking about developing an Islamic practice appropriate to the
modern age, they raised the slogan of return to the original
scriptural sources, Qur'an and Hadis, throwing off the intellectual
ballast accumulated during the intervening thirteen centuries.
They attributed the stagnation of the Muslim world to the heavy
weight of established practice, the blind following (taqlid) of
earlier generations of Muslim thinkers, and they were convinced
that the exercise of ijtihad, independent interpretation of the
Qur'an and hadis (though within definite limits) would make
Islam much more adaptable to new circumstances.
  When in the early 1980s the Nahdlatul Ulama made a radical
break with its recent past as a political party, this too was
explained as a return to an earlier past, to the spirit of the
founding fathers, to the strategy (khittah) of the year 1926,
when the organisation was established. It was hardly a
coincidence that simultaneously with this alleged return to
tradition, leadership of the organisation passed from the tired old
men who had unimaginatively been at the helm into the hands of
two younger men who were, each in his own way, very much
concerned about the future of Islam and of the people whom
they were going to lead. The very concept of the khittah of
1926 was, in fact, first formulated by one of them, Kiai Achmad
Siddiq, as recently as 1979.1 Both 'modernist' and 'traditionalist'
Muslims, when planning to take a step forward, thus appealed to
an older tradition--although what was understood thereby in
these two cases was quite different.
  There is a growing awareness among historians and
anthropologists that the relationship between tradition and
change, or tradition and modernity, is not as straightforward as
earlier generations used to think. Not only is the body of
tradition in any society continually evolving, it is also often
subject to deliberate innovations.2 We have for some time now
been aware that many allegedly ancient traditions are in fact
quite recent inventions.3 This may be true of religious traditions
as well as of court ceremonies or the rituals surrounding sports
events. Bearing this in mind, there is no a priori reason to
presume that a self-consciously traditionalist organisation (such
as the Nahdlatul Ulama) is less dynamic or less prone to change
than a self-proclaimed anti-traditional one.

