Chapter Two Traditionalist Islam and the Army in Indonesia's New Order: The Awkward Relationship Andree Feillard Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest traditionalist Islamic organisation, played a legitimating role in the rise of President Suharto's New Order military-backed regime following the abortive coup of September 1965 (the coup which triggered the elimination of Indonesian communism). A unique phenomenon in the Muslim world, NU grew in importance from that time on, in large part because it was the only major political force, next to the army, which remained intact. The fact that it gained more than 18% of the vote in the 1955 and 1971 general elections further contributed to its political weight. NU was established in 1926 as an association of ulama and their followers in the pesantren (religious boarding school) milieu. It came steadily closer to the centre stage of Indonesian politics during the 1950s, despite its rural roots which often caused it to be slighted by the Jakarta elite, both secular nationalist and Islamic modernist. During the Second World War, the Japanese had made NU's president-general (rais am) head of the National Religious Affairs Office (Shumubu),1 and after independence, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was given to an NU leader (after initially being held by a modernist Muslim). The period of parliamentary democracy saw NU rise as a political party when it took the rather audacious step in 1952 of parting from the major Islamic political party, Masyumi, whose leadership was, according to NU leaders, too much dominated by modernists. In the first national elections in 1955, NU's political strength was demonstrated when it became the third largest party, after the PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia--The Nationalist Party of Indonesia) and Masyumi. The PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia--the Communist Party of Indonesia) was the fourth-ranked party. Each of NU's three main competitors were swept aside over the next decade. In 1960 Masyumi was banned because of its ties with the 1958 PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia--the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) rebellion in Sumatra. Following the 1965 coup the PM, being perceived to be too close to Sukarno, was severely weakened while the PKI was banned and its members either killed or incarcerated. Thus, of all the major political parties from the Sukarno era, NU was the only party of consequence left. As such, NU's response to developments in the period immediately after the coup was important in reshaping Indonesia's political system after Sukarno's 'guided democracy'. Ironically, as NU abetted the army's rise to power it simultaneously found itself increasingly sidelined in Indonesian politics. This drove some Within it to a new radicalism, away from the tradition of Sunni Pragmatism in politics, which has always been a distinctive feature of NU's political thinking.2 I shall analyse the early relationship between the army and NU, and the many reasons for their later estrangement, looking beyond the general assumption that the military had neither the intention of sharing power nor the intention of letting ideologies and religions divide the country. I shall begin by retracing the role NU played in General Suharto's installation as president in 1968. This history is important if one is to understand the reaction of deep disappointment that followed when traditionalist Islam was given a subordinate political role after the 1971 elections. Following this, I shall describe the mounting tension, both in the political and religious fields, between the two political groups, a tension that culminated in the violent 1971 election campaign. This led to a long period of malaise which only came to an end in 1984, when NU decided to leave practical politics and allow its members to support the army- backed Golkar party. We shall see that the Sunni tradition of government legitimation, which determined NU's political strategy in 1966, and also in the 1987 elections, was not an uncontested approach, but had serious opponents even among the ulama. The Alliance with the Army NU's reaction to the events of 30 September 1965 was seen in the massive outbreak of anti-communist violence that followed the coup.3 There is strong evidence that in East Java, Ansor, the youth wing of NU, played an important part in the anti-communist killings of 1965-1966.4 When in December 1965 the Team Peneliti Korban G30S PKI, an official fact- finding mission into the killings, reported back to Sukarno, the president is said to have strongly reprimanded the delegates of the team who were Ansor members, saying he was disgusted by Ansor's role in the slaughter.5 But NU's official political position was in fact due more to prudence than