took over role of chairman-general of the NU board for the remainder of the Occupation.50 Following the declaration of Indonesian independence in August 1945, Sukarno appointed Wahab to the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung). This was a prestigious position but one carrying little direct influence.51 Wahab's appointment did, however, indicate that he was on good terms with, and trusted by, the President. With the onset of the Indonesian Revolution Wahab became involved in the guerilla movement against the returning Dutch forces. He raised money for military equipment, addressed guerilla units and helped coordinate the recruitment and training of santri in East Java.52 Rais Am Following the death of Hasjim Asj'ari on 25 July 1947, Wahab Chasbullah, as the next most senior ulama within NU, assumed supreme leadership of the organisation. It was from this period until the early 1960s that, as rais am,53 he would dominate the organisation and greatly influence the course of its development. Before discussing his role as rais am it is necessary to examine first the internal dynamics and cleavages of NU from the late 1940s till the mid-1960s. Within NU's leadership during this period there existed what might best be termed two polarities: one of them hardline and the other pragmatic. NU leaders were orientated in various degrees towards one or other of these two 'poles' on the basis of ideology as well as ties of patronage or loyalty to a more senior kiai. The hardliners, in general, were those who favoured a firm adherence to both the letter and spirit of Islamic law. Their frame of reference was more scholastic and exclusively islamic than that of the pragmatists. They were strong supporters of the notion of an Islamic state and wanted formal recognition of the Syariah in the Indonesian Constitution. To this end they advocated the inclusion of the 1945 Jakarta Charter, which called for obligatory implementation of the Syariah for all Muslims, in the Constitution. They also placed a high value upon Islamic unity and argued that good relations with their co- religionists, whether modernist or traditionalist, should take precedence over relations with non-Muslims. An abiding anti- communism was especially evident. Other attitudes which characterised the hardliners included a disdain of politicking and its associated deal-making and compromise, a tendency towards conservatism on matters of social change, and a less syncretic approach to Islamic devotional practice. The dominant figure amongst the hardliners was Bisri Syansuri though others, such as KH Achmad Siddiq, KH Mohammad Dachlan and KH Machrus All, were also significant at various times. The pragmatic stream, by contrast, displayed a less doctrinaire approach to policy and action. Its interpretation of Islamic law was more liberal and realist than that of the hardliners, with preference frequently given to general jurisprudential maxims and precepts over more specific legal interdictions.54 Among the most commonly used precepts were amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (enjoining good and preventing evil), maslahah and mafsadah (respectively, the pursuit of benefit and avoidance of harm), and akhaffud-dararain (in essence, choosing the lesser of two risks). There is much debate amongst Muslim scholars about the meaning and realisation of these precepts but in the hands of NU's pragmatists, they became a prescription for political flexibility and expedience. In policy terms the pragmatists were more cautious on the Islamic state issue because of concerns about alienating non-Muslim Indonesians and doubts that it would necessarily result in a more Islamic society. They were also far less concerned about maintaining solidarity with modernist Muslims, and indeed, often regarded the latter as rivals for the leadership of the umat. On many issues, they were closer to the nationalists, particularly those of more moderate persuasion, than to modernist Muslims, and their attitudes towards left-wing groups tended to be more tolerant. Wahab Chasbullah was the pre-eminent Pragmatist in NU's leadership. This was especially evident in his political outlook. He had little interest in elaborate or abstract political theories; politics, for him, was ultimately about the pursuit and use of power. He believed the best way for NU to protect and advance the interests of Islam and the community of believers was to secure a share of political power. In post-independence Indonesia, this effectively meant having influence within the government and legislature. The greater the number of NU ministers, bureaucrats and members of parliament, the better the organisation would be able to realise its aspirations. Wahab's views were strongly supported by many of NU's more politically-inclined leaders including Zainul Arifin, Masjkur, Idham Chalid and Saifuddin Zuhri. Despite this bipolarity within NU's leadership, the organisation's internal dynamics were remarkably fluid because of a strong preference for decision-making by consensus rather than voting. For either the hardliners or pragmatists to win on any given