that in spite of some shortcomings, they wished a new term for the Siddiq-Wahid tandem. More critical voices were hardly heard. Jakarta, which is dominated by anti-Wahid factions, was expected to open an offensive, but by the time its turn to speak had arrived the opposition seemed so much in disarray that no one came to the fore. When, after the other regions, finally a Jakarta delegate spoke, he seemed wary of angering the congress and his criticism Was very muted. South Sulawesi was the only other region that had critical words for Abdurrahman Wahid himself especially for his being too close to Golkar. The moderate critical comments by the official delegate of this province received shrill counterpoint from an unofficial Buginese delegate who, in the resonant and somewhat hysterical voice of a fire-and-brimstone preacher, let fly at Abdurrahman Wahid for his political behaviour and especially his 'weird' ideas, about which the speaker had read in the press. Was Wahid one of those fiends who, although outwardly Muslim, are out to destroy Islam? It was a minor embarrassing incident that only accentuated the near-general consensus that Wahid was the man whom the NU needed at this stage. It was also a reminder that among the rank and file there are many who feel uncomfortable with the new course the NU is embarking upon. After the regions' comments, Wahid, by way of defence, once again systematically listed the criticisms leveled against him and answered the most important charges. He was aware that some of his ideas, especially when reported in unsympathetic media, could hurt other people's sensitivities. He apologised for unintended injury but not for the ideas. Comparing the NU to a car in which the ulama kept stepping on the brakes, he said there was a need for someone who would step on the gas from time to time, if one wanted to keep moving forward. He reiterated his conviction that the NU cannot afford to refrain from efforts to improve the social and economic situation of its constituency. The government has various minor programmes intended to remedy the severest regional imbalances but continues stimulating a highly unequal development, in which we witness the untrammelled growth of business conglomerates. The Muslims should contribute to finding a middle way, and here lies a major task for the NU. Finally, he reassured the congress that his ideas and the community development approach that he represented were not going to bring the NU into a renewed conflict with the president. Responding to the damaging pamphlet on his being out of official favour, he explained in detail what his connection was with the Kedung Ombo protests and why he had proposed to write a letter to the World Bank. The latter had been drafted by others, he had apologised to the president, the president had gracefully accepted his apologies. He had had assurances that the government was not opposed to his leading the NU for another term. It may seem ironic that in the NU, which in the 1970s had developed into the only significant oppositional force, a leader should campaign for himself by saying that he is acceptable to the government. It was not the first time that Wahid had emphasised how important it was, to his mind, to be in the government's good books. Being oppositional was perhaps more heroic but it did not leave one the freedom to do the things that really matter. The social and economic backwardness of the masses represented by the NU--this is his major theme -need to be remedied before it is too late to catch up with the others. The Muhammadiyah had perceived this much earlier, and it is not incidental that Muhammadiyah has long stood aloof from practical politics. Its members have now become part of the mainstream of Indonesian social and economic life; they can be found in the bureaucracy, in the military and in business circles. NU people--apart from a few successful kiai and some urbane politicians--are as marginal as ever. Carving out a decent place for them without seeming subversive is, in the view of both Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid, an urgent necessity. The more thoughtful members of the NU are generally agreed, and admit that Abdurrahman Wahid, whatever they may think of his other ideas, is the person the NU needs at this juncture. A New Board Elected The elections finally yielded the result that had by then become obvious-although Idham's supporters were to provide a little surprise. Each province commanded a number of votes equal to the number of its local branches plus one for the provincial board. This added up to 305 votes-of which only 44 belonged to East Java and another 43 to Central Java including the Yogyakarta area.9 In this respect, then, the NU is clearly not at all Javanese dominated! Names of candidates were to be put forward by the branches, after which these would vote between those candidates who had at least forty supporters. For the position of chairman, almost all put forward Abdurrahman Wahid; a few proposed Jusuf Hasjim, but he did not even receive the necessary minimum of forty supporters, so that his nephew could be elected by acclamation. The surprise came in the election of the rais am. Idham Chalid himself, in spite of his probably sincere disclaimer of further ambitions, was put forward as the counter-candidate, and his supporters gave an impressive show of strength by delivering him 116 votes against Achmad Siddiq's 188. The race for the deputy rais am was between two equally learned and broad-minded kiai, the Central Javanese Sahal Mahfudh, one of the pioneers of community development through the pesantren (as well as being an affinal relative of Abdurrahman Wahid), and Ali