NU and Islamic Tradition

  Any attempt to define what the Nahdlatul Ulama is, what it
represents and what it stands for, involves the concept of
tradition; tradition is the essence of its self-perception and self-
definition. There is no single Indonesian (or Javanese) term
covering the entire semantic range of this self-conscious
traditionalism. Instead, the foreign loanwords 'tradisi' and
'tradisional' are often used. Thus one may speak of Islam
tradisional; a recent study of the pesantren (Islamic school)
world by a person of NU background was entitled Tradisi
Pesantren,4 and a textbook for use in NU-affiliated schools
discusses a few points of difference with modernists under the
heading of Tradisi keagamaan kaum Nahdliyyin,'The religious
traditions of NU's followers'.5 The absence of an indigenous
term suggests that the present awareness of the tradition as such
is relatively recent.
  What does the NU's traditionalism consist of! There are
several key concepts in Islam that are frequently translated as
'tradition', the most important of them being hadis, sunnah and
adat. None of these terms is co-extensive with Muslim
traditionalism, and with the last it has had a highly ambivalent
relationship. Adat (Ar. `adah) is local practice, the way of the
ancestors; since for the first generations of Indonesian Muslims
the ancestors obviously were not Muslims, Islam and adat have
at some times and places been at odds. As time went by,
however, inevitably more and more of the ancestors were
Muslims, and adat was gradually adapted to Islam (or even came
to incorporate elements from Muslim law). Conversely, much of
adat came to be seen as part and parcel of Islam. In the view of
Muslim reformists, the religious practice of the traditionalists is
pervaded with local practices of non-Islamic origin; it is a
mixture of Islam and adat. The traditionalists themselves
strongly object to this view; they emphasise that traditionalist
ulama have played leading roles in the struggle against adat
practices that are in conflict with the syari'ah.
  The sunnah of the Prophet, i.e. the precedents set by him for
believers to follow, constitutes a core element in the self-
conscious traditionalism of the NU ulama. Traditionalist
Indonesian Muslims refer to themselves as ahlus sunnah wal
jama'ah (abbreviated to Aswaja), 'people of the sunnah and the
(orthodox) community'. This term explicitly excludes
rationalists (who depend on reason rather than the sunnah) and
all sorts of sectarians, notably the Shi'is (who have de facto
broken with the Sunni community). But the traditionalists most
commonly use the term to distinguish themselves from
modernist and reformist Muslims, whom they also see as
deviating from the sunnah. The latter, however, firmly claim
that they themselves are the true ahlus sunnah wal jama'ah and
point out that for many traditionalist beliefs and practices no
Prophetic precedent can be found. Reformists and traditionalists
have different perceptions of the sunnah, rooted in different
attitudes towards the hadis.
  Hadis (literally meaning 'reports' but commonly translated as
'traditions') are sayings attributed to the Prophet or,
occasionally, eyewitness reports concerning his acts. They
constitute the major source of knowledge of the sunnah of the
Prophet and thereby embody the most authoritative doctrinal
and behavioural norms. The hadis have in fact had a much
greater impact on the life of the Muslim community than the
Qur'an has; there is no belief or practice that is not ultimately
legitimated by some hadis. In the light of what was observed
above on tradition in general, it should come as no surprise that
numerous hadis can be shown to be later fabrications, apparently
invented in order to legitimate existing local practices, to
support one faction as against others, or to address problems
arising long after the Prophet's lifetime.6
  When the modernists and reformists raised the slogan of
return to the Qur'an and hadis, they meant by the latter the
canonical collections of 'sound' (shahih) traditions, from which
the most obvious falsifications had been weeded out.
Traditionalists also acknowledged the central importance of
hadis, but before the early 20th century, the canonical
collections of Bukhari and Muslim were not studied in the
pesantren. Many santri, it is true, got to know one or more of
the shorter 'Forty Hadis' collections that were popular
throughout the Muslim world, or even one of the larger
collections of devotional and moralistic hadis.7 Mostly,
however, they encountered hadis in the 'processed' form, as
they are quoted in support of an argument in the texts on fiqh
('junsprudence') and doctrine that made up most of the
pesantren curriculum.8 For in matters of law and doctrine,
traditionalist Muslims--and here we come to the core of the
tradition--follow the great ulama of the past rather than
deriving their own conclusions from the Qur'an and hadis. In
other words, they adhere to one of the orthodox mazhab or
schools of law and practise taqlid, i.e. follow the rulings of the
founding father and other major scholars of this school as they
are found in standar fiqh works.