issue, they needed to attract the support of those board members who lacked a strong a priori commitment to a particular view. Usually, once a clear majority had been persuaded towards a certain position, the remainder of the leadership would relent without forcing a ballot. During the period in question it was Wahab and the pragmatists who were most frequently ascendant. In examining Wahab's influence Upon NU's political behaviour, particular attention will be paid to four critical events: NU's secession from Masyumi in 1952; its decision to enter the cabinets of Ali Sastroamidjojo in 1953 and Djuanda tie. Kabinet Karya) in 1957; and lastly, the decision to participate in the Gotong-Royong Parliament In 1960. In all of these issues tensions between the hardline and pragmatic elements were evident. Secession Nahdlatul Ulama's separation from Masyumi was the greatest upheaval in Islamic politics of the early 1950s. Since the latter part of the 1930s there had been substantial cooperation between modernist and traditionalist organisations, firstly through MIAI, and later, from 1943, through Masyumi. The subsequent re-emergence of animosity between the two streams had long-term consequences for the dynamics of Indonesian politics. Aspects of the secession will be examined in some detail as they reveal much about Wahab's influence on events, his leadership style, and his outlook. The origins of the NU-Masyumi split can be traced to the 1949 Masyumi congress in Yogyakarta. A new generation of modernists under the leadership Mohammad Natsir won control of the Masyumi board and the party's rules were changed to limit the influence of the Majlis Syuro (Religious Advisory Council) which was chaired by Wahab Chasbullah and dominated by NU ulama. The political competence of traditionalist kiai was also ridiculed by modernist speakers leading to a walkout by NU delegates.55 Such was the anger at the perceived anti- traditionalist trend within Masyumi that at the next NU congress, held in Jakarta in April 1950, sections of the organisation proposed that it withdraw from the party. Foremost among the pro-secessionists was Wahab, who viewed Masyumi's actions as not only an attempt to marginalise NU, but also a personal affront to his authority as chairman of the Majlis Syuro. As in the 1920s he set about rallying traditionalist Muslims to confront the modernist challenge. He told NU delegates that if Masyumi was unwilling to agree to a more equitable share of power between the party's main member organisations and restore the powers of the Majlis Syuro, then NU should disaffiliate and establish its own political party. He was sanguine about NU's prospects outside Masyumi, and in a typically blunt and hortatory address to the NU congress, his first as rais am, he reproached colleagues who expressed misgivings about secession. There are many NU leaders in the provinces and also in the centre who are not convinced of NU's strength; they are more convinced of the power of other groups. These people are influenced by the whispers of other people who spread propaganda... NU's strength is like a cannon... [Yet] that propaganda makes the hearts [of NU leaders] shake as if their weapon is not a cannon, but only...a gelugu or coconut branch acting as a fake cannon...! The foolish (tolol) NU leaders aren't aware that this is the tactic of opponents to bring down NU by means of making its leaders doubtful d their own power.56 Despite support for the secession proposal, no formal decision was taken on the matter. The NU leadership was, however, instructed to negotiate with Masyumi regarding organisational reform of the party.57 Tensions continued to simmer over the next two years as the Masyumi board repeatedly rejected NU's demands. It was the refusal of the Masyumi board in February 1952 to nominate an NU member to the new cabinet which brought NU to the brink of disaffiliation.58 NU had expected to retain the Religious Affairs portfolio, a position it had held in the last two cabinets. Loss of this department, which had become NU's only stronghold in the bureaucracy and an important source of patronage, would have been a major blow. There was widespread anger and disillusionment within the organisation over Masyumi's actions. Wahab was especially incensed and resolved that if the Masyumi board could not be forced to back down and endorse an NU nominee to the ministry then NU would split from the party. From late February until early May he conducted an audacious campaign to achieve this end. His demands were served upon the Masyumi board in a series of three personal letters sent between 8 and 20 March. In the first of these he demanded, without the knowledge or approval of the NU board, the Religious Affairs and Defence portfolios for NU.59 He also released the letter to the press, thereby gravely undermining Masyumi's position in the delicately balanced negotiations over cabinet posts.60 His actions infuriated the Masyumi board. In his second letter, on 15 March, Wahab called for President Sukarno to be directly involved in the allocation of portfolios and vented, in notably forthright terms, his