anything else. The fact that some senior NU leaders had a strong attachment to Sukarno made their position difficult. This resulted in the emergence of two distinct currents of thought, a radical, pro- army current and another one rather more ambivalent about its support for Suharto's new army-backed regime. NU's Role in the Rise of President Suharto On 1 October the first reaction of NU's senior leaders was to seek information about the kidnapping of the army's six top generals, who were later found to have been killed. Indeed, the mounting rivalry between the army and the PKI was clear to everyone, but the radio announcement by the coup leaders on October had not indicated any PKI involvement, saying instead that it was 'a movement within the army' aimed at Protecting Sukarno from an army plot sponsored by the CIA.6 Suspicion of communist involvement was, however, high among the NU leadership.7 The decision was taken to have NU senior leaders go into hiding while a mandate was given to 34 year old Zainuri Echsan Subchan, NU's fourth vice-chairman, to deal temporarily with NU's day-to-day affairs.8 Subchan was an obvious choice as a young unmarried, well-to-do and outspoken anti-communist who had good contacts not only with some army generals but also with youths groups from outside NU circles. Apparently, Subchan was given the task of 'preserving NU's unity and studying the origins of the coup'. He would also have been given instructions to make whatever alliances were necessary to safeguard the interests of NU and its members.9 It is difficult to ascertain the official position taken by NU at the time to the events of 30 September as all non-government publications were banned until 7 October. NU archives show that Ansor made a declaration on 1 October, rejecting a claim made in a radio broadcast that four NU or NU-affiliated leaders were members of the 'Revolutionary Council' (a body named by the coup leaders to which all power in the Republic was to be passed until new elections could be held).10 Ansor appealed to its members to remain loyal to Sukarno and not be drawn into the 'counter-revolutionary' action of the Thirtieth of September Movement. Muslimat, the NU women's association, made a similar denial on 2 October.11 On 3 October Ansor asked its members to assist the army in restoring order.12 A large-scale massacre of communists followed shortly after. At the same time, the Action Front to Crush the Thirtieth of September Movement (KAP-Gestapu) was created with Subchan and Harry Tjan Silalahi of the Catholic party as its leaders. On 4 October at a mass rally in Jakarta, they asked, in the name of major political mass organisations which included Ansor, for a ban on the PKI.13 The KAP-Gestapu was thereafter to play an important role in the fight against communism. NU's formal position at this time remained unclear. While young NU leaders showed great eagerness to react fiercely, the senior leadership remained very much in the background.14 If we are to believe Duta Masyarakat, NU's daily newspaper, a declaration was read in a radio broadcast on 1 October, urging members to keep loyal to Sukarno and help the army restore order.15 After several meetings with the army, an NU statement was finally issued and read on the radio on 4 October, calling for the PKI and its affiliates to be banned.16 Interestingly, the declaration was prepared by young NU activists, with Subchan's blessings, but was not actually signed by the NU leadership until the following day. On 5 October, at the burial of the six generals who had been kidnapped and later murdered by the coup leaders, senior NU leaders were met by two of the party's younger leaders and pressed to sign.17 Idham Chalid, the NU chairman- general, signed it later at a cabinet meeting in Bogor.18 Clearly, the initiative was in the hands of junior NU leaders while senior leaders were wary of making the wrong steps in a confused political situation. Thus, by mid-October, ambiguity continued to Prevail when instructions were given to all NU media, including Duta Masyarakat, 'to preserve good relations with the PKI, with Sukarno, and not to offend the Air Force, and the Armed Forces in general'.19 A 'mission impossible'. From this point onwards NU began increasingly to take sides with the army. Apart from Subchan's action in organising anti. PKI student demonstrations within the KAP-Gestapu and KAMI,20 NU's role in Parliament became crucial for the legal transfer of power from Sukarno to General Suharto. Indeed, with the help of student demonstrations, the army had enjoyed an initial first success: emergency powers had been handed over by Sukarno to General Suharto on 11 March 1966. But only the Consultative Assembly (MPRS) had the power to confirm and extend these powers. Here, the role of Achmad Sjaichu, a leading NU figure, was particularly important. As