Fiqh, Mazhab and Taqlid

  Taqlid and mazhab are perhaps the most central concepts of
the learned variety of traditionalist Islam. A few ulama of
exemplary learning and piety in the early Islamic period laid
down the principles of jurisprudence and legal practice in more
or less fixed mazhab (lit. 'path'). In so doing, they practised
ijtihad or independent interpretation of the scriptural sources.
Later generations modestly refrained from ijtihad and practised
taqlid instead. In the traditionalist view, it is perilous to depend
on one's own reading of the Qur'an and hadis, as it may lead to
sinful error. The average believer, and even learned scholars, can
only avoid going astray by strict adherence to one of the
mazhab, i.e., by relying on its standard works of fiqh. Out of a
larger number existing in the past, only four Sunni schools of law
survive, the Hanafi, Syafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali mazhab
(sometimes the Shiite Ja`fari mazhab is counted as the fifth).
Indonesian Muslims almost without exception used to adhere to
the Syafi'i mazhab, which was also the dominant one in South
Arabia and southern India.
  Fiqh is, for the traditionalists, the queen of the sciences; it is
the guide for all behaviour, prescribing what the believer should
and should not do. In the other religious sciences of doctrine
('aqidah) and mysticism (tasawwuf), they also practice taqlid,
following in matters of belief Asy'ari and his school (with lip-
service to the rival school of Maturidi) and in mysticism the
moderate Ghazali, while rejecting Ibn 'Arabi's mysticism and
metaphysics. Reformists reject Asy'ari and Ghazali (as well as, of
course, Ibn 'Arabi) and elevate the puritan Ibn Taimiyyah to the
status of the greatest scholar of the past. Ibn Taimiyya's works,
in turn, are anathema in the pesantren world.
  The traditionalist insistence on taqlid appears to be rooted in
a pessimistic view of history, according to which knowledge and
piety necessarily decrease with increasing distance from the
Prophetic intervention. Today's ulama are believed to be but
pale shadows of the great scholars of the past, and presuming to
improve upon their rulings by practising one's own ijtihad is
seen as unwarranted arrogance. Reformists and modernists, on
the other hand. vehementlv criticised 'blind ra4lid' and the
accompanying medieval mentality as responsible for the
backwardness of Indonesia's Muslim community. Their call for a
return to the Qur'an and hadis often amounted to a radical
rejection of most of the religious literature of the intervening
period, and especially of fiqh and its mazhab.9
  Both traditionalists and reformists, incidentally, have tended
to exaggerate the rigidity of the mazhab. It is true that fiqh
books prescribe in great detail what has to be done in numerous
specific situations, but a fair amount of flexibility and freedom
has always existed because fiqh is neither a complete nor a
consistent system. It is not complete, for many concrete
problems are not covered by it, so that the expert has to choose
which known problem he considers most relevant to the case at
hand. And the casuistry of the fuqaha (experts in fiqh) is
proverbial; a skilled legist can find arguments in support of
almost any opinion. This is further facilitated by the fact that
on many questions that are explicitly treated in the fiqh works
there appear to exist not one but several answers, derived by
different leading lights of the mazhab or sometimes by the same
expert in different periods of his life. Due to the willingness to
accommodate different opinions and inconsistencies, the
mazhab have retained a certain potential for development and
adaptability. Taqlid is not necessarily rigid. Ironically, in the late
20th century, traditionalist ulama often appear more flexible
than the spokesmen for reformist Islam, many of whom have
not evolved beyond the positions taken at the beginning of this
century.

Respect and Rituals for the Dead

  The concept of taqlid is closely associated with the great
respect in which the ulama, and especially those of the past, are
held by traditionalist Muslims. The ulama deserve respect as the
carriers of (religious) knowledge; they are, as a celebrated hadis
has it, the 'inheritors of the prophets'. The transmission of
religious knowledge, even if this concerns only a written text,
involves a personal relationship between teacher and disciple,
and the latter is acutely aware of being at the end of a long chain
of such teacher-disciple links (the chain is called isnad in the
case of hadis and other textual knowledge, silsilah in the case of
mystical initiations). It is the disciple's duty to continue paying
respect to his teachers and teachers' teachers, even after their
deaths. He may also request a deceased teacher's, or another
saint's, intercession, blessing or supernatural support.
Pilgrimages to the shrines of the saints who introduced Islam to
the archipelago and to those of great ulama--especially the kiai
who allegedly possessed supernatural powers--are an important
part of traditionalist religious life. Most pesantren organise
annual celebrations, called khaul (Ar. hawl), to commemorate
the deaths of their founders.
  The khaul is a special case of ziarah kubur, the visiting of
graves that is considered as meritorious in traditionalist circles
(and much frowned upon by reformists). It is part of a whole
complex of practices relating to the dead, based on the
assumption that some form of contact still exists. On the first
seven nights after a death, relatives and friends come together
for a ritual meal preceded by prayers and tahlilan (recitation of
the creed la ilaha illa'llah). The participants present the merit
(pahala, sawab) of prayers and recitation as a gift to the soul of
the deceased. In the same way, one says prayers and Qur'anic
verses when visiting a grave, as a present to the person buried
there. In exchange, especially when visiting graves of saints, one
may ask for intercession with God, the cure for a disease,
business success or other forms of supernatural assistance, or
seek a divinatory dream or vision. In the view of the sufis, even
after their death teachers remain indispensible as intermediaries
in the chain of spiritual guidance from the Prophet to the
individual believer.
  These practices are severely condemned by reformists, in
whose opinion communication ends with death and all attempts
at contacts beyond the grave are no less than syirk, idolatry.
Much more than technical questions of taqlid versus ijtihad, it is
these practices that maintain a sharp boundary between
reformists and modernists on the one hand, and traditionalists on
the other. On the former matter, both sides have evolved in
converging directions (more emphasis on canonical hadis in the
pesantren and more respect for the intellectual tradition of fiqh
among reformists). On the point of relations with the dead,
however, the difference is as wide now as it was seventy years
ago. This is, therefore, certainly at present, the most sharply
distinguishing feature of Muslim traditionalism in Indonesia. It is
recognised as such by several NU-affiliated authors, and the
defence of the said practices receives much attention in their
apologetic works.10 However, in the more self-conscious recent
statements on Muslim traditionalism, the various reformulations
of NU's khittah, these practices are hardly mentioned and
certainly not given any emphasis.

