idea of obligation without, however, setting out precisely how it would be enforced. The Ministry of Religious Affairs gave assurances that the Charter would not harm non-Muslims, but there was no answer to those Muslims whose practice and knowledge of Islam was minimal.58 As NU controlled the Ministry of Religious Affairs, NU would, of course, be a determining factor in the debate. The minister, KH M. Dachlan, made a declaration that the Charter was indeed 'a source of law', a declaration used by modernist Islam to strengthen support for the Charter. Later, in August, Dachlan called those who 'betrayed' the Charter 'hypocrites'. As early as June 1968, the government had reacted by asking civil servants not to attend Jakarta Charter commemoration ceremonies. A PMPI celebration was also refused authorisation by the army.59 The Catholic youth group, Angkatan Muda Katolik, sent a memorandum to President Suharto rejecting a ministerial decision that described one of the tasks of the Ministry of Religious Affairs as 'applying the Jakarta Charter in its relationship with the Constitution'. 60 It suggested that the Ministry be disbanded altogether. It was only under government pressure that the debate subsided. As the aformentioned political parties' commission had not succeeded in elaborating a common definition of the Charter, the army urged them to stop their efforts, arguing that tensions would be exacerbated at a moment when the New Order's stability was still fragile.61 Ibrahim Hosen, a law specialist, was quoted in a widely read Muslim magazine as saying that the Charter was 'a necessity for law uniformisation, but did not constitute an effort to enforce the application of the Syari'ah'.62 I have found few declarations indicating exactly what NU understood to be implied in the Jakarta Charter. KH Dachlan said the Charter would allow government intervention to ensure that the zakat and Muslim marriage customs be respected.63 This gives a rather limited scope to the Charter, not interfering with religious practices or the law in general. NU never officially stated its understanding of the Charter, and most texts on it quoted by Duta Masyarakat were from non-NU or joint organisations' circles. Given the diversity of thought within NU, there is reason to believe that there would, in fact, have been no agreement on the scope of the Charter. There was never any official ban of the Jakarta Charter but from then on, any contentious reference to it was avoided. This is not to say that the Suharto government was opposed to Islamic concerns. On the contrary, it accepted such arrangements as the one that saw zakat being imposed on civil servants, collected by a foundation, Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslimin Pancasila, but not formalised in law. There were other sore points, including the suppression of substantial subsidies for the hajj. NU also disapproved of the government's laxity toward prostitution, pornography and gambling. It was most of all worried at new inroads apparently made by Christianity in Sumatra and Java in the early years of the New Order-one of the consequences of the 1966 MPRS decision to make religious education compulsory and to ban atheism.64 Thus, it is clear that the two 'brothers'-NU and the army- had developed into awkward partners. Despite army resistance, some ulama wanted the Jakarta Charter recognised while NU politicians wanted a greater degree of democracy which they believed would bring about a larger representation for NU in Parliament. But NU was in a difficult position: representing the government through the Minister of Religious Affairs, it had to go against its own values and interests and protect all five officially recognised faiths. It also had to defend the suppression of subsidies for the hajj, and appeal for tolerance. Such appeals were controversial at a time when Muslims were resentful of what they saw as unprecedented competition from Christians. Kiai Dachlan's speeches reveal how he oscillated from a compromising stance to a fierce defence of Islam. In a speech in May 1968, he repeated Suharto's recent statement that there was 'neither majority nor minority in religion, and there was 'neither legitimate nor illegitimate children', clearly protecting the minority religions.65 But in January 1969, Dachlan went as far as declaring that: 'If the faithful of other religions attack the Muslims and soil its purity, then the Muslim community has to face this challenge with the same approach in obedience to Allah, and if necessary, has to take arms to preserve the purity of its religion." He made this statement at a time when several incidents had recently occurred between the Muslim and Christian communities in 1967 and 1968.67 The final stage of open conflict between the army and NU was the legislative elections which took place in 1971. The army-backed Golkar, now competing as a political party, had succeeded in attracting a few ulama, some of whom were so ostracised later that they