deputy speaker of Parliament (since 1963), and then as speaker (after June 1966), he approved three successive parliamentary purges by which leftist members were replaced by army-backed MPs. Following his election as speaker, he called for a meeting of the MPRS. The assembly conferred emergency powers upon Suharto until such time as elections could be held. It also allowed the army's further involvement in Parliament through the nomination of more MPs from the 'functional groups', which served as the military's political arm. Six months later, several student groups demanded Sukarno's dismissal and trial.21 Several of NU's younger leaders added their voices to the general clamour. One of them, Jusuf Hasyim, a leading Ansor figure, asked that Sukarno's role in the coup be examined and that he be tried just like any other citizen. Subchan lent his support to this position.22 In the following MPRS session in February 1967, young NU radicals close to the army pressed the party's more conservative leaders to commit NU to removing Sukarno and installing Suharto as president. It is important to note that this move came from the NU youth and Was entirely contrary to the personal inclinations of some of their elders. Nevertheless the political climate in early 1967 meant that the senior leadership was under strong pressure to relent. Finally Nuddin Lubis, an NU parliamentarian, moved a resolution calling for the dismissal of Sukarno as president, an inquiry into his role in the failed coup and the election of a new President. Following this another NU politician, Djamaluddin Malik, moved a further resolution proposing that Suharto be the next president. It needs to be pointed out that the initial Lubis resolution represented a major reversal within NU as Lubis initially lacked the firm support of the majority of NU MPs at the time he proposed the resolution.23 Immediately after winning over the support of the parliamentary group, aided greatly by deputy rais am, Kiai Bisri Syansuri, he summoned purnalists to a press conference and deliberately announced the resolution without prior consultation with the NU general-chairman, Idham Chalid.24 Lubis' statement to the press presented the NU leadership with a fait accompli.25 NU postponed its February congress in Bandung, partly to deny a forum to critics of the resolution, but also to comply with army warnings that security conditions in West Java were still too Uncertain to permit the holding of such a major meeting.26 These NU resolutions brought Suharto to the presidency ad interim, and presented Sukarno with the prospect of a trial (a threat which was never carried out). NU's action in parliament would not have been possible without key developments in the months leading up to the February session. These included Sukarno's continued support for the PKI, his belittling of the army's role in the Revolution, a series of sharp price increases and ongoing student demonstrations. Thus, February 1967 was a turning Point for the pro-army current within NU. This current asserted itself at the very moment when the army appeared to gain decisive ground. In the period that followed, significant hostility towards Sukarno emerged from within NU. The West Java Syuriah (Religious Council) declared that it withdrew the title of Waliyul Amri Dlaruri Bissyaukah. This title, given to him at a 1954 ulama conference, made him the legitimate ruler of Indonesia, a state with a Muslim majority but a secular political system. Duta Masyarakat explained in an editorial that 'a president having a symbolic function required a noble mind, which Bung Karno does not possess.27 Finally the ulama could be clearly seen to have taken sides. The dominance of pro-army elements within NU continued to be evident throughout 1968. During the course of the year Achmad Sjaichu agreed to a controversial 'reform' of parliament which reduced the number of MPs overtly aligned with Islamic concerns to 28%, down from 48% in 1955.28 Sjaichu later explained that he had had the assurance of Suharto that Islamic interests would not be sacrificed in these changes. He recalled that when he voiced his concerns to the president, he was told: 'the kiai are not the only ones to know what is haram (forbidden in Islam) and what is not'.29 A few weeks later, General Suharto was elected full president. Sukarno, at that point under virtual house arrest, died in June 1970. The New Order had been formally legitimated and, in part, it had been done with the assistance of a divided Nahdlatul Ulama. An Insight into the Disagreement Two currents had thus emerged within NU, among not only the top leadership but also among the student leaders. The more conservative of these two currents was closer to Sukarno, the other, more radical current was inclined towards the Armed Forces. The press talked of there being a dichotomy between