The formation of the Ali cabinet was of considerable significance. Firstly, it demonstrated how NU under the pragmatic leadership of Wahab Chasbullah could strengthen the middle ground of Indonesian politics and, in certain circumstances, combine with other parties to isolate Masyumi Secondly, as the longest-serving government during the seven- year period of parliamentary democracy, the Ali cabinet allowed NU to consolidate itself as a political force. For almost two years the party used its position in government to provide resources, employment and a wide range of other preferments to its members and supporters.78 The patronage networks established during this period greatly assisted the party's recruitment and electoral activities and would continue to serve NU throughout the remainder of the Sukarno years. At the 1955 general election NU emerged as the third largest party in Indonesia, attracting almost seven million votes or 18.4% of the national total and lifting its parliamentary representation from 8 to 45.79 The result caused jubilation within the party. Whilst many had hoped for a strong showing, few seriously believed such an outcome was likely. The party's own campaign committee had predicted on election eve that NU would only capture between 20-25 seats.80 The election result was not only a victory for the party but also a personal triumph for Wahab. It was he who had led NU's move into politics and persuaded his more sceptical colleagues of the organisation's capacity to become an independent and influential party. His sagacity and prescience now seemed confirmed by NU's remarkable electoral success. The post- election period marked the peak of his career and power within the party. Amongst the grassroots of NU, where a strong culture of venerating senior kiai existed, Wahab was increasingly acclaimed as a wali, and many stories circulated extolling his oracular and magical abilities.81 Wahab used his authority during this time to promote proteges of a pragmatic persuasion to high office in NU. At the party congress in Medan in December 1956 several of his most loyal lieutenants were appointed to strategic positions within the organisation. Chief among them was Idham Chalid, who replaced KH Mohammad Dachlan as the chairman-general of the Tanfidziah (Executive Board).82 He had developed a close relationship with Wahab in the early 1950s, often accompanying him on his travels to NU branches. A shrewd but cautious man with a keen political instinct, Idham prospered under Wahab's tutelage, learning much about organisational, debating and oratorical techniques whilst also building up his own network of support within the party. Other Wahab supporters to be elevated included Saifuddin Zuhri, who became secretary- general, and the wealthy businessman and film producer, Djamaluddin Malik, who became third chairman of the NU board. These appointments strengthened the pro-Wahab element within the NU leadership, with many continuing to be influential figures in the party until the 1970s and 1980s. Not all of Wahab's activities in the mid- to late 1950s showed good judgement. His apparent willingness to use his position in NU and connections with government to advance his family's pecuniary interests and career prospects was a particular source of criticism, both within the party and without. Although nepotism is not uncommon in the tightly-knit kinship groups of Javanese ulama, many NU leaders and cadre looked askance at Wahab's ardent promotion of, amongst others, his eldest son, Wahib Wahab, and stepson, Achmad Sjaichu, both of whom had been elected to parliament in 1955.83 Wahab's business dealings, especially those involving Chinese entrepreneurs or government licences, also gave rise to concern. Several of these dealings came under public scrutiny in 1956 when sections of the Jakarta press began publishing allegations that Wahab and Wahib had sought preferential government treatment for a number of commercial ventures.84 While it is difficult to determine the validity of these accusations it would not have been surprising, given the frequency with which political leaders of the time extracted personal gain from public office, for Wahab to have engaged in such practices. Despite maintaining a relatively simple Personal lifestyle, the financial needs of his pesantren and large family would have been considerable.85 The Accommodation of Guided Democracy The period from 1957 to 1960 was one of great upheaval in Indonesian politics as President Sukarno, with support from the army, progressively dismantled the existing system of parliamentary democracy and replaced it with the more authoritarian 'guided democracy'. The transition to guided democracy created serious tensions within the NU leadership as it raised fundamental questions regarding the future shape of Indonesian politics and NU's place within it. There were three elements of this transition process which proved especially divisive for NU: firstly, the shift of power from a democratically-elected parliament and parties to the executive and particularly the President; secondly, the marginalisation of Masyumi resulting