were almost banished from their communities.68 Among those who crossed over were members of the great NU families from Jombang, East Java, like KH A. Karim Hasyim, one of the sons of Kiai Hasyim Asy'ari. It is not my purpose here to describe Golkar's inroads into the Islamic organisation, but it is important to note that those within NU who did not yet see the army as rivals were soon convinced of it during the election campaign when intimidation became commonplace. Subchan warned that NU had 'abandoned its sarong in order to be able to run faster than Golkar'.69 Ken Ward has rightly pointed to the fact that Golkar's expansion and its methods had forced NU to play a role it always had avoided: the role of an opposition.70 As we have seen, this role can be traced back as early as 1966. NU's attitude of accommodation toward the communist- friendly Old Order had turned into a new opposition against the army-dominated New Order. Subchan had been a prominent figure during both periods. But here again, there was a conservative current. Idham Chalid appealed to NU sympathisers to 'increase participation and cooperation with government agencies' and to make the elections 'a success', a formula implying relative support for the new regime.71 In the face of contradictory statements coming from NU, Kiai Masykur had to intervene to dispell suggestions of confrontation within the organisation. According to him, Idham Chalid and Subchan were only 'managing two different fields'.72 With 18.67% of the total vote in 1971, NU performed well (improving on 18.4% of the vote gained in 1955), but it did poorly compared to Golkar's 62.8%. It felt distressed by the results. Indeed, there had been predictions within NU that political parties would gather as much as 85% of the votes and that Golkar would come third after NU and the PNI. The disappointments did not stop, however, with the 1971 election results. The next blow came when the Ministry of Religious Affairs was removed from NU's control. The new minister was Mukti Ali, a professor of comparative theology and a modernist Muslim with no particular ties to any established organisation. The government expected that he would put an end to the Ministry of Religious Affairs being seen as 'a state within the state', something frequently asserted by its critics. In 1971, the Ministry Religious Affairs had refused to apply new legislation regarding monoloyalitas or the 'moral obligation' for civil servants to join and vote for Golkar. A consequence of 1971's manifold disappointments was the expansion of an anti-Subchan current within NU. This current was strengthened by the ill fortune of the revived Masyumi, Partai Muslimin Indonesia. It was subject to tight government control and interference, a disconcerting development for NU which had been unaccustomed to government intervention in its internal affairs.73 In January 1972, after the death of Kiai Wahab Chasbullah, Subchan was dismissed from NU's executive board. Many observers have seen in this dismissal the hand of the army manipulating power conflicts within NU. But the official letter announcing Subchan's resignation would seem to indicate that this decision was due largely to traditional Sunni anti-radicalist sentiment. One reason mentioned is that NU wanted to choose 'the way of the middle', away 'from extremes and away from western or oriental political practices'.74 Abdurrahman Wahid, grandson of NU's founder Hasjim Asj'ari and of Kiai Bisri Syansuri (who was made the new rais am after the death of Kiai Wahab), was quoted at that time explaining Subchan's dismissal in the following terms: 'Pressures will be stronger from the government against NU, the effect of which will be to isolate NU from the mainstream, the main current of Indonesian politiCs'.75 This sentence has a prophetic ring today when one knows how NU activities suffered from the authorities' distrust during the 1970s.76 It is essential to note that the Sunni tradition of government legitimation was not the only current of political thought evident in the 1971 context. Subchan was defended by major ulama such as Kiai Ali Ma'sum of Krapyak, Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin of Situbondo, and by many regional branches, who had put their hope in this dynamic, educated and cosmopolitan politician. With the dismissal of Subchan and then his accidental death in Mecca in 1973, NU moved closer to the mainstream, but remained for more than ten years the army's main critic in Parliament. Pushed by sharpened rivalry with the army, NU could not relent in its battle despite the Sunni tradition of moderation. In conclusion, we can see that NU was not a monolithic organisation in the early New Order period, but rather an association of ulama and individuals with greatly differing backgrounds and widely divergent interests. This resulted in constant debates among the small circle of people controlling the party, who disagreed over how far NU should go in defending its interests without