Demise of the Traditionalist-Reformist Conflict

  There is no disagreement as to the centrality of the above-
mentioned traditions to the identity of NU. Taqlid with the
Imam Syafi'i in questions of religious obligations, with Imam
Asy'ari in matters of doctrine, and with Ghazali in mysticism
and piety, extraordinary veneration for the ulama of the past,
presenting prayers and other gifts to the dead and asking for
their intercession were the elements of traditional religiosity
most fiercely attacked by reformist and modernist Muslims in
the first decades of this century. Traditionalism, which declared
those aspects of religious practice that were the most criticised
to be the most essential, was the understandable defensive
reaction to the reformist onslaught. In the 1920s and 1930s the
debates between reformists and traditionalists were heated, but
the emotions have long since subsided. In matters concerning the
relations with the dead, the reformist and traditionalist
viewpoints are as irreconcilable as ever, although this now rarely
leads to open conflicts between neighbours anymore. In the
taqlid versus ijtihad debate, however, there has been among the
traditionalists a gradual shift towards accommodation with
reformist positions.
  An early attempt at reconciliation was made by Kiai
Machfoezh Shiddiq, who was the NU chairman-general from
1937 to 1942. In an influential booklet he argued that there was
no real contradiction between taqlid and ijtihad. 'Strict' ijtihad
was only practised by the great imams of the past, but within the
mazhab there remain numerous problems that cannot be solved
by literal following of those imams, and that necessitates
interpretation and creative thought of a lower order. Taqlid
should never consist of the blind unthinking following that is so
criticised by reformists, but in Machfoezh Shiddiq's view
necessarily involves a certain amount of what the reformists
term ijtihad. Reformists, on the other hand, agree that ijtihad
may only be practised within very strict limitations.11 Kiai
Machfoezh' younger brother Achmad Siddiq was later to develop
this argument a little further in his Khitthah Nahdliyah, and as
NU's rais am was to preside over the formal reconciliation of
Muhammadiyah and NU.
  It needs hardly be said that the heated reformist-traditionalist
debates of a half century ago were not part of the idealised past
that the 'return to the khittah of 1926' should recreate. Those
thinkers in NU who attempted a formulation of the khittah were
also for various reasons in favour of further accommodation
with the reformists and wished for an emulation of their
successes in education, welfare and social mobility. They
therefore tended to under emphasise in their formulations the
dimensions of traditionalism that were previously used to define
the boundaries with reformism.12 There were no anti-reformist
overtones in any stage of the discussions on the 'return to the
khittah of 1926.'