Yafie, Jakarta-based but originating from Central Sulawesi and a long-time Idham ally. The latter won, with 202 votes, so that Idham's supporters have one of their number in a top position. The outcome of the vote was, of course, not the result of numerous free and independent decisions but was prepared through an intricate process of lobbying and negotiations. Which persons were going to be elected had already been decided between the two major factions, the Siddiq-Wahid group and Idham's, only the margins by which they would win remained unpredictable. Idham's strong showing in the vote for rais am came as a surprise, but it was probably just that: a show of strength and not an attempt to grab that position. The Siddiq- Wahid team, though feeling closer to Sahal Mahfudz, had told sufficient branches to vote for Ali Yafie in order to let him win, but did not wish Kiai Sahal to end up with too poor a showing either. The composition of the remainder of the board, though formally the responsibility of the elected committee, had also largely been agreed upon before by the various factions, and only minimal last-minute changes were made. Chalid Mawardi, another Idham ally, became one of the five deputy chairmen. Abdurrahman Wahid this time got the people in this team that he felt he needed, with the dynamic Gaffar Rahman, an old-time friend from East Java, as his secretary-general and Ma'ruf Amin, a learned Bantenese from Jakarta, as the secretary-general of the Syuriah. Kiai As'ad and his allies and supporters proved to have little or no influence on the outcome of the congress. None of his favoured candidates was given a place on the board. He was himself offered the honorary position of a mustasyar (counsellor) that he had also held during the preceding period-- not doing so would have been an extremely rude snub-but modified statutes and by-laws reduced the power of that position. Kiai As'ad was adamant in his disaffection and declared himself seceded from the NU for as long as it would be led by Abdurrahman Wahid.10 Social and Economic Activities The NU's shift from political to community-oriented activities began, as noted above, officially at the Semarang congress, which declared that 'social concerns' (syu'un ijtima'iyah) should henceforth be given more emphasis. There was, however, little unanimity as to what these 'social concerns' were. A small but growing group of young people were interested in pesantren-based community development. The ideas of Paola Freire and Ivan Illich were not unknown in this circle, and in collaboration with the Jakarta-based research institute LP3ES (which in turn had European sponsors) a few pilot projects were set up. Abdurrahman Wahid, Kiai Sahal Mahfudz and Jusuf Hasjim were the three top people involved in these efforts. The majority of the NU, however, stuck to a more limited definition of 'social concerns'. Recommendations on syu'un ijtima'iyah by the 1983 munas concerned the facilitation of the haj, supervision of food and drink to guarantee its being licit, guidance for new converts to Islam, and similar subjects (PBNU 1984:26-7). Another series of recommendations, however, supported a few pilot projects in education, cooperation, legal aid and clean water supply. The Situbondo congress represented a victory for the group interested in community development, and that was reflected in the working program then adopted, which contained long sections on social (charitable) work, economic efforts (self- reliant rural development work) and improvement of labour conditions (PBNU 1985a: pp.146-51). Thanks to generous foreign support, the number of small community development projects carried out in and by pesantren increased. The NU had meanwhile in 1983 established its own non-government organisation, called P3M, to coordinate these projects.11 After an initial period of high hopes and confidence in the 'emancipatory' potential of the pesantren (reflected in various contributions to Rahardjo 1985 and in Ziemek 1986), there followed one of disappointment and scepticism among many of the younger activists who participated in these projects and felt hindered by the hierarchical relations in the pesantren world. Serious doubts were raised about the chances of success of such projects through the pesantren.12 It is perhaps for that reason that the five year action Program adopted by the Krapyak congress speaks of various forms of community development but does not explicitly mention the pesantren in this connection. NGO activists affiliated with the NU had prepared a draft action programme, that was discussed in one of the committees meeting on the third day. The text gave a sweeping overview of unequal development on a world scale as well as within the country, of the breakdown of traditional structures. of population growth and environmental depletion. It criticised the top-down approach consistently adopted by the government, and remarked that the official cooperatives and other developmental institutions in practice funnelled funds away from the rural to the urban section. It advocated a bottom-up approach instead, with active participation and projects aimed at sustainable growth (PBNU 1989: pp.73-100). Many delegates appeared not to recognise themselves in this radical NGO language, and much of the draft was rejected--in form at least. The program that was finally adopted starts off like a Friday sermon and steers clear of the sensitive remarks of the draft. The substance of the proposal, however, was maintained: the development of small-scale rural industry, small cooperative enterprises and mutual aid associations. Aid will be sought from 'other social classes' and national or international organisations but