risking a political backlash. The Lubis resolution in February 1967 committed NU to Suharto's cause despite a hesitant leadership, and Subchan was dismissed in 1972 in a kind of peace pact with the army, regardless of strong support for his radicalism even among the ulama. Some NU leaders nowadays speculate that NU would have fared better if the radical current led by Subchan had been less influential. But Subchan was merely articulating a current of dissatisfaction, whose sources were numerous: while the army was increasingly dominating the political institutions, the more religious members were themselves uneasy at the way in which the Jakarta Charter was pushed aside, this unease was also exacerbated by the phenomena of widespread conversions to Christianity. In any case, the major changes taking place in the post-Sukarno period could hardly have occurred without a significant degree of pain. Subchan's influence increased as the dissatisfaction grew, but was held in check by the traditional Sunni concern with avoiding chaos at any price. Despite the 'peace pact', the relationship with the army remained at best uneasy in the 1970s. This awkward relationship improved somewhat after 1984 when NU decided to 'withdraw from politics', that is to stop giving its exclusive support to the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the sole Muslim political party into which all Muslim parties had to merge in 1973. From then on, under the umbrella of the armed forces and the government, the movement started to prosper again, enjoying more facilities for what mattered most for the ulama: to preserve Islam through preaching and education.77 References Anam, Choirul 1985, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama, Jatayu Sala, Solo. Boland, B. J. 1971, The Struggle of lslam in Modern Indonesia, Verhandlingen van het Koningklik Vorr Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, The Hague. Cribb, R. (ed.) 1990, The Indonesian Killings: Studies from Java and Pall, 1965-1966, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No.21, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne. Crouch, H. 1978, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. Feillard A. 1993, 'Les Oulemas Indonesians Aujourd'hui: De I'Opposition 9 Une Nouvelle Legitimite', Archipel, no.46, pp.89-110. Feith, H. 1968, 'Suharto's Search for a Political Format', Indonesia, Ithaca, pp.88-105. Grunebaum, G.E. von 1962, L 'Islam medieval, Editions Payot, Paris. Jones, S. 1984,'The Contraction and Expansion of the "Umat" and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia', Indonesia, no.38, pp.1-20. Hughes, J. 1967, The End of Sukarno: A Coup that misfired, a Purge that Ran Wild, Angus and Robertson, London. Nasution, A.H. 1989, Memenuhi panggilan tugas: masa pemancangan Orde Pembangunan, jilid 8, Masagung, Jakarta. Nugroho, N. 1985, Tercapainya Konsensus Nasional 1966- 1969, PN Balai Pustaka, Jakarta. Sjaichu, A. 1991, Kembali ke Pesantren: Kenangan 70 tahun KH Achmad Sjaichu, Yayasan Islam al Hamidiyah, Jakarta. Walkin, J. 1969,'The Moslem-Communist Confrontation in East Java 1964-1965', Orbis, pp.822-847. Ward, K. 1971, 'The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia', Indonesia, pp.37-47. ---1974, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no.2, Monash University, Melbourne. Zuhri, S. 1987, Berangkat dari Pesantren, Gunung Agung, Jakarta. ******* 58 Duta Masyarakat, 24 June 1968. 59 Nasution, jilid 8, 1989:105-106. 60 Ward 1968:46. 61 Interview with former intelligence chief, Sutopo Yuwono, 1991. 62 Kiblat, 8, XVI, p.33. 63 Kiblat, 3, XVI, 1968, p. 6. 64 Boland 1971:231. The Assembly introduced compulsory religious education from primary school to university. The aim was to create purely 'Pancasilaist citizen' (manusia pantjasilais sedjati) (Decision TAP MPRS XXVII/1966, chapter I, article 1). Every Indonesian had to profess one of the five officially recognised religions: Islam, Catholicism Protestantism, Buddhism and Hinduism. 65 Speech of 11 May 1968, published in Kiblat, 4, XVI, p. 32, 1968. 66 'Pendjelasan Humas Departemen Agama mengenai Toleransi Agama', published in full in Duta Masyarakat, 3 March 1969. 67 Clashes between Muslims and Christians took place in several Indonesian cities, including Makassar in October 1967 (following a Protestant clergyman's alleged criticism of Allah and polygamy) and in Banjak Island in 1968, where there was a massive exodus of Christians. 68 See Jones 1984 on the subject. 69 Analis, 20 June 1971. 70 Refer to: Ward 1984:110. 71 Angkatan Bersendjata, 18 June 1971. 72 Duta Masyarakat, 23 June 1971. 73 On this, see Ward 1970. 74 'Pendjelasan tentang Keputusan P.B. Syuriah NU tentang Pembebasan JTH Sdr. H.M. Subchan Z.E. dari Kepengurusan PBNU' (Personal archive of Asnawi Latief). 75 Kompas, 25 February 1972. 76 On this, see my article in Archipel 46, Feillard 1993. 77 I have shown how beneficial the 1984 decision had been in education and missionary activities in Feillard 1993.