The Desire for Change and Definitions of the Khittah

  When the 1984 NU Congress at Situbondo decided to 'return
to the khittah of 1926' there was little agreement as to what
precisely was meant by those words. Different persons held and
continue to hold different, sometimes even conflicting, views on
this return to a better past, depending on what they perceived to
be the major ills of the present. The sources of discontent had
been numerous recently: the increasing political marginalisation
of NU, its failure to contribute to the well-being of its
constituency, and the declining role of the kiai in the
organisation. To some delegates at the congress, returning to
NU's original platform implied a clean break with parliamentary
politics; to others it meant that the ulama should take full
control of the organisation again (after it had been hijacked by
the politicians); to yet others it signified that NU should also
represent the social and economic interests of its constituency.
  Since NU had been forced to merge with other Muslim parties
into the PPP (United Development Party), its effectiveness as a
channel of political and economic patronage had steadily
declined. NU politicians faced heavy-handed government
intervention in PPP to reduce their influence. NU-affiliated
businessmen faced economic boycotts: not only were they not
awarded government contracts, but even their dealings with
private sector partners were often blocked by local authorities.
These were reprisals for the oppositional role NU played in
Indonesia's parliament during the 1970s. Many, if not most, of
NU's local branch committees were dominated by businessmen
who desired to get rid of the odium of political opposition.
  Many kiai felt that they had lost their grip on the
organisation; by name it still was an organisation of ulama but in
practice it was run by urban politicians who had little time for
the rural kiai. The kiai were, of course, not just losing control of
the organisation, their influence in society at large was declining
even faster. They were no longer the highest educated persons of
their villages, and the value of a pesantren education had fallen
far below that of a western-type school diploma.
  The largely rural mass following of NU belonged to the most
backward segments of Indonesian society, and Indonesia's
pattern of economic development tended to exacerbate their
relative backwardness. Some young members of the NU elite felt
that the emphasis on political struggle during the past decades
had led to neglect of NU's educational role and of its
responsibility for the welfare of its following. They too looked
back to a less politicised past to legitimise the community
development-type activities they envisaged.

The Founding Fathers, the Khittah and the Future

  Apart from discontent in various circles, there is another
reason why around 1980 there was an increasing demand for an
explicit formulation of NU's principles. This was the inevitable
process of ageing and death of the charismatic leaders of the first
era. The great ulama of the founding generation enjoyed
tremendous respect in NU circles, and as long as they were alive
it was they who embodied NU's values and aims.
  Until 1980, the highest position in the organisation had in
turn been held by the three most respected founders, Hasjim
Asj'ari (d. 1947), Wahab Chasbullah (d. 1971) and Bisri Syansuri
(d. 1980). Each of them put a highly personal stamp on the
organisation, resulting in quite different emphases in NU's
traditionalism. It was not only due to changed external
circumstances that NU's behaviour in their respective periods
shows great differences. NU's unyielding support for Sukarno's
policies was very much due to Kiai Wahab and his pragmatic
attitude. The 'radical traditionalism' of the 1980s, which several
times brought NU into open conflict with the New Order
government,13 was just as much due to Kiai Bisri's personality
and his different views as to when one should be principled.
  The difference between the attitudes of Kiai Wahab and Kiai
Bisri is often explained by their preferences of, respectively,
qawa'id al-fiqh and ushul al-fiqh as methods of deciding which
course of action is dictated by Islamic law in a given situation.
To many concrete questions, as mentioned above, the fiqh
literature does not provide unambiguous answers. The qawa'id
(singular, qa'idah, 'rule') are simple legal maxims, rules of
thumb for quickly cutting through a problem. One of the most
celebrated of these maxims may be paraphrased as 'the
prevention of developments that could be detrimental or sinful
has a higher priority than the pursuit of that which is beneficial
or morally superior.14 Reliance on this maxim, to the
unsympathetic observer, will be hard to distinguish from ordinary
opportunism. Ushul al-fiqh, on the other hand, is a sophisticated
methodology of fiqh, detailing how to arrive at a judgement
from first principles (Qur'an, hadis, consensus of the great
ulama of the past), allowing a restricted form of reasoning by
analogy (qiyas). It is a strict and severe intellectual discipline,
that does not condition its practitioners for compromise. Kiai
Bisri clearly was the better scholar; Kiai Wahab had the stronger
political instinct. His use of qawa'id al-fiqh gave religious
legitimation to what his instincts told him was in the best
interests of NU.
  After Bisri Syansuri's death, none of the founding fathers
remained, and there was nobody left who could be said to embody
NU's principles (Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin tried to act that part
but was not really successful). This made it more urgent for the
principles to be laid down explicitly; it was necessary to define
the traditions that until recently had been present in the form of
the founding fathers. In a way, one could say that Kiai Bisri's
real successor was the khittah.15
  The idea that a new formulation of NU's aims and principles
should take the place of the living presence of the Ulama of the
founding generation was expressed quite explicitly by Kiai
Achmad Siddiq in the booklet in which he attempted this
formulation.16 Kiai Wahab and Kiai Bisri were still alive then but
according to the author the time had come for an authoritative
statement. Not only was he worried about the widening gap
between the founding fathers and the younger generation of NU
members, but he also perceived that the latter had become very
heterogeneous in educational and cultural backgrounds.
  One gathers that this observation referred to the fact that
NU's becoming a political party had made the organisation
dependent on leaders with different skills, and perhaps different
basic values as well, than those transmitted in the pesantren.
During the 1955 elections NU did not itself have sufficient
educated members to fill all the parliamentary seats it had won,
and it had to recruit outsiders. This pattern continued into the
1970s, and even many politicians of solid NU family
backgrounds lacked the exposure to pesantren education that
could have made the kiai's norms and values second nature to
them.