from its iii-fated involvement in the regional rebellions and staunch opposition to Sukarno's political reforms; and thirdly, the expanding role and influence of the PKI and other left-wing groups in government. The hardliners within NU strongly objected to each of these aspects whereas the pragmatists were prepared to accept them. According to the hardliners it would be sinful for the party to Support or condone any actions which breached the principles of democracy and arbitrarily reduced the influence of Islam whilst bolstering that of communism. Hence, opposition to guided democracy was a moral imperative. Some argued it was also a Sound political strategy to thwart Sukarno's initiatives. They reasoned that for Sukarno to form a credible coalition government he would need the participation of at least one of the two major Islamic parties. If NU joined with Masyumi in rejecting guided democracy, Sukarno would be forced to temper abandon hi, plans and the Islamic parties would have demonstrated their combined power to set the political agenda. The pragmatists' accommodatory approach to guided democracy reflected, above all else, a conviction that far greater danger lay in resistance than in acquiescence. It was a stance which, characteristically, emphasised risk minimisation and retention of political influence as a means of protecting the umat. Central to their argument was a belief that Sukarno and the army now held sufficient power to dictate the terms of the political restructuring and punish those who resisted. Opposition was thus not only futile but also extremely dangerous for NU and its constituency. Far better, they argued, for NU to remain within government from whence it could exert a moderating influence on Sukarno and counter the activities of the PKI. Some of the more pro-Sukarno pragmatists were attracted to the notion of guided democracy, particularly as it allowed a greater role for the President to act as a unifying figure and surmount Indonesia's political ills. As for the fate of Masyumi, many pragmatists believed that its problems were largely self-inflicted. Its rigid opposition to Sukarno's plans as well as its complicity in the regional rebellions had discredited the party and ultimately harmed the interests of both political Islam and parliamentarianism. In any case, Masyumi's demise as a political force made it doubly important for NU to provide Islamic representation within the government. There were two important occasions during the transition to guided democracy when the party was forced to choose between the pragmatist and hardline positions. These concerned the issue of participation in, and by extension, approval of, newly created institutions in the transition process. The first, in early 1957, was the extra-parliamentary Kabinet Karya (Working Cabinet), and the second, in mid-1960, was the Sukarno-appointed Gotong-Royong (Mutual Assistance) Parliament. In both cases there was considerable ambivalence among NU leaders not yet committed to either a hardline or pragmatic stance. Many acknowledged the validity of the hardliners' arguments about upholding democracy, showing loyalty to Masyumi and resisting the leftwards movement of Indonesian politics, but were also deeply apprehensive about the risks to NU of opposing guided democracy. The pragmatists eventually won by persuading their colleagues that risk avoidance was of higher priority. Wahab, as NU's pre-eminent ulama-politician, figured prominently in gaining majority support for the pragmatist position In the tense meetings which decided NU's stance he dominated proceedings, repeatedly warning his colleagues that there was grave danger in resisting Sukarno's demands and that their paramount responsibility as Islamic leaders was to safeguard their faith and party from such danger. He also shrewdly coaxed waverers with the argument that NU should enter the cabinet while it had the chance, and could later withdraw should the government's performance prove unsatisfactory. Such a course removed the risk of immediate political isolation but still left the party with the option of opposing Sukarno's actions at a later date. He encapsulated this principle in the catchphrase: 'enter first; leaving is easy' (masuk dulu; keluar gampang).86 To appease the hardliners he promised that NU would refuse to join any cabinet which contained PKI members. Participation in the Kabinet Karya was finally agreed to on the basis of maslahah, with the NU leadership declaring it would endorse the four NU ministers appointed by Sukarno 'in order to bring the greatest possible benefit for us all...or at the very least minimise harm (madlarraat)'.87 The issue of the Gotong-Royong Parliament proved more intractable. Certain hardline ulama, notably Bisri Syansuri and Achmad Siddiq, argued that participation would be tantamount to condoning ghasab, a jurisprudential term referring to the arrogation of another's property or rights. Sukarno, they asserted, had violated the rights of electors and the dismissed Parliamentarians by arbitrarily dissolving the popularly-elected legislature and replacing it with a parliament of