own displeasure at being excluded from day-to-day political decision-making within Masyumi. He complained about 'various doors being jammed shut', and gave notice that he would 'pound on them' to test if they would open. His closing sentence stated: 'As a final warning, if it is evident that my pounding continues unheeded, then believe me, we will both soon see what happens'.61 In the final letter he gave Masyumi a two-day deadline to reverse their decision before NU would reconsider its membership of the party. This letter was accompanied by a statement from the NU board formally supporting, for the first time, Wahab's actions.62 Aside from his correspondence with Masyumi he also met and canvassed NU's options with other political leaders, the most notable of whom was President Sukarno who shared Wahab's strong dislike for the Natsir group.63 The breakdown in NU-Masyumi relations entered a terminal phase in late March. At a meeting with the Masyumi board on 23 March Wahab declared that his demands were an 'absolute condition' for any further negotiation and 'NU would struggle by itself if they were not acceded to. The board, irked by Wahab's ultimatums and politicking, rejected his conditions. He responded by immediately disclosing his correspondence and failed negotiations with Masyumi to the cabinet formateur, PNI's Wilopo, in the vain hope of securing the last-minute inclusion of an NU member. After learning of his actions an exasperated Masyumi board formally nominated Muhammadiyah's Fakih Usman as Minister of Religious Affairs on 26 March.64 Having brought NU to the threshold of secession Wahab and his supporters still faced the task of convincing the organisation to take the next step and transform itself into an independent political party. Despite widespread anti-1Masyumi sentiment within NU, many members were apprehensive about being seen to divide the umat. There was also concern about NU's potential to be a viable party given its ramshackle organisational structure and lack of cadre with sufficient educational and administrative experience. Wahab displayed no such doubts. For example, when a Masyumi leader asked sarcastically how many lawyers, engineers and doctors there were within NU, he replied in typical homespun fashion: If I buy a new car the salesman doesn't ask 'Sir, can you drive?' Such a question is unnecessary because if I can't drive a car I can post an advertisement: 'Driver Wanted'. Without doubt there will soon be a queue of candidates in front of my door.65 In other words, once NU had its own political vehicle, the necessary expert personnel could be hired or coopted. The final decision regarding disaffiliation was taken at the NU congress in Palembang which began on 26 April 1952. There was heated debate on the issue with a vocal minority of delegates resisting the board's attempts to achieve unanimous approval for departing from Masyumi.66 According to an eye-witness account, at one point in the debate several leaders appeared to be wavering in their resolve so Wahab took the podium and declared: If you really doubt the stand we are taking, you are welcome to continue within Masyumi. Let me lead NU by myself as a political party separate from Masyumi. I only ask to be accompanied by just one young person---one is enough--as my secretary. Later you will see [what happens].67 Eventually the congress agreed to a formula which resulted in NU's official withdrawal from Masyumi on 1 August 1952.68 At the end of that month NU effectively became a political party by joining with two smaller parties--Perti and Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia--to form the Liga Muslimin Indonesia, a loose (and largely ineffectual) federation designed to counterbalance Masyumi. NU's estrangement and eventual departure from Masyumi offers one of the best documented episodes in Wahab's career. The picture which emerges is that of a man totally convinced of the correctness of his views and prepared to adopt an 'end- justifies-the-means' approach to achieve them. He wielded his authority as rais am and NU co-founder to the full, often behaving in an autocratic and pre-emptive manner but also displaying considerable political savvy. It was these qualities and his penchant for brinksmanship which led many modernists to blame him for the rupture between NU and Masyumi. It would, however, be more accurate to describe Wahab's role as catalytic rather than causal. Had there not been a substantial groundswell of resentment against Masyumi into which he could tap, Wahab would never have been able to marshal majority support for secession. Party Consolidation and Personal Triumph The period between 1952 and 1955 was one of rapid expansion and consolidation for the new party. Having committed itself to political activity much now depended on attaining a significant share of the vote at Indonesia's first general election which was scheduled for September 1955. NU had boasted that some seventy per cent of Masyumi members were either NU members or sympathisers; it now had to attract their support.69 The three years following NU's secession were hectic for Wahab. Having