Chapter Six The 28th Congress of the Nahdlatul Ulama: Power Struggle and Social concerns* Martin van Bruinessen On 25-28 November 1989 the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) held its 28th Congress in the pesantren Al-Munawwir in Krapyak, a little south of Yogyakarta.1 It was the first congress since the crucial one of Situbondo in 1984, which had made conciliatory gestures towards the government, accepted Pancasila as the sole foundation, and elected a new and younger leadership team. The most prominent men of the new team, Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid, were 'accommodationists' like most NU leaders before them; more clearly than many others, however, they were so out of principle rather than mere expedience. They steered the NU away from its earlier course of confrontation with the government and strictly enforced its definitive break with the Muslim political party PPP. Over the past five years, there had been much criticism of their leadership and policies, and especially of the often controversial public behaviour and utterances of Abdurrahman Wahid. It was widely known that the relations between them and several other board members were less than harmonious, reflecting a struggle between different factions in the NU as well as a conflict of opinion about real issues. Within the NU ranks, and even within the board, there was much dissatisfaction with the complete withdrawal from 'practical politics'. Those members loyal to the PPP resented Wahid's active efforts to 'deflate' this party prior to the 1987 elections. Others complained that the board did not deliver on its promises, that there had been too much talk and too little action. The nonagenarian Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin of Situbondo, presented in the press as the powerful man behind the screen, was openly disaffected with Abdurrahman Wahid, whose election he had secured five years earlier, when he hosted the 27th congress. The partisans of another grand old man, Idham Chalid, who had been chairman for over a quarter century, resented the way Idham had been dumped by an internal coup in 1982 and his faction virtually eliminated from the board at the Situbondo congress. The 1989 congress was to be a test for the popularity of leaders and policies, and a trial of strength for the various factions. It was also one of the stages on which the power struggle within the military-political elite, preparing for the post-Suharto era or another Suharto presidential term in 1993 was acted out. President Suharto himself opened the congress with a speech underlining that two decades of mutual mistrust between the government and the NU had definitively ended. Consistent with his recent general approach, he clearly courted Muslim opinion. The other major actors also put in appearance: in separate sessions, Minister of the Interior Rudini, Minister of Defence and Security L.B. Moerdani, Secretary of State Moerdiono and Armed Forces Chief Try Sutrisno each gave a speech, Vice-President Sudharmono had a few days earlier opened the congress of NU-affiliated tarekat (mystical orders) that preceded the NU congress. Several of these contenders lobbied actively to influence the outcome of the conference, putting their weight behind favoured factions. Their presence is an indication of the political importance attributed to the NU, which is the organisation with by far the largest mass following in the country. Fringe Activities at the Congress The election of a new board, being the most exciting activity of the congress, was set for the fourth and last day. The first three days were devoted to the standard fare of congresses; addresses by important persons, accounts by the board, comments by the regional branches, discussions on the programme and on religious questions. And of course to the important business of meeting old friends and acquaintances. For many of the kiai, especially the less prominent ones, an NU congress or munas (national conference) is a unique opportunity for meeting many colleagues and discussing matters of common interest. Some seemed to have come for that purpose only and did not even attend the sessions, leaving this to younger members of their regional branch. Many of the more prominent kiai, incidentally, stayed away from the sessions too, presumably because they were engaged in intense lobbying, knowing that whatever the formal procedures were, the important decisions were not to be taken in the sessions but elsewhere. In the margins of the congress a lively bustle went on deep into the night. Tens of thousands who were not delegates had also flocked to Krapyak, as supporters and sympathisers, or simply out of curiosity. The city of Yogyakarta had set up a large fair nearby, where one could find food and drink, books, brochures and calligraphy, T-shirts and handbags and all sorts of other cheap souvenirs. NU-affiliated brassbands paraded around, at times even drowning out the discussion in the conference sessions; in the evenings the cream of the country's Javanese preachers competed in delivering public sermons. The atmosphere was not unlike that of a great pilgrimage, and to many of those present it seemed, in fact, to be one. The opening of the congress, by Suharto, was not without its symbolism-carefully planned no doubt. After reading his very conciliatory speech, he formally opened the congress by beating a large bedug, a drum of the type used in traditional mosques to mark the times of prayer. He surprised everyone by beating the complex pattern that usually only the trained santri can produce. The message was not lost on the Javanese in the audience. Someone told me, 'this means that he must often have beaten the mosque drum in his youth, So in a way he is one