Kiai Achmad Siddiq's Restatement of the Khittah
 
  Kiai Achmad Siddiq emphasised that NU had been established
as a purely religious organisation (jam'iyyah diniyyah) and that
its participation in practical politics had been only an
intermezzo that had in fact ended in 1973, when the political
role was taken over by the PPP.17 This was not how most
people then saw the situation: the general view was that NU was
continuing its political life as one clearly identifiable 'stream'
within PPP. Even Kiai Bisri Syansuri, the rais am, remained
active in politics almost up to his death. There were, in the late
1970s, already voices in NU calling for a withdrawal from
practical politics and Kiai Achmad Siddiq probably agreed with
them, but rather than joining in the call for a change he chose to
redefine the situation and state that the change had already
occurred. Only the actors had pet to be made aware of it. Many
individual NU members were and would remain politically active
but, as Kiai Achmad implied, not in the name of their
organisation. Kiai Achmad Siddiq was a past master in such
semantic games, and he was repeatedly to have recourse to
similar stratagems in the following years.
  The radicalism and confrontation with the government of the
1970s were, as Kiai Achmad implied (without explicitly referring
to them, however), not part of the NU tradition. The most
essential characteristics of Islam, he wrote, are the principle of
tawassuth (moderation, keeping to the middle road) and the aim
of rahmatan lil alamin (compassion and kindness towards the
entire world). Both imply tolerance and accommodation towards
all but the implacable enemies of Islam. Tawassuth and the
cognate concepts of i'tidal and tawazun (equity and balance)
should be applied in all spheres of life.
  In religious matters, Kiai Achmad continued, tawassuth means
the avoidance of fanaticism, a balanced use of reason as well as
tradition based in revelation. It further required efforts to purify
Islam of foreign accretions but tolerance towards Muslims whose
religion still contains such foreign elements. This formulation
appears to imply accommodation with reformist Islam and
benevolent neighbourly relations with abangan (nominal)
Muslims. Like his brother Machfoezh Shiddiq before him (cf.
note 11) Kiai Achmad appeared willing to meet the reformists
halfway.18 No such religious accommodation was possible with
abangan Muslims-Kiai Achmad resolutely rejected all forms of
syncretism-but the emphasis on tolerance appears designed to
cool down the confrontation between rural santri and abangan,
that had divided Java's countryside since the 1950s. One may
perhaps also perceive here a criticism of NU's angry response to
the recognition of aliran kebatinan (Javanese mystical sects) by
the MPR session of 1978, which had caused the NU deputies to
stage a walk-out.
  In social and political life, tawassuth, i'tidal and tawazun
imply acceptance of the variety of mankind, and mutual
understanding and respect for others. The political consequences
Kiai Achmad derives from his concepts of moderation deserve
quoting in full:

	(1  The preservation of the national state (which was
	    established by the common wish of the entire people)
 	    and the defence of its existence are obligatory.
	(2  The legitimate head of state (government) must be held
	    in respect and must be obeyed as long as it does not
	    deviate from, or issues orders in contravention of, God's
	    commands.
	(3  If it so happens that the government is at fault, the way
	    to admonish it is in a polite manner.19