NU-ABRI (ABRI is the acronym for the Armed forces) and NU- PNI, and also of 'NU-Orba and NU-Orla' (Orba and Orla being the common abbreviations for 'New Order' and 'Old Order' respectively).30 The rais am, Kiai Wahab Chasbullah, was prominent in the pro-Sukarno current, as can be seen from his declaration of June 1966 that Sukarno would be NU's presidential candidate forever.31 By that time, Sukarno's demise was already clear to many politicians, making Kiai Wahab one of the last prominent supporters of the 'Father of the Revolution'. Idham Chalid also expressed his genuine sympathy for the ailing president and visited him in Bogor on several occasions, including after March 1967, when Sukarno was under effective house arrest.32 He reportedly told friends he felt sorry for the lonely former president.33 At the opposite end of the spectrum within NU was Subchan, whose strong commitment to the Armed Forces was lauded in Duta Masyarakat as early as June 1966 in these terms: 'Subchan cleverly and forcefully directed the progressive-revolutionary forces whereas some of our leaders did not dare face the situation and preferred instead simply to wait for the next turn of events'. Again in 1966, Achmad Sjaichu, another leading pro-army figure, strongly expressed the special ties between the army and NU, comparing them to two 'brothers' .34 It should be noted however that the leadership of NU was never entirely united in its political outlook. One good example of this is the situation in 1959, when there was division within NU about whether or not to accept the 'guided democracy' of President Sukarno, which put an end to the liberal democracy of the post-independence years. One NU leader, Imron Rosyadi, joined forces with those resisting Sukarno's move to gain a firmer hold on power, and as a result was imprisoned. At the same time the NU leadership agreed to participate in guided democracy. Several years later, in the period leading up to the events of late 1965, Subchan, who, as we have already noted, was an outspoken anti-communist, tacitly contested Idham Chalid's leadership of NU. The result was a farcical state of affairs in with each of them endeavoured to conduct the business of leading NU from their private homes. (Concerned to ensure that correspondence emanating from their desks was seen to be official, when writing letters each would contact staff in the NU Head Office in order to obtain the 'correct reference number'.) After the events of 30 September 1965 a number of figures within NU were immediately persuaded that Sukarno had no chance of remaining in office because he was seen as too close to the PKI. Many others, however, felt that as 'Father of the Revolution' Sukarno was simply irreplaceable. The persistence of this pro-Sukarno current can be best understood by briefly examining the history of the close personal relationships between the nationalist leader and some of the senior Nahdlatul Ulama leaders.35 As early as 1940, NU decided that it would push for the election of Sukarno as future president, paradoxically at the very time when he was clearly expressing his sympathy for the secular Ataturk model.36 Many factors are responsible for the special relationship. Of some consequence is the fact that the major NU leaders and the president both came from East Java, speaking the same dialect of Javanese. More importantly though is the fact that Sukarno was a protege of Kiai Wahab's close friend, Tjokroaminoto, leader of Indonesia's first large-scale Muslim association, Sarekat Islam. Sukarno also shared with Kiai Wahab the same taste for Javanese theatre (wayang) and for selamatan (ritual communal feasts). Another common factor was that both were married a number of times. Further strengthening the relationship was the fact that Sukarno allowed Wahab to make use of a number of important business facilities. Within NU, there were also genuine feelings of admiration for the brilliant orator and nationalist leader, to the point where his speeches and writings were studied in a number of pesantren. There was also considerable gratitude felt toward Sukarno on account of his support for the creation of a separate NU political party in 1952. Of greater importance was the strong sentiment of many NU leaders that priority was to be given to stability in government rather than to absolute democracy. Thus, Idham Chalid justified guided democracy by saying that according to Islam it was not necessarily 'the voice of the majority which is always the wisest'. Islam, he went on to say, chose to be guided by 'haq dan ahlinya', i.e., law and its experts.37 The Syuriah leader, Kiai Wahab, was more cautious than the Tanfidziah (Executive Board) chairman, and said that 'a leadership without democracy could only lead to dictatorship while anarchy as well as dictatorship are contrary to democracy'.38 But