of us', and others agreed. The enormous bedug, it transpired moreover, belonged to the family in which Suharto had grown up as an adoptive son; it had been specially lent to the pesantren for this occasion. (The pesantren had, of course, its own bedug but that of more modest size). After Suharto left, the bedug remained in place, its bulk and symbolism dominating the following proceedings. Of all the prominent guests it was General Try Sutrisno who Was given the warmest welcome--which is not surprising, since he is the first Javanese santri to become supreme commander of the armed forces. During his speech, which resounded with Islamic phrases, the audience was entranced and when he was finished it broke into the Shalawat Badar (a prayer song that is often sung in emotional circumstances). Hundreds rushed from their seats and crowded about him, trying to shake his hands or to embrace him. Moerdani's appearance at the congress was much less successful. Openly in conflict With Suharto, he did not accompany him for the opening celebration (as did the other ministers attending) but came along in the evening. Five years earlier, in Situbondo, he had been enthusiastically cheered by the congress and spontaneously embraced by kiai, in a celebration of reconciliation between the NU and the Armed Forces. The contrast that his present reception made could hardly be starker. There was hardly any reaction when he entered, apparent disinterest during his speech (which contained tough words on national security and denunciations of foreign humans rights activists, and oblique reference to Wahid's international contacts). When he ended with an as-salam alaykum hardly anybody answered. None in the audience rose to their feet and tried to shake his hand, as people did to all the other speakers. It became obvious that, in his conflict with Suharto, Moerdani cannot count on the NU and its vast rural constituency as a power base. Neither the masses nor the elite of the NU are at present inclined to put their hopes in him. His lobbying on behalf of Kiai As'ad and his faction during the following days, through envoys, remained without effect too. None of As'ad's favoured candidates ended up in the board that was later elected. The Siddiq-Wahid Team, Supporters and Opponents Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid were ultimately reelected but this was by no means a foregone conclusion when the congress began. During the preceding few weeks, the press had resounded with criticism of them--more in fact than was later heard at the congress itself. Journalists had interviewed many of their opponents, and various names of counter-candidates had been put forward. A name repeatedly mentioned as the favourite replacement of Siddiq was Idham Chalid, while various other Young board members were suggested as replacements for Abdurrahman Wahid. Idham Chalid represented a strong alliance of interests. Being a Banjarese from South Kalimantan, he almost automatically drew support from the non-Javanese members in cases where the differential interests of East Java versus the outer regions clashed. As the NU's most experienced politician, a master of patronage management, he moreover had still strong support both in sections of the state apparatus and with numerous local branch boards that longed for his style of clientelist politics. Since his disgraceful demise as chairman-general he had restricted his activities to the association of tarekat, a daughter organisation of NU, where he had strengthened his ties with some influential Javanese tarekat-kiai who were opposed to Abdurrahman Wahid. Idham himself had repeatedly declared, in private and public, that he was quite contented with his position in the tarekat union and that he had no further ambitions. This failed to convince everyone who knew him; it was not the first time he had made such statements, only to be persuaded later by his faithful supporters that he should serve another term. He had moreover to take care of his allies, such as the younger Chalid Mawardi (a Central Javanese). Mawardi would have been a strong candidate for the chairmanship in 1984 had he not just been made ambassador to Syria then, as if to clear the way for the new Wahid-Siddiq team. He had returned to Indonesia a year before the 1989 congress and obviously needed a job equal to his experience and stature. Another factor to be reckoned with was Kiai As'ad, who had emerged as a powerful and strong-willed NU leader in the early 1980s. Although not known as very learned, he could lay claim to authority because he was one of the few surviving members who had played a part, however marginal, in the NU's founding. Unlike Idham, he had repeatedly used the press to publicise his disaffection with Abdurrahman Wahid and, citing some of the latter's controversial statements,2 he demanded his head. There were also more earthly reasons for his disaffection, notably the current board's failure to channel to him the sort of government largesse that he felt was his due. He had earlier played, allegedly for similar reasons, a major part in the coup deposing Idham Chalid. The aged kiai had the support of Moerdani, whose major remaining NU contact he was, and who must have been less than pleased with Abdurrahman Wahid's drifting away from him. An influential ally of Kiai As'ad, who shared his criticism of Abdurrahman Wahid, was the aged politician Masjkur, a former NU chairman. Many other elderly kiai, too, were uneasy with Abdurrahman Wahid's unconventional behaviour and often provocative statements--most which they only knew through distorted press reports.3 He had expressed appreciation for Shi'a Islam and the rationalist theology of the Mu'tazilah--both taboo in NU circles--and claimed that Islam need not