care will be taken to prevent new dependence or 'economic domination by a certain class' (PBNU 1990: pp.126-62, especially pp.152-5) Implementation of the Program The first step taken by the new board in the socio-economic field was the establishment, a few months after the congress, of a bank--not one of the interest-free, risk- and profit-sharing 'Islamic' variety but an ordinary credit and savings bank. The bank is intended to serve the credit needs of small provincial businessmen, and is expected to draw savings from the numerous NU followers who have so far kept their money under their mattresses instead of in bank deposits. Interest, as is well known, is a sensitive issue on which the ulama's opinions are divided, but in this case most of the NU ulama silently consented. The board could, in fact, refer to a decision by an earlier NU congress allowing the interest of(state-owned) banks as well as to earlier ventures by the NU into banking.13 The bank is a joint venture for the NU with a sympathetic established Muslim Chinese businessman, who contributed his management experience as well as a substantial share of the starting capital. Its first branch was opened in Sidoarjo (near Surabaya) in March 1990, and Abdurrahman Wahid announced that he was seeking support from Indonesia's big business conglomerates for the establishment of some 2000 branches in the near future. The political climate favoured such an effort. Suharto, concerned about the increasing gap between rich and poor, and with an eye to the 1992 elections, just then publicly told the most prominent Chinese tycoons to do something to narrow that gap and so prevent 'social envy' and violent conflict. He suggested a transfer of shares from the business conglomerates to cooperatives, which he believed to represent the lower income groups (see Tempo 10 March 1990). Abdurrahman Wahid approached the Chinese business world and proposed a joint committee for devising fruitful ways of channelling know-how and funds to small-scale pribumi entrepreneurs. One obvious channel would be the people's credit banks that the NU was setting up. In June the NU signed an agreement with the large Bank Summa (belonging to William Soeryadjaja's Astra group), under which no less than 2000 people's credit banks will be established.14 The NU is, incidentally, not the only Muslim organisation to go into banking. The Muhammadiyah, too, has some time ago announced its plans of setting up its own people's credit banks, which will also be operating with interest. Conclusion The 28th congress of the Nahdlatul Ulama has consolidated the position of Abdurrahman Wahid and Achmad Siddiq and their policy of resolute depoliticisation. In spite of recent changes in PPP favourable to its NU-affiliated members, the formal break with this political party was reaffirmed to be definitive, and there was no support for the proposal to establish another political party. The Idham Chalid group has regained positions in the board but has to accept that policy is henceforth made by Abdurrahman Wahid et. al. Kiai As'ad, allegedly the 'king- maker', became irrelevant once the branches were given the power to elect the board. With his death, the transfer of authority to a much younger generation, with different ideas and ambitions, was completed.15 This generation wants the ulama to pay more attention to contemporary social and economic problems instead of minor details of worship. Instead of seeking tenders and other forms of government patronage for privileged members, the present board tries to devise strategies for improving the general welfare of its constituency. The idea that the NU should involve itself more directly in economic development has gained general currency. Opinions as to what and how, understandably, vary widely but most NU members are highly critical of the government's top-down approach which, it is felt, rarely, if ever, benefits the lower strata. Radical third world ideologies are known but the NU, wary of confrontation, prefers to adopt an approach that is complementary to the government's rather than an alternative to it. Its choice of cooperation with big Chinese capital for its first major economic project should perhaps also be interpreted as a public declaration that it does not believe in class struggle but class harmony.16 The congress also represented an occasion for Suharto to decrease the distance between himself and the rank and file of the NU. Although popularity among the general population will be at best of marginal importance in the power struggle at the top, Suharto has made great efforts recently to improve his image among the Muslims. His most open opponent, Moerdani (who as a Catholic is not a candidate for the presidency himself but is a potential kingmaker), failed to prevent Suharto from making further inroads among the Muslim constituency. He proved to have lost the grip on the NU that he had before he fell out with Suharto. The most popular man at the top, not surprisingly, appeared to be Try Sutrisno, but it remains to be seen whether he is smart enough to capitalise upon his popularity. The other contenders for power also cultivate their relations with the NU or with factions within it. For the time being, many middle-ranking cadres of the NU seem to agree that of the serious candidates for the presidency, Suharto is still better than the alternatives, and more favourable to Muslim interests. The board is more careful and keeps all its options open. Abdurrahman Wahid refused, for instance to take part in a joint declaration of Muslim leaders in favour of a new Suharto term. He gave constitutional considerations as his reason, but another consideration, equally important, is that