discussion with older NU politicians seems to indicate that what they objected to most about Guided Democracy was cooperation with the communists rather than the authoritarian system of government itself. In any case, by late 1966 it was clear that the tide had turned and the pro-Sukarno current reluctantly gave in to the new situation. Thus, Idham Chalid boasted in September 1966 that NU was not afraid 'to criticise and be criticised, and when it did criticise Sukarno, it was out of love for him'.39 The army had achieved its aim of having Nahdlatul Ulama contribute to the rise of the New Order, and in the process had gained a degree of legitimacy. The Deterioration of the Relationship Between NU and the Army In the process of NU assisting the ratification of the New Order regime disagreements arose over the various political institutions that were being established as well as over the place of Islam in the post-Sukarno era. These differences soured the alliance between NU and the army. The Political Question As early as 1966, even before NU had formally proposed Suharto as president, there were signs of the authoritarian inclination of the emerging regime. One draft bill said the press could 'control, criticise and correct' but only in a 'constructive way'.40 One of the first points of conflict between NU and the army was the date for the holding of elections. NU wanted these to be held in 1967; the new government first proposed 1968 and then postponed them until 1971. This gave time for the army to organise its own political vehicle, Golkar. NU also opposed a 1966 plan to reactivate a presidential instruction (Penpres 2/1959) which forbade senior civil servants from joining political parties. As the main source of civil servants for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, NU suffered considerably when a similar measure was later introduced. The most serious threat came from a set of bills on political institutions proposed in November 1966. Anxieties within NU were heightened by one draft bill asking political parties and social organisations to base themselves on the national ideology, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution. It also gave the government the power to dissolve political parties whenever they were deemed guilty of 'political misdeeds'.41 The election bill also came under fire from NU. It rejected the 'district system' for legislative elections, whereby the regions would chose candidates rather than a political party. With regions outside Java being less populated, the political weight of Java, NU's stronghold, would decrease. Finally, it objected to a proposal that the army be given 50% of parliamentary seats. NU wanted it to have only 5%.42 It is interesting to note that these parliamentary debates occurred in February 1967, at a time when NU was assisting Suharto's bid to become president through the Lubis and Malik resolutions. The draft bills had already been issued at the end of 1966 and NU knew of their contents at that time. One should recognise here the influence of the Sunnite tradition of government legitimation, with its fear of chaos, in determining NU political strategy. Thus, Kiai Machrus Ali of Kediri said of Suharto at the time of the debates on the new political system, that the future president was like 'dawn after the night'.43 NU intellectuals were not unaware of the threats of an army- dominated government, as can be seen in one Duta Masyarakat editorial: 'The people's sovereignty should be applied concretely in laws and should not be a consumption object given in the form of fairy tales'.44 The emergence of two new currents was already evident: a conservative current and a radical anti-army current parallel to the pro-army and pro-Sukarno currents, though not always coinciding. In July 1967, at its Bandung congress, NU began, however, to flex its muscles. It requested early elections, the cancellation of the ban on senior civil servants' membership of political parties, an anti-corruption bill and a more openly anti-Israel foreign policy. Moreover, it complained of the poor economic conditions faced by batik producers in such major textile production areas as Tasikmalaya, West Java, and demanded that these things be borne in mind by the government as it formulated policy.45 Slowly but surely, during the course of 1968, Duta Masyarakat started to become more outspoken, with the pro- army-turned-radical Subchan being more and more often quoted by the conservative daily newspaper. During a meeting of the MPRS in 1968, Subchan opposed the election of Suharto, arguing that he should be elected only after legislative elections as MPs make up half of the Assembly electing the president. Subchan soon became one of the most outspoken opponents of the New Order political system. This climaxed in the 1971 legislative elections when violence