largely government appointees. Despite the efforts of Wahab and his fellow pragmatists, these hardliners remained implacable, forcing the NU Syuriah to issue a split decision which stated that, according to Islamic law, involvement in the new parliament was '(1) allowed with intention of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar [ie promoting good and preventing evil] or (2) disallowed because it entails ghasab'.88 As a result, NU nominees to the Gotong- Royong parliament were free either to accept or to reject appointment based on whether they believed it to be a case of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar or ghasab.89 At a series of subsequent party meetings Wahab strongly urged NU's nominees to take up their appointments in order to maintain a share of political power which could be used to protect the umat in the uncertain times ahead. All but three of NU's 55 nominees later accepted positions in parliament.90 Its acquiescence to the process of political restructuring allowed NU to secure its position within the system of guided democracy. The forced dissolution of Masyumi in September 1960 left NU as the sole major Islamic party and the chief religious component in Sukarno's Nasakom (an acronym formed from nasionalisme, agama and komunisme or nationalism, religion and communism). In reality its influence, like that of the PNI, was greatly reduced, with power now increasingly concentrated in the hands of the President, the army, and the PKI. NU was able, however, to use its position in government to further build its organisational structure and patronage networks as well as to counter the activities of the PKI. Wahab Chasbullah's dominance of the party during the late 1950s owed much to his ability to persuade his colleagues that pragmatism was not only politically sensible but religiously correct as well. As the party's most experienced politician and also the one closest to Sukarno, his political views carried immense weight. In religious debates he spoke with the assurance of an ulama who had spent much of his life advocating genera: principles of risk minimisation and expedience. Though lacking the jurisprudential scholarship of Bisri Syansuri or Achmad Siddiq, he drew on his debating skills and knowledge of Islamic history, typically citing precedents from Sunni Islam's long tradition of political quietism. He was also adept at appealing to the non-confrontationist proclivities of NU's predominantly Javanese leadership. In addition to his political and religious authority Wahab's forceful personality and preparedness to take advantage of NU's culture of deference to senior kiai made him a formidable force within the party. He was not, however, the dictator that his critics claimed him to be. On those occasions when he swayed the party to a particular course, it was usually because it found his reasoning persuasive. When he was unconvincing, his proposals were rejected.91 Twilight Years Wahab's role and influence within the party declined progressively throughout the 1960s. From the early part of the decade his health began to deteriorate causing him to spend an increasing amount of time at his pesantren and rely ever more heavily Upon trusted lieutenants such as Idham Chalid and Saifuddin Zuhri. His personal morale and prestige within NU were also dented by the actions of Wahib Wahab who had been appointed Minister of Religious Affairs in 1959. His inept handling of this portfolio attracted considerable criticism from the Muslim community and reached an ignominious conclusion 19 February 1962 when Wahib was forced to resign from cabinet over his involvement in a foreign currency scandal.92 Having vigorously promoted Wahib's career both within NU and the government Wahab was now acutely embarrassed by his son's misdeeds.93 The damage to the party's reputation caused many NU members to lament the cost of Wahab's ill-judged nepotism. After 1963 his authority was further weakened by the emergence within NU of a more militant anti-communist and anti-Sukarno movement which enjoyed strong support in the party's youth and veterans' organisations. Whilst the Wahab- Idham group within the party's central leadership continued the policy of accommodation, the militants mounted a campaign of direct opposition to PKI activities and the leftwards drift of Indonesian politics under guided democracy. This campaign included mobilising NU members to physically resist the PKI's unilateral land reform offensive in 1964 and joining with the army and other anti-communist groups in eliminating, by mass execution and detention, the PKI following the 1965 coup attempt. Wahab played only an incidental role in these activities. Although he was briefed about the militants' activities and occasionally asked to approve them formally, he had little direct input into their planning or decision-making. In the immediate aftermath of the 1965 attempted coup, for example, it was the younger leaders such as Subchan Z.E., Jusuf Hasjim, Zamroni, Moenaser and Chalid Mawardi who took the initiative in formulating NU's staunchly anti-PKI stance. Wahab went along with the policy