the NU does not want to antagonise any potential winner. The NU will, true to the Sunni tradition of political legitimation, recognise and cooperate with any de facto government, and strive to further its particularistic interests within the framework of the status quo. References Bruinessen, Martin van 1990, 'Indonesia's Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives', Prisma-The Indonesian Indicator, no.49, pp.52-69. Hamzah, KH. Imron and Anam, Drs Choirul 1989, Sebuah dialog mencari kejelasan: Gus Dur diadili kiai-kiai, Jawa Pos, Surabaya. Jones, Sidney 1984, 'The Contraction and Expansion of the "Umat" and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia', Indonesia, no.38, pp.1-20. Kuntowiioyo 1988, 'Menuju kemandirian: pesantren dan pembangunan desa', Prisma, vol. XVII, no.1, pp.102-15. Mudatsir, Arief 1984, 'Dari Situbondo menuju NU baru: sebuah catatan awal',Prisma, vol. XVII, nomor ekstra, pp.130-42 (English translation in Prisma - The Indonesian Indicator, no.35, 1985, pp.161-77). Nakamura, Mitsuo 1981, 'The Radical Tranditionalism of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang', Southeast Asia Studies (Japan) vo1.19, no.2, pp.187-204. Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama [PBNU] n.d., Ahkam al- fuqaha. Kumpulan masalah-2 diniyah dalam Mu'tamar NU ke I sid 15 (2 vols in one), Toha Putra, Semarang. ---- 1984, Laporan penyelenggaraan musyawarah nasional Alim Ulama Nahdlatul Ulama pada tanggal 18-21 Desember 1983 di Pesantren Salafiyah Syafi'iyah Sukorejo., Situbondo, PBNU, Jakarta. --- 1985a, Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27 Situbondo. Nahdlatul Ulama kembali ke Khittah 1926, Sumber Barokah, Semarang. --- 1985b, Anggaran dasar dan anggaran rumah tangga Nahdlatul Ulama, Lajnah Ta'lif wan Nasyr, PBNU, Jakarta. --- 1985c, Khitthah Nahdlatul Ulama, Lajnah Ta'lif wan Nasyr, PBNU, Jakarta. --- 1988, Keputusan Munas Alim Ulama Nahdlatul Ulama dan Konbes NU di Cilacap, Sumber Barokah, Semarang. --- 1989a, Pedoman umum Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke- 28 di Pondok Pesantren Al Munawwir Krapyak Yogyakarta, Tim Teknis Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke-28, Jakarta. --- 1989b, 'Laporan pertanggungjawaban pengurus besar Nahdlatul Ulama periode 1984-1989', Tim Teknis Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke-28, Jakarta. --- 1989c, Bahan-bahan pembahasan Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke-28 di Pondok Pesantren Al Munawwir Krapyak Yogyakarta, Tim Teknis Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke-28, Jakarta. --- 1990, Hasil-hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke-28 di Pondok Pesantren Al-Munawwir, Krapyak, Yogyakarta, 25- 28 Nopember 1989, PBNU, Jakarta. Rahardjo, M. Dawam (ed) 1985, Pergulatan dunia pesantren. membangun dari bawah, P3M, Jakarta. Ziemek, Manfred 1986, Pesantren dalam perabahan sosial, P3M, Jakarta. *************** 9 Division of the other votes: West Java and Jakarta together commanded 44 votes, Sumatra 74, Kalimantan 34, Sulawesi 39, Ball 6 (!) and the remaining parts of East Indonesia 21. It is obvious that the average branch in outer Indonesia is much smaller than that in Java. 10 In March 1990 he was persuaded to return to the bosom of the NU and accept his position as mustasyar, but he remained opposed to Wahid's leadership. He died on 4 August 1990. 11 P3M stands for Perhimpunan Perkembangan dan Masyarakat, 'Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society'. its official director is Jusuf Hasjim, but day-to-day affairs are in the hands of a managing director. 12 See the sharp criticism in Kuntowijoyo 1988. This author, a widely respected Muslim historian, is not affiliated with the NU, and many were unhappy with his criticism. Several of the young men who have actively taken part in these projects are, however, even more critical and cynical about the kiai's ulterior motives for taking on such projects. They feel that democratisation through the pesantren is a contradiction in terms. 13 See the weeklies Tempo and Editor, 10 March 1990. Deputy rais am Ali Yafie referred to a fatwa of the NU congress in Banten (more precisely: in Menes in 1938) that legitimised banking. I have not found the text of this fatwa; the opinions of the ulama were apparently indecisive and no decision was published. The previous year, however, the 12th congress still had advised against depositing money in bank accounts (PBNU n.d: 70-1). In the 1950s, NU leaders established the Bank Nusantara in Jakarta and the Bank Haji in Semarang. Both banks failed because of poor management. 14 The decision to cooperate on this scale with large Chinese capital ran predictably into some opposition, also in the Syuriah. Criticism remained subdued, however, because the programme serves a need strongly felt among the NU rank and file. The terms of the contract seem quite favourable to the NU: it begins with a controlling share, while Bank Summa's share in due time will be phased out. See the special report in Tempo, 9 June 1990. The last great kiai of the founding generation and immediately after have now died: Bisri Syansuri (in 1980), Machrus Ali (in 1985), Ali Ma'shum (a few days after the congress) and As'ad Syamsul Arifin (in August 1990). Of this generation, only Masjkur (born in 1897 or 1898), who was not a founding member but once was the chairman and had many other official functions, still survives at the time of writing [editors' note: Masykur died in 1993]. 16 The cooperation is of course facilitated by the Chinese entrepreneur's awareness of the very real possibility of new anti- Chinese riots, which makes some of them eager to be seen doing something nice for Muslims.