played a pivotal role in NU becoming a party his own credibility was now tied to the success of NU's political venture. His responsibilities were numerous. As rais am he had to oversee the organisation's development and policy formulation.70 He began travelling regularly around the contryside mobilising support and building up the organisation's branch structure and financial base.71 As a senior member of NU's parliamentary fraction, he also figured prominently in determining party tactics and responses to pending legislation as well as negotiating with other party leaders. In addition to this, he became an increasingly important link between the President and NU. The two had enjoyed warm personal relations since at least the early 1940s. Apart from their shared experience of Surabayan life in the 1910s and 1920s, Wahab and Sukarno had many interests in common, including politics, international affairs, Javanese culture and a fascination with attractive women. After Sukarno's elevation to the presidency in 1945, Wahab became a regular visitor to the palace. His quick, earthy humour and forthright counsel on political and religious issues were, by all accounts, welcomed by Sukarno.72 With NU's emergence as an independent party the mutual benefits of close Presidential-NU relations would have been evident to both men. Sukarno sought to promote NU as a moderate Islamic alternative to Masyumi while Wahab hoped the President's support would bolster his party's prospects in a highly competitive political system. Wahab's great admiration for Sukarno's leadership qualities must also have influenced his behaviour. He believed that NU should support the President not only because of his key role in achieving Indonesia's independence but also because he remained a crucial figure in maintaining and developing a sense of national unity and purpose.73 In the middle of 1953, NU faced a new crisis in its relations with Masyumi, again over cabinet positions. The resignation of the Wilopo government in early June led to almost two months of protracted and intense discussions between various parties over the composition of a new cabinet. NU's preferred option was for a 'United Front' cabinet containing both PNI and Masyumi. Opinion within NU was divided, though, on how to proceed if these two parties refused to coalesce. The more hardline NU leaders were committed to maintaining solidarity with their fellow Muslims in Masyumi whilst the pragmatists, who remained mistrustful of that party's modernist leadership, were prepared to enter a non-Masyumi coalition with the PNI and smaller nationalist and Christian parties. Neither side commanded a majority in its own right and relied on attracting support from the sizeable 'undecided' element within the party's leadership. Initially NU aligned itself with Masyumi in the maneuvering for portfolios on the understanding that it would receive the Religious Affairs Ministry. When, however, in late July discussions between Masyumi and PNI again broke down NU began dealing directly with the formateur over positions in a non-Masyumi cabinet. President Sukarno was widely believed to have intervened in the ensuing negotiations urging NU and other smaller parties to join.74 On 30 July NU finally accepted an offer of three portfolios--those of Second Deputy Prime Minister, Religious Affairs and Agriculture--in a new cabinet to be led by PNI's Ali Sastroamidjojo. Its decision was bitterly criticised by Masyumi leaders who claimed to have received an undertaking from NU not to break ranks with their party.75 Although much of the internal politics regarding NU's decision to enter the Ali cabinet remains obscure, Wahab seems once again to have played a critical role. In the final meetings of the NU leadership to consider the party's stance on the cabinet Wahab reportedly argued emphatically for participation.76 The case put by him and his fellow pragmatists was based mainly on the jurisprudential precepts of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar and maslahah. According to this line of argument participation was justified in order, firstly, to prevent harm to the nation and its political system by breaking the long impasse in forming a new government and, secondly, to secure benefit for NU and its Muslim constituency. Regarding the latter point it was asserted that as the second largest party in government NU's ministers would be able to implement many of the party's policies and also enhance its prospects at the next election.77 This view was eventually accepted though an undertaking had to be given to hardliners that NU backing would be withdrawn if the cabinet's performance proved unsatisfactory. ******** 50 Anam, p. 123. 51 Parlaungan, p. 214. 52 Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p. 50; and interview with Hasjim Latief, Sepanjang, 11September 1991. 53 Whereas Hasjim Asj'ari had been referred to as the rais akbar, Wahab, out of deference to his predecessor and teacher took the somewhat humbler title of rais am. 54 I am indebted to Kiai Muchith Muzadi, Ali Haidar and Martin van Bruinessen for their helpful comments on differing approaches to jurisprudence within NU. 55 See Idham Chalid's account in Amak Fadhali (ed.), Partai N. U. dengan Aqidah dan Perkembangannja, Tohaputra, Semarang, 1969. p. 27. 