of denouncing the PKI but his appeals for caution and attempts to defend Sukarno did little to dampen the fervour of the militants.94 The nadir of his long career came during the 24th NU Congress held in Bandung in July 1967. Wahab's support base within the party was crumbling with many delegates believing that he was no longer capable or politically acceptable as rais am. Now in his eighties Wahab was stricken with blindness and several other ailments which severely hampered his movements. Moreover, at a time when NU was keen to demonstrate its repudiation of the old guided democracy regime and endorsement of General Suharto's 'New Order', Wahab's leadership had become anachronistic. No other NU leader had been more closely associated with Sukarno or more identified with guided democracy. Anti-Wahab sentiment was further inflamed by his clumsy attempts prior to the congress to suspend Subchan in order to improve the prospects of Sjaichu and Idham.95 In the subsequent ballot to elect the rais am, Bisri Syansuri received a clear majority of the votes. He refused, however, to accept the position whilst his friend and brother-in-law remained alive. The congress was forced, by default, to reappoint Wahab, though he now bore the indignity of being the first incumbent president of NU to lose an election ballot.96 Most of Wahab's last years were spent quietly at Tambakberas. Effective leadership of NU fell increasingly to Bisri Syansuri and Idham Chalid. In December 1971 Wahab, despite being gravely ill, attended his 25th and final NU congress in Surabaya. Although too sick to deliver his presidential address or take much part in proceedings he was re-elected rais am by acclamation. He died at Jombang on 29 December, four days after the congress closed.97 Conclusion Wahab Chasbullah's influence upon Indonesian Islam and politics was considerable. For almost 50 years he served as a pivotal figure in the defence, organisation and political development of traditionalist Islam. This began in the late 1910s with his involvement in the founding of Taswirul Afkar, Nahdlatul Wathan, and Nahdlatul Tujar, and continued in the early 1920s when he rose to national prominence as an advocate of traditionalist values and interests at Al-Islam congresses and public meetings. The high point of his early career was his central role in the establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926, which soon became the main representative body for traditionalist Muslims. His involvement in the forming of MIAI eleven years later is also noteworthy. But his period of greatest power came during the 1950s when, as rais am, he led NU from Masyumi and oversaw its transformation from a small and hesitant opposition party into the largest, most politically secure Islamic party in Indonesia. The success of the party was in no small measure due to Wahab's ability to steer it towards a pragmatic and accommodatory course from which it could enter the political mainstream. Judgements about the moral and qualitative aspects of Wahab's career will depend upon the normative criteria used. He was, above all else, an arch-traditionalist with a deep commitment to fostering and developing traditional Islam in order to ensure its place in a rapidly changing society and state His willingness to subordinate principles of Islamic solidarity and liberal democracy to the interests of traditionalist advancement has been much criticised as also has his dubious business practices, his nepotism and autocratic and domineering manner. For his detractors, they are evidence of an unscrupulous, intellectually narrow and self-interested personality. Despite the validity of some of these criticisms, they should not overshadow the magnitude of Wahab's achievements; no other Person has been so influential in shaping traditionalist responses to a variety of challenges over such a long period of time. Wahab Chasbullah deserves to be regarded as the most significant traditionalist Islamic leader in Indonesia this century. detractors, they are evidence of an unscrupulous, intellectually narrow and self-interested personality. Despite the validity of some of these criticisms, they should not overshadow the magnitude of Wahab's achievements; no other person has been so influential in shaping traditionalist responses to a variety of challenges over such a long period of time. Wahab Chasbullah deserves to be regarded as the most significant traditionalist Islamic leader in Indonesia this century. ***** 78 NU was by no means unique in using government to expand its patronage networks. Most parties from the time of this Ali cabinet engaged in the practice to some degree, with the PNI the most notorious exponent. 79 Feith, pp.434-35. Masyumi gained 20.9% of the vote and 57 seats I" 1956, NU's numbers in parliament rose to 47 when two Chinese minority representatives, Tan Eng Hong and Tan Kiem Liong (later Mohammad Hasan), joined the NU faction. 80 Interview with KH Idham Chalid, Jakarta, 15 June 1992. 