erupted between the army and NU sympathisers. The Religious Question The second vexed issue in the relationship between the army and NU during the first years of the New Order was the question of Islam's official role in the Indonesian state and society. The question of the Syari'ah (Islamic Law) and its legislative relationship with the state had been around since the preparation for independence in June 1945. A preliminary agreement had been reached on what was called the 'Jakarta Charter', by which it was suggested that the Constitution require obedience to the Syari'ah from all Indonesian Muslims.46 In August 1945, NU gave in to pleas by the largely Christian eastern islands, objecting that they would not be part of an Islamic state. The Charter was thus abandoned. The national ideology, Pancasila, made up of five universal principles, including 'belief in one almighty God', made no special reference to Islam.47 But the subject reappeared during the Constituent Assembly debates in 1959. Sukarno unilaterally dissolved the Constituent Assembly after neither Islamic nor secular groups were able to achieve the required two- thirds majority. The following compromise was worked out with NU: a return to the 1945 Constitution would be proclaimed while the Jakarta Charter with its reference to the Syari'ah would be recognised as 'inspiring' and 'being at one with' the Constitution. Under the New Order, Pancasila was understood to exclude any ideology, communist or religious. It became the only accepted reference while the Jakarta Charter increasingly became a taboo subject. As early as 1966, the army became worried when the Jakarta Charter began to surface again in Islamic public discourse. During a large street parade held for NU's fortieth anniversary in January 1966, banners were reportedly seen asking for a return to the Charter. I have found no confirmation other than verbal of the presence of such banners and NU says nowadays that if there were any, they were not officially sanctioned. Whatever the case, during the following days, the army-backed press denied NU's alleged support for an Islamic state.48 The fact is that the Jakarta Charter was used as a legitimate reference during these early years of the New Order. Thus, in April 1966, at a meeting of NU's Party Council in Bogor, an official NU announcement said: 'Since the State is founded on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which cannot be separated from the Jakarta Charter, the way is open to implement the party's ideals'. It further said: 'If Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are applied properly in the life of the state, and if the Jakarta Charter is properly applied in society, the result will be a society in conformity with the party's ideals'.49 Despite this, it seems that NU did not request a revision of the Constitution in favour of the Jakarta Charter, and no longer placed the Charter in opposition to Pancasila as had been done in 1959. Later, at the MPRS meeting of July 1966, NU and Muslim MPs in general asked that the Charter continue to be mentioned in official texts.50 Finally, it was decided that mention would only be made of 'the fact' that the Jakarta Charter had been named in the 1959 presidential decree.51 This amounted to a mild recognition of the Charter. It failed, however, to be mentioned as one of the sources of law. NU had more success when the MPRS agreed to make religious education compulsory, a unanimous decision aimed at countering communism, which has been seen as a major contribution to the further Islamisation of the archipelago. In 1967, the Charter became the subject of further debate in the press. The fact that NU defended the Charter's legitimacy caused it to be branded 'neo-Darul Islam', after the violent Muslim rebellion in West Java during the late 1940s and 1950s. During MPRS commission discussions, proposals in favour of Islam arose but it is difficult to have a clear picture of the real demands being made by Islamic groups as proceedings were held behind closed doors. The press practised self-censorship and the Charter was steadily becoming a forbidden subject. The ulama adapted to the new situation, insisting on the Charter's legitimacy but avoiding any confrontation between Pancasila and Islam. The Sunnite tradition of compromise was again apparent with a call from Kiai Machrus Ali to 'Keep away from actions or words that can provoke anger among other people. According to Islamic law, any action that can disturb the society's order is a major sin that will be judged by God'.52 Another conflict emerged between the secular and Islamic forces when a draft bill on marriage for Muslims was heartily supported by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, an NU stronghold as we have seen. The draft bill took the Jakarta Charter as a reference and proposed that 'laws in accordance with the Muslim Syari'ah could be issued especially for Muslims'. 