56 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat, p. 390. 57 Saifuddin Zuhri, Kaleidoskop di Indonesia, vol. 3, Gunung Agung, Jakarta, 1981, p. 213. 58 The Masyumi board's intention was to nominate a Muhammadiyah member as Minister of Religious Affairs. This followed considerable criticism of how previous NU Ministers had handled the portfolio. The board believed that Muhammadiyah not only had superior candidates to those proposed by NU but was also entitled to demand that such an important ministry for Muslims be rotated amongst the major Islamic organisations. 59 The Political Advisory Council of the NU board was forced to issue a press statement claiming that Wahab's actions were a personal initiative and had not been discussed at a board level. Berita Indonesia, 8 March 1952; and Abadi, 10 March 1952. Wahab had also, without prior consultation, renominated Wahid Hasjim, the incumbent Minister of Religious Affairs (and his nephew by marriage). despite Wahid's firm refusal to stand again. Interviews with Solechah Hasyim Wahid Hasjim's widow), Jakarta, 19 November 1991 and Hamid Baidowi, Jakarta, 26 April 1992. 60 Buku Putih, DPP Masyumi, Jakarta, 1952, pp. 11-12. 61 Reproduced in Buku Putih, pp. 20-1. 62 Buku Putih, pp. 26-8. 63 Berita Indonesia, 1 March 1952; and Buku Putih, p. 6. 64 Buku Putih, pp. 29-32. Wahab's meeting with Wilopo also unsettled his colleagues. Wahid Hasjim wrote a personal note to Natsir regretfully informing him of his uncle's actions. His note is reprinted in ibid. p. 31-2. 65 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat, p. 399. 66 Wahab had earlier locked a reluctant NU board into accepting, in principle, secession from Masyumi and presenting this to congress for ratification. This made it far more difficult for the anti- secessionists as a failure to confirm the board's decision would be taken as repudiation of the organisation's leadership. This tactic of 'raising the stakes' for his opponents was employed on numerous occasions by Wahab during his term as rais am. Pikiran Rakjat, 8 April 1952; Haluan, 9 April 1952; and interview with KH Muchith Muzadi, Jember, 2 July 1992. 67 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat, p. 398. 68 According to several delegates at the congress, Wahab's speech failed to persuade a number of influential anti-secessionists. A compromise formula involving the establishment of a committee to negotiate with the Masyumi board over the terms of separation was only able to be struck after the intervention of Wahid Hasjim. Interviews with Nuddin Lubis, Jakarta, 17 July 1992 and KH Muslich, Jakarta, 26 September 1991. 69 See the comments of Mohammad Dachlan in Pikiran Rakjat, 5 April 1952. 70 Until his death in April 1953, Wahid Hasjim, as deputy chairman of the NU board, directly managed much of the administrative and policy work for the party. His untimely demise in a car accident robbed NU of one of its most gifted and competent leaders. 71 Amak Fadhali, PP 28-30; and interview with Idham Chalid, Jakarta, 15 2999 1992. According to Idham, he and Wahab spent most weekends from mid-1952 to 1954 visiting NU branches and pesantren. 72 Interviews with Solechah Hasyim, Jakarta, 19 November 1991; Hasib Wahab, Jombang, 28 October 1991; Hamid Baidowi, Jakarta, 17 July 1992; and Ruslan Abdulgani, Jakarta 20 July 1992. 73 Interviews with KH Muslich, Jakarta, 26 September 1991; KH Nasrulloh, Jombang, 29 October 1991; and KH Jusuf Hasjim, Jakarta, 14 July 1992. 74 This was not the first time NU had entered into direct cabinet negotiations following Masyumi's withdrawal. In the fourth week of negotiations it appeared on the verge of agreeing to a Ministry in a proposed non-Masyumi cabinet but withdrew when several other parties expressed reservations. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1962, pp. 333-4. 75 Deliar Noer, Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Nasional, Grafiti Pers, Jakarta, 1987, p. 235; and Abadi, 31 July and 3 August 1952. This claim is problematic. Noer provides no details of who gave the undertaking and there appear to be no surviving documents, official or otherwise, Which refer to it. More importantly, NU had demonstrated five weeks beforehand that it would consider participating in a non-Masyumi cabinet, so it would seem surprising if the Masyumi leadership withdrew from cabinet negotiations on the basis of this 'undertaking', as Noer asserts. 76 Noer, Partai Islam, p. 235; and field notes of Dr Herbert Feith. 77 The statement of the NU board, reprinted in Merdeka, 12 September 1953, declared that the principle of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar and Calculation of maslahah and mafsadah obliged NU to join the new cabinet, albeit without Masyumi. See also the comments of Zainul Arifin and Nur A.G.N. in Abadi, 3 and 4 August 1953; and interviews with Idham Chalid by Dien Madjid, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta Selatan, tape no.18.