be Arab but could legitimately be Indonesianised. He had even once dared to criticise the Muslim community in front of a Christian audience. He also stimulated critical analysis of kitab kuning, the religious books studied in the pesantren, instead of their reverent memorisation, and thereby was unsettling one of the formerly unshakeable foundations of the kiai's position. The present congress was in fact preceded by a seminar in which such texts were critically discussed and their social relevance questioned. A group of alarmed kiai had called for a boycott of the seminar because of the shocking ideas put forward at previous seminars by some of the younger participants who enthusiastically questioned vested standpoints. Strong opposition came also, understandably, from those who were still committed to PPP. They obviously resented the formal break with this party, and moreover, Abdurrahman Wahid's efforts to weaken this party in the 1987 elections. Even among those who were disaffected with Naro's PPP, there were many who strongly objected to the depoliticisation of the NU. In fact, at a conference (a 'national consultation' or munas of NU ulama) in 1987, a group of politicians had attempted to get rid of Wahid and had proposed that the NU become a political party again, independent from PPP. The recent PPP congress, earlier in 1989, had seen Naro's demise and the rise of several NU members to leading positions. This obviously strengthened the hand of those favouring continued involvement in practical politics. Even among those who were opposed to a return to PPP, such as the tough-speaking politician Jusuf Hasjim,4 there was nevertheless uneasiness with the 'accommodationist' attitude of the leading tandem. Wahid had in 1988 accepted an appointment to the National Assembly (MPR), in which he had joined the Golkar group, thus hurting the credibility of his opposition to practical polities. And Achmad Siddiq, Jusuf told the press, was rarely available for discussion of important issues with the other board members, preferring to discuss them over their heads, directly with the president. On the eve of the conference, another opponent sent around a pamphlet of the opposite tenor, accusing Wahid of dangerous radicalism. It claimed that he had aroused the ire of the president by his involvement in protests by a group of NGOs (non- government organisations) to the World Bank over a controversial government project.5 This was the criticism that hit hardest and was potentially most damaging. The rank and file of the NU and the delegates at the congress, much as they liked some of Wahid's innovative ideas, did not wish the NU to get into the government's bad books again. They would not vote for a chairman who could jeopardise the improved relations with the government. In his account to the congress, Wahid was to dwell long upon the incident and to emphasise that the president had accepted his apologies. Abdurrahman Wahid's strongest support (but not necessarily that of the authoritarian Achmad Siddiq) lay not with the kiai but with the boards of the local branches, which were generally dominated by younger people. Many of them liked his ideas about community development, others were small businessmen who had profited from the NU's accommodation with government. While many of the kiai were afraid of change, these people wanted only more of it, aware that the NU presents one of the most backward segments of society. Abdurrahman Wahid, precisely because of the qualities that made him so seemingly unrepresentative of the NU milieu, was in their eyes the only person capable of transforming the NU and leading its constituency towards a more equal participation in the political and economic life of lndonesian society. Creating a Favourable Setting for Re-election The incumbent board had of course certain options to influence the outcome of the congress. The choice of Krapyak as the venue, for instance, was very significant. The previous congress, as well as an important conference a year earlier, had both been held at Situbondo and thereby shored up Kiai As'ad's position and prestige. Kiai As'ad had proposed to convene the 28th congress in his pesantren again--a generous offer, given the considerable cost, but an investment that would certainly pay off if accepted. Siddiq and Wahid had obviously little interest in further enhancing the nonagenarian kiai's claims to guardianship of the NU and judiciously chose for Krapyak. Its kiai, Ali Ma'shum, had acted as the NU's interim president (rais am)6 for the period between the death of Bisri Syansuri in 1980 and the 27th congress in 1984. Kiai Ali was known to be ailing, and the congress would perhaps be the last chance to honour him and acknowledge his services to NU (he died in fact a few weeks after the congress). Moreover, Abdurrahman Wahid had, when still a high school student in Yogyakarta, studied Arabic here, and he had always cultivated a cordial and respectful pupil-teacher relationship with Kiai All. The kiai could be expected to protect Abdurrahman Wahid against the criticism of Kiai As'ad and other senior kiai.7 Another factor of crucial importance was the procedure by which a new board was to be elected. At the Situbondo congress, everything had been laid into the hands of the elderly kiai, who were baptised the 'ahlul halli wal aqdi', the term that Muslim law uses for the elect to whom society entrusts the power of decision.8 In practice this meant that power was in the hands of Kiai As'ad, who was by acclamation chosen as the head of the ahlul halli wal aqdi. It seems that supporters of the Siddiq- Wahid tandem had deliberately brushed up Kiai As'ad's image as the grand old man of the NU in order to make this unprecedented method acceptable. Behind the