  This carefully worded statement allows various readings,
probably deliberately so. It affirms acceptance of the status quo
and accommodation with the government but has a built-in
reservation. The government, it is implied, may well do wrong
and will then have to be admonished--albeit politely.
Interestingly, the state is said to be legitimate because it is a
national state and an embodiment of popular sovereignty. This
is an implicit rejection of Islamic religio-politics. From this
position it was not a great step to argue in favour of acceptance
of Pancasila as the one-and-only ideological foundation of NU,
as Kiai Achmad did in 1983. Also his affirmation at the 1984
Congress that the Pancasila-based Republic represented the final
form of the Indonesian state--i.e., his rejection of the idea of an
Islamic state--is already implicit in this earlier formulation.20
  As important elements of the khittah, Kiai Achmad further
mentions ma'arif(education), mabarrat (charity), mu'amalah
(economic activities) and izzul Islam wal Muslimin (glory of
Islam and Muslims). All of these are well-known terms, but they
are given a somewhat modern slant. Speaking of education, the
kiai always mentions madrasah and school together, thereby
implicitly attributing equal weight to non-religious and religious
subjects. Charity is declared to be a 'social' act of worship
(ibadah ijtima'iyyah) and thereby put on a level with other
forms of worship such as prayer and fasting. Establishing
hospitals and orphanages (this was once an activity in which
Muhammadiyah distinguished itself from NU) is an important
this-worldly form of social worship, but other-worldly forms of
charity such as prayers for the dead should trot be forgotten
either.
  In economic matters, to provide for one's own and one's
family's basic needs is declared a fardlu 'ain, a religious duty
incumbent upon each individual. It is, moreover, highly desirable
to achieve more than a minimal standard of living, so that one
can also fulfill the obligation of expending zakat and
shadaqah.21 It is perhaps significant that Kiai Achmad does not

*************

1   Kiai Achmad Siddiq published a booklet titled Khitthah Nahdliyah ust
    before the 1979 NU congress. The ideas had been germinating for more
    than a decade, however, before receiving their final shape. An     earlier version appeared in 1969 as Pedoman Berfikir Nahdlatul     Ulama'. I an grateful to Greg Fealy for providing me with a copy of     this document.

2   Dutch adat law scholars believed that they were uncovering ancient     and unchanging traditions. It is satisfying to observe that one of     the chief works of this school, C. van Vollenhove's The Discovery of     Adat Law, in Indonesian translation has been given (though not     deliberately, I fear) the fittingly ambivalent title of Penemuan     Hukum Adat--the first word of which may mean 'invention' as well as     'discovery'.

3   Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition
    (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

4   Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan
    Hidup Kyai (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982). This is a translation of the     author's 1980 ANU dissertation, The Pesantren Tradition.
    
5   Ally As'ad, Ke-NU-an, Buku pertama(Yogyakarta: Pengurus Wilayah
    Ma'arif NU Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 1981), pp. 31-3. The     traditions described and defended here include ziarah kubur     (visiting the graves of ancestors and teachers), tahlilan (reciting     the formula la ilaha illa 'llah, 'there is no god but God'), and     shalawatan (invocations of divine blessing on behalf of the Prophet     and his family).

6   European scholars such as Ignaz Goldziher, Joseph Schacht and G.H.A.
    Juynboll have emphasised that the hadis literature is to a large     extent a product of later centuries. Muslim scholars reject their     conclusions but agree that there are hadis of various degrees of     reliability, the canonical collections of Bukhari and Muslim being     considered as the most reliable. Reformists insist on stricter     criteria of reliability of hadis than traditionalists, and have in     fact declared numerous popular hadis to be false or unreliable.

7   Of the 'Forty Hadis' collections, those by Nawawi and 'Ushfuri are     the most popular among traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia. Nawawi's
    Forty exist in numerous editions and translations, and they are for
    instance appended to the Indonesian translation of Hasjim Asj'ari's
    Muqaddmah al-Qanun al-Asasi, the most authoritative early statement
    of what NU stood for (the translation was published by Menara,     Kudus, 1969).'Ushfuri's Forty (known as Ushfuriyah) were recently          translated into Indonesian by the santri-journalist Mustafa Helmi         with the explicit intention of acquainting an urban public with the             pesantren atmosphere. A more voluminous collection used in many     pesantren is Riyadl al-
    Shalihin, also by Nawawi. Many of the hadis in these collections do     not stand up to the reformists' stricter criteria of authenticity,       and the same is true of numerous hadis quoted in the fiqh textbooks 
    referred to below.