53 This draft bill was quickly rejected by secular and non-Muslim groups as opening the way to a juridical dualism. The controversy over the Charter intensified in 1968, and one can wonder whether this intensification was not tied to the political parties' increased marginalisation by the army's inroads into Indonesian politics. NU, together with other Islamic groups, wanted the Charter mentioned and thus legalised by the MPRS as part of the Broad Policy Guidelines (GBHN). Furthermore, Islamic groups wanted the definition of human rights to ban religious conversions (ganti agama). Having elected Suharto full president, the MPRS finished its sessions without making any decision on the Charter and the human rights questions, and the Armed Forces opposed the continuation of the debates.54 NU protested vehemently. Nuddin Lubis lashed out at Catholics and sections of the functional groups which he said were 'without roots in society [and] which did everything to see to it that the commission works be rejected'.55 A few days later, on 8 April, Suharto summoned the four Islamic parties, and asked them to agree among themselves on the meaning of the Charter. A commission directed by Prawoto Mangkusasmito, a former Masyumi leader, was given the task of elaborating a common vision. Kiai Masykur represented NU in that commission.56 The anniversary of the Charter on 22 June was commemorated with a plethora of declarations. Duta Masyarakat published a statement of the commemoration committee signed by the Pemuda Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Islam Pusat (PMPI), an association of youth Muslim organisations which included Ansor. It said, amongst other things: 'The implementation of the Syari'ah does not mean that Indonesia would be an Islamic state. The Syari'ah brings divine grace and happiness for the Nation and its people on earth and in heaven'.57 The second point of the statement read: 'the obligation of religious practice (ibadah) reinforces morals and character and is thus more powerful than appeals and exhortations.' This apologetic declaration seemed to imply the ****** 1. During the Second World War, after an initial period of strained relations with Nahdlatul Ulama, the Japanese cleverly courted Islam by the establishment of the Shumubu. This cooperation led to the creation of a national Islamic Council, Masyumi, which later became the largest Islamic political party. 2 Several medieval Sunni thinkers have tried to bring constitutional theory into line with political reality, the chief concern being to Preserve Islam and its law through political concessions. With the argument that disorder and chaos are more dangerous than tyranny or injustice, legitimation could be given to a strong sultan, even if he were a despot. Thus, if one is to conform exclusively to just orders, al-Ghazali (1058-1111) asked: 'Shall we stop obeying the laws? Shall we revoke the kadis? (...) Shall we let the people live in sin? Or shall we continue, recognising that what is inanimate actually exists, that all administrative acts remain valid, given the circumstances and the necessities of the moment?' (in G.E. von Grunebaum, L'lslam medieval, Payot, Paris, 1962: p. 185). Al-Mawardi and al-Baqillani have also influenced NU'S political thinking. 3 On this, see Hughes 1967, Walkin 1969 and Cribb 1990. This conflict had in fact began sporadically in the early 1960s when Muslim landowners resisted PKI-inspired campaigns to force land reforms. 4 Refer to Cribb 1990: 26; Hughes 1967:154; and Crouch 1979:152. 5 Interview with Chalid Mawardi, an Ansor delegate present at the meeting (1991). The fact-finding commission was appointed by President Sukarno at the end of December 1965. It estimated that 54,000 had been killed in East Java alone. The number of victims was minimised, however, and the commonly accepted estimate was between 250,000 and 500,000 People killed across the archipelago (Crouch 1978:155-156). 6 Crouch 1978:97. There are several theories on the origins of the coup. The official lndonesian version has it that the coup was the work of the PKI, a version contested by Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey from Cornell university. Scholars have been debating in favour or against one Or the other theory. Although it seems clear that there was indeed some PKI involvement, the extent of it remains uncertain. 7 Interview with Moenasir, 3 December 1994. 8 Interview with Syah Manaf, 1991. Present at the meeting were Kiai Masykur, a member of the NU's supreme religious council, the Syuriah, Idham Chalid, the Tanfidziah chairman, and Syaf Manaf, from NU's political bureau. Moenasir confirmed such a mandate was given to Subchan but was unaware of the time and place it was given to him (Interview, 3 December 1994). 