screen, there were hard-nosed negotiations between the various factions in the NU on the composition of the board that the ahlul halli wal aqdi were to choose. As'ad duly appointed Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid but caused a surprise by striking all Idham allies from the agreed-upon list and replacing them with men of his own choice. This composition of the board was the cause of much uneasiness in the following years. It was not surprising, therefore, that Wahid, in the name of the current board, did not propose the 'Islamic' procedure of election by ahlul halli wal aqdi this time but a combination of direct and indirect elections by the delegates from the regions. The rais am with his deputy and the chairman were to be elected directly; together with four other directly elected persons they were to form a committee (formateur) that would appoint the other members of the board. This construction clearly had the merit of giving the new chairman, once elected, a strong hand in selecting to the board persons that he could cooperate with. All insiders knew Abdurrahman Wahid to be extremely frustrated with his experience in the current board, several members of which, he felt, had not worked at all or even sabotaged his own efforts. The only opposition to the proposed procedure (apart from As'ad's partisans) came from Jusuf Hasjim, who favoured indirect elections to all positions--a procedure by which he was likely to exert more influence. On the first day of the congress, the delegates, most of whom did not seem to be aware of the implications of both proposals, adopted by acclamation the procedure proposed by Abdurrahman Wahid. Apart from these judicious procedural preparations, Abdurrahman Wahid also made unprecedented efforts to address the rank and file prior to the congress. In the last few weeks he indefatigably toured the country, visiting most of the provincial branches, listening to complaints and wishes, explaining his views and planned activities. The outer regions often complained of being neglected by the East Java and Jakarta based elite, and these visits were therefore likely to generate some additional goodwill. His last trip, only a few days before the congress, was to Mecca. It was never explicitly said what the objective of this trip was but its symbolic meaning was obvious. Shaikh Muhammad Yasin of Padang, who leads an Islamic school there, is considered by most kiai--including those most critical of Abdurrahman Wahid--as the supreme religious authority. By paying him his respects and asking his blessing for the congress, Abdurrahman improved his moral standing among the kiai. Moreover, many Indonesians believe that a visit to the Holy City of Islam and performing one's prayers at the Holy Mosque purges him of sins. Not once, during the congress, did Abdurrahman refer to his recent visit to Mecca--it had been reported by the press anyway. In a subtle way he had shown that, however 'strange' he might at times behave and speak, he was still essentially an NU man and shared the moral and spiritual outlook of his organisation. The Old Board Criticised and Defended In the evening of the first day, Abdurrahman Wahid gave the congress his account of the old board's activities. He used this opportunity to emphasise the difference between what he and his potential rivals stood for. As usual his speech was peppered with little jokes, which allowed him to be very critical without sounding insulting. He was not, he said, going to give a brief oral account and then ask the congress for forgiveness, knowing that forgiving is a part of the NU tradition (a not very oblique hint at Idham's performance at the 1979 congress, recorded for posterity by Nakamura [see chapter three)). This time the board had prepared a detailed written account (published in PBNU 1990), so that its merits and shortcomings would be clear. In his speech he would only mention a few important points. He frankly admitted that the board had been unable to live up to its plans and promises (in education and community development for instance) because of internal conflicts or rather, he suggested, because some board members simply refused to carry out his initiatives. Most people understood whom this referred to; the secretary-general whom Kiai As'ad had imposed on him, Anwar Nurris. If we haven't performed well, he joked to the congress, it is really your own fault for you agreed with this board in Situbondo; this time you'd better be more judicious! The concrete implications of the farewell to 'practical politics' still remained too vague, so that conflicting interpretations could co-exist, and he invited the congress to give them some more reflection. Certain contractor members, Wahid said, are wary of losing their tenders if the NU returns to politics. The NU-here he challenged Jusuf Hasjim, the oppositional politician--should be more explicit about where it draws the boundary of 'practical politics'. The" idea of transforming the NU into a political party beside the PPP (first put forward by Mahbub Djunaidy at the 1987 conference, where he attempted to unseat Wahid) was unrealistic. The constitution, it is true, allows for any number of parties, but political life is governed by the decisions of the National Assembly (TAP, or ketetapan MPR) that explicitly allow for only two parties besides Golkar. He asked the congress to affirm that the withdrawal from party politics was complete and unconditional. But withdrawal from politics, he insisted, should not imply restricting oneself to preaching and praying. The NU has a special body for da'wah (religious propaganda), led by Syukron Ma'mun (a very popular Jakarta-based preacher with a tough tone, who was known to be strongly opposed to Wahid, and whom some wished