8   See Martin van Bruinessen, 'Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script
    Used in the Pesantren Milieu', Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en
    Volkenkunde 146 (1990), 226-269; idem, 'Pesantren and Kitab Kuning:
    Maintenance and Continuation of a Tradition of Religious Learning',
    Mizan (Jakarta) vol. V no. 2 (1992), 27-48.

9   The origin of the mazhab, the potential for development within the
    mazhab, and the challenge posed to the mazhab by reformist thought     are presented very clearly in Noel J. Coulson, 'The concept of     progress and Islamic law', in: Robert F. Bellah (ed.), Religion and     Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 74-92.

10  A booklet by KH Ali Ma'shum, NU's rais am (president-general) from
    1982 to 1984, discusses nine issues on which reformists vehemently
    disagree with traditionalists (KH Ali Ma'shum, Kebenaran
    Argumentasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah. Translated from the Arabic by
    KH Ahmad Subki Masyhadiy. Pekalongan: Udin Putra, 1983). Three of
    these concern matters of worship (non-obligatory prayers and the
    determination of beginnning and end of the fasting month), one the
    experiences of the soul after death, and the other five concern     various aspects of relations with the dead. See also note 5.

11  Ch. M. Machfoezh Shiddiq, Debar tentang Idjtihaad dan Taqlied.
    Soerabaia: H.B.N.O., n.d. My attention was first drawn to this
    publication by Professor A. Mukti Ali (who remembered it as a
    watershed in traditionalist-reformist relations). I thank Kiai     Muchith Muzadi of Jember for finding this rare booklet and sending     me a photocopy.

12  This should not be thought to imply that the said aspects of
    traditionalism were less meaningful for these thinkers personally.     Kiai Achmad Siddiq was also an associate of the unconventional and     highly charismatic peripatetic clairvoyant, miracle-working mystic     and living saint, 'Gus Mik' (KH Chamim Djazuli). Siddiq was later     buried in a graveyard designed by the latter to become a centre of     spiritual power by having 40 huffazh (persons knowing the Qur'an by     heart) and 40 'inheritors of the saints' buried there. It would have     been hard to find anyone in NU more directly embodying the polar     opposite of Islamic reformism than Gus Mik.

13  The expression 'radical traditionalism' was first used by Mitsuo
    Nakamura to describe NU's political attitude during the 1970s. See     his article in this volume [chapter three].

14  In Arabic: daf' al-mafasid muqaddam 'ala jalb al-mashalih. This
    maxim was often referred to by NU politicians to explain that they
    cooperated with Sukarno in order to prevent a worse outcome, i.e. an
    even stronger influence of the communists on government policies.

15  One is reminded, of course, of Weber's well-known discussion of the
    transition from charismatic to legal-bureaucratic authority, of     which this process of explicit self-definition is clearly a part.     The reader will have no difficulty discerning Weber's third type,     traditional authority, as a crucial factor in the selection of     Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid to become the first new team to     lead the organisation after the adoption of the khittah.

16  KH Achmad Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyah (second edition, Surabaya:
    Balai Buku, 1980), pp. 14-15.
    
17  Achmad Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyyah, p. 15-16.

18  As NU's rais am he was later to make overtures towards
    Muhammadiyah and, together with the latter organisation's chairman,
    A.R. Fahruddin, thereby signalling that the differences of the past     had largely been ironed out in the interest of ukhuwah islamiyah,     brotherly relations among Muslims.

19  Achmad Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyah, p. 51.

20  '... Republik Indonesia adalah bentuk upaya final seluruh nasion
    teristimewa kaum Muslimin untuk mendirikan negara di wilayah
    Nusantara.' See: Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27 Situbondo
    (Semarang: Sumber Barokah, 1985), p. 89.

21  Zakat is the obligatory 'alms-tax,' consisting of a fixed, precisely
    stipulated percentage of certain sources of income, to be divided     equally among specified categories of recipients (including the         poor); shadaqah are voluntary gifts to those recipients.