9 Interview with Syah Manaf, 1991. 10 'Pernyataan pujuk pimpinan gerakan Pemuda Ansor', signed by Jahja Ubaied, its president, and by Chalid Mawardi (National archives, Jakarta). The list of Revolutionary Council members was drawn up without consultation and most nominees denied having any knowledge of it (Crouch 1979: 98). 11 Interview with Mrs. Asmah Sjachruni, a senior NU leader, 1991. The NU leaders named were: KH Fattah Yasin, A. M. Eahman, Jahya Ubaied and Mahmudah Mawardi from the Muslimat. signed by the chairman, H. A· 12 'Instruksi 3 Oktober, PP GP Ansor', Chamid Wijaya (National Archives, Jakarta). 13 Berita Yudha, 5 October 1965. 14 General Nasution passed on a letter to Idham Chalid explaining the situation and expressing his thankfulness in advance for a firm position from NU (Interview with KH M. Moenasir, 3 December 1994). 15 Duta Masyarakat, 7 October 1965. I have found no trace of the original Statement, which could have confirmed that it was actually_ made as early BS 1 October. Moreover, the national radio station was in the hands of the September Movement leaders until 1 October at 7 p.m. 16 Ibid. Berita Yudha, 6 October 1965, published the entire statement bearing the date of 5 October. 17 Interview With Jusuf Hasyim, 1992. 18 Idham Chalid could not be found prior to the cabinet meeting. Knowing that he would attend the Bogor meeting, a student was sent to Bogor to Obtain his signature. (Interview with H. Moenasir, 2 December 1994). 19 'Surat PBNU, Pedoman Politik Pemberitaan Harian NU', 14 October 1965, sent to five media outlets (National Archives, Jakarta). 20 Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, the students' action front, organised major demonstrations, bringing an important contribution, in coordination with the army, to the destabilisation of the Old Order. 21 Refer to Crouch 1978: 212. 22 Duta Masyarakat, 11 January 1967. 23 He acted with the understanding and backing of the army. 24 This parliamentary session of 9 February ended at 1 am. One hour later, Lubis called a press conference. 25 Interview With Nuddin Lubis, 1991. 26 Interview with Nuddin Lubis, August 1991. 27 Duta Masyarakat, 10 March 1967 28 Angkatan Baru, 21 March 1968; and Ward 1968:42. 29 Sjaichu 1991:69. 30 Duta Masyarakat, 5 April, 29 May, 3 July and 11 July 1967. 31 Antara, 7 June 1966. 32 After the MPRS session of March 1967, Sukarno remained in his palaces but it soon apparent that he was under virtual house arrest. In May 1967, he was no longer allowed to use his titles (Crouch 1978: 220). 33 Interview with General Nasution, 1991. 34 Duta Masyarakat, 13 August 1966. 35 It is important to note that the NU was politically dominated by just a few senior leaders, those interested in politics, be they from the Tanfidziah (Executive Board) like Idham Chalid or from the Syuriah like Kiai Bisri. It was a top-down organisation and the mass membership had little impact on every day decisions. 36 See Berita Nahdlatoel Ulama, Surabaya, 1 July 1940, p. 8/225, about NU's reaction to Sukarno's defence of Kemal Ataturk. On Sukarno's choice as future president, see Anam 1985: 112. 37 Speech called 'Islam dan Demokrasi Terpimpin', given at PTI NU, Fakultas Hukum Islam where Idham was teacher (dosen luar biasa). 38 Zuhri 1987: 475. 39 Duta Masyarakat, 21 September 1966. 40 Duta Masyarakat, 12 November 1966. 41 Duta Masyarakat, 24 February 1967. 42 Duta Masyarakat, 24 March 1967. On the new political system put into place by the New Order, see Feith 1968. 43 Duta Masyarakat, 9 March 1967. 44 Duta Masyarakat, 22 February 1967. 45 Duta Masyarakat, 14 July 1967. 46 The famous phrase agreed upon on 22 June 1945 and known as the Jakarta Charter is: 'Belief in God with the obligation for Muslims to implement the Syari'ah in accordance with a just humanity'. It was never clear what it exactly meant or how the obligation would be carried out. 47 In the months preceding independence in 1945, Sukarno proposed the five universal principles of Pancasila (belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice). Any reference to a religion was avoided in order to create unity in this diverse nation. Sukarno's main argument was that, if]slam was indeed the majority religion, Parliament would issue laws in conformity with Islam. 48 Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersenjata, 31 January 1966. 49 Antara, 16 April 1966. 50 Nugroho 1985:38. 51 'TAP XX/MPRS/1966 tentang memorandum DPR-GR mengenai sumbertertib hukum Republik Indonesia dan Tata Urutan Peraturan Perundang RI'. 52 Duta Masyarakat, 9 March 1967. 53 'Pendjelasan mengenai Undang Undang tentang Pokok-pokok peraturan pernikahan umat islam. Pendjelasan Umum', artikel 2-4. 54 Nasution 1989, jilid 8:105-106. 55 Duta Masyarakat, 3 April 1968. 56 Interview with Lukman Harun of the Muhammadiyah, January 1993. 57 Duta Masyarakat, 22 June 1966.