to put forward as a counter-candidate). But the NU should be more than just a mass organisation for da'wah, it has numerous other functions that need to be further developed (and of which, he seemed to imply, the said orator has little understanding), such as higher Islamic learning and socio- economic activities. Since the Semarang congress in 1979, the NU had declared social affairs (translated into Arabic as syuun ijtima'iyah so as to sound really Islamic) to be an essential part of its functions. He invited the congress to make more precise what this commitment to social activities meant; in order to stimulate the discussion the board had a draft 'five year plan' prepared. On the second day, delegates from the regions were to give their comments, criticism and suggestions. Each of the twenty- six wilayah (corresponding with a province), was given ten minutes. Although the chairman of the session had asked them not to turn it into a speech contest but speak factually, several speakers had little to say but empty phrases. They were jeered by the congress, which showed little of the restraint that is sometimes said to be typical of the Javanese. 'Another Friday sermon!', they mocked, or shouted 'to the point, dong!' The majority of the participants were young and impatient. It also soon became clear that their sympathies were overwhelmingly for Abdurrahman Wahid and that they were fed up with the sanctimonious style of some of his opponents. When there was criticism of the board's performance, the shortcomings were usually attributed to a lack of unity in the board or to unnamed individuals. One delegate criticised the program for being so vague that there was no way in which one could measure how much of it had actually been carried out. The board's management had been extremely weak, he observed, but it had at least had the merit of bringing a new enthusiasm to the NU and improving its contacts with the world around it. This seemed neatly to summarise the opinions of most of the regional delegates. Several already said _______________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________ Martin van Bruinessen * This article was originally published in Archipel, no.41, 1991, pp. 185-200 and is reprinted here with the kind permission of the publishers. 1 I wish to thank Abdurrahman Wahid for securing me invitations to this congress and that of the NU's tarekat preceding it. I also thank the numerous participants of both congresses who shared with me their knowledge, impressions, perceptions, suppositions and interpretations. My indebtedness to these informants will be clear to any reader, just as it will be obvious that the opinions and interpretations expressed here are my responsibility alone. 2 Particularly his remark that Muslims might just as well say 'good morning' to one another as 'as-salam alaykum'. For Indonesia's self- conscious Muslims, with their 'minority complex', the salam is an important marker of identity, and it was felt (correctly, I believe) that Abdurrahman Wahid intended to break down the barrier between Muslims and non-Muslims (and, for that matter, the less strict Muslims). When he was severely reprimanded by his former teacher, Ali Ma'shum, he humbly apologised to him. Kiai As'ad, incensed perhaps that the apology was not made to him, remained unforgiving. 3 Attempting to neutralise criticism, allies of Wahid explained what he had really said and done. A few weeks before the congress, Kiai Imron Hamzah (president of the provincial board of the NU in East Java) and the journalist Choirul Anam published a book with the catchy title Gus Dur put on trial by the kiai (Hamzah & Anam 1989). It lists the chairman's words and deeds that had most shocked his constituency, each of which is then eloquently explained and defended in Wahid's own words. 4 Jusuf Hasjim is the last surviving son of the NU's chief founder Hasjim Asj'ari and therefore an uncle of Abdurrahman Wahid, who is the eldest son of his elder brother Wahid Hasjim. Relations between uncle and nephew, who can theoretically make conflicting claims to being Hasjim Asj'ari's legitimate successor, are complex but seldom harmonious. 5 A group of NGOs had sent the World Bank a letter detailing the government's treatment of villagers displaced by the (Bank-sponsored) Kedung Ombo dam. The government felt severely embarrassed by the letter, and took reprisals against some of the NGOs. The original idea of the letter had been Wahid's but it was drafted by others, apparently in much more radical terms than he intended. He was obliged to apologise to the president for this letter 6 The NU has a dual board; ultimate authority is with a council of ulama, the Syuriah, led by the rais am, while the executive or Tanfidziah, led by the chairman (ketua umum) is in charge of daily affairs. The first three rais am, Hasjim Asj'ari, Wahab Chasbullah and Bisri Syansuri, were founding members and held this position until their deaths. Achmad Siddiq is the fifth rais am. 7 When the storm first broke over Abdurrahman's controversial 'good morning' remark (note 2 above), Kiai Ali reprimanded him, after which he wrote a letter of apology. For Kiai All, the case was closed herewith, and he was known to be irritated when Kiai As'ad continued beating the war drum over the same affair and demanding another apology (thereby implicitly denying Kiai All's authority). 8 See the entry 'Ahl al-hall wa al-' ak' in the Encyclopaedia of Islam. It had been Achmad Siddiq's proposal to use this 'Islamic' institution, obviously because it was more likely to guarantee the desired outcome than more democratic procedures. Idham Chalid, it should be pointed out, had great influence over many of the local branches thanks to his dispensing patronage for so may years.