81 These stories often focused on the special relationship which was said to exist between Wahab and God. His knowledge was claimed to have been received directly from God (laduni) rather than acquired by learning. He was also said to have gained divine guidance through istikharah, a Special prayer seeking God's help in deciding how best to resolve intractable problems. Other stories told of his magical powers, including the ability to be in several places simultaneously as well as make himself and others invisible. 82 Dachlan's relations with Wahab had often been strained. His strict adherence to official procedures and party regulations frustrated Wahab end others who usually relied upon informal networks within the organisation. He was also one of the few NU executives prepared to query openly Wahab's actions. Consequently, prior to the Medan congress Wahab sanctioned a campaign by Idham's supporters to remove Dachlan. Interviews with Nuddin Lubis, Jakarta, 6 December 1991 and 22 July 1992, and Achmad Sjahri, Bekasi, 15 January 1992. 83 Wahib was the focus of much of this disquiet. Most observers believed he lacked the judgement and diligence to hold the high political office which his father sought to obtain for him. His subsequent appointment as Minister of Civilian-Military Cooperation in 1957 and then Minister of Religious Affairs two years later dismayed many sections of the party. Sjaichu was a more able leader than his step-brother, though his aloof manner and reported collaboration with the Dutch in Surabaya during the Revolution hindered his acceptance within the party. He became leader of NU's parliamentary faction in 1957 and entered cabinet in 1963 as Deputy Speaker of the parliament. 84 The main allegations concerned three companies in which Wahab and Wahib were involved: P.T. Sri Gula, a sugar marketing firm; C.V. Kurnia, putatively a rubber exporter; and P.T. Rahmat, a small sugar processing operation. Sri Gula endeavoured (apparently unsuccessfully) to gain a partial monopoly on domestic sugar sales and Kurnia obtained a special licence (lisensi istimewa) to export rubber slabs. Both companies were backed by Chinese capital leading to charges of them being 'Ali-Baha' enterprises (a reference to the practice of pribumi Indonesians fronting Chinese businesses). See, for example, Indonesia Raya, 11, 20 and 27July and 28 August 1956. Also interviews with Hamid Baidowi Jakarta, 12 July 1992 and Nuddin Lubis, Jakarta, 17 July 1992. 85 According t, Aboebakar (PP 125-6) by the mid-1950s Wahab had Sixteen children. 86 Abadi, 12 April 1957; Sin Po, 17 April 1957; and interview with KH Idham Chalid, Jakarta, 15 June 1992. 87 Siaran ke-V, PBNU, 14 April 1957, pp. 4-5, Koleksi Nahdlatul Ulama, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta Selatan (hereafter refered to as AN), folder no.158. 88 See Keputusan P.B. Sjuriah, 25 April 1960, reprinted in Laporan Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (Reports to the 1962 NU Congress in Solo), December 1962, lampiran 8, AN 3. For reports of the debate within the Syuriah see Mimbar Umum, 29 April 1960, and 21 and 24 June 1960. 89 'Putusan Sidang Pleno PBNU Tentang DPR-GR', 24 June 1960, Laporan Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, December 1962, lampiran 9, AN 3. 90 Laporan Fraksi NU, 1960, AN 260; and Mimbar Umum and Duta Masjarakat, 18 June 1960. The three nominees who refused to join the parliament were Z. Arifin Tanamas, Jusuf Hasjim and Mohammad Dachlan. 91 The best example of this was NU's refusal in 1959 to support the return of the 1945 Constitution without the Jakarta Charter. Wahab had argued for passing the Constitution. 92 Wahib's questionable business dealings and marriage to a non-Muslim Chinese woman in Singapore had been a constant source of controversy during his time as a minister. That Sukarno chose to demand his resignation in 1962 may well have been partly due to deteriorating relations between the two men. According to several sources, Wahib had clashed repeatedly with Sukarno during 1961 over the issue of PKI involvement in the cabinet. Interviews with Muhammad Madchan, Jombang, 8 December 1994; and Said Hilabi, Jakarta, 6 December 1994· See also, Duta Masjarakat, 19 March 1959, 6 January 1960 and 2, 3 and 9 November 1962. 93 Saifuddin Zuhri writes candidly of Wahab's distress at his son's behaviour in Berangkat, pp. 492-5. Wahib was probably saved from serving a lengthy prison term by the intervention of Sukarno. 94 Interviews with Chalid Mawardi, Jakarta, 14 August 1991; KH Moenasir, Mojosari, 14 September 1991; Said Budairy, Jakarta, 30September 1991; KH Jusuf Hasjim, Jombang, 26 October 1991 and Jakarta, 14 July 1992. 95 Subchan's suspension was overturned by the NU board shortly before the congress started. Interviews Asnawi Latief, Jakarta, 22 July May and 29 June1967; and Allan Samson, 'Islam and Politics in Indonesia', Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1972, p. 183. 96 Aziz Masyhuri, p. 63; and interviews with Asnawi Latief, Jakarta, 25 April and 22 July 1992; KH Jusuf Hasjim, Jakarta, 14 July 1992; Nuddin Lubis, Jakarta, 29 April 1992 and 22 July 1992; and Chalid Mawardi, Jakarta, 25 February 1